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$3.50/Winter 1983

The Turmoil in Israel

JONATHAN FRANKEL

In the Labyrinth of Recession

ROBERT REICH
LESTER THUROW
GUS TYLER
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Legacies of New Deal Liberalism

THEDA SKOCPOL

From the Prisons of Poland

TWO REMARKABLE UNDERGROUND DOCUMENTS

The Black Bourgeoisie Revisited

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The Life of the Homeless

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DISSENT (ISSN 0012-3846), issued January 1, 1983, is published quarterly, winter, spring, summer, and fall, by the Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas, Inc., 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Subscriptions: $14.00 for one year; $25.00 for two years; $9.00 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add $3.00 for mailing costs per year; institutional rate $19.00 per year, $35.00 for two years, single copy $3.50. All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy, $3.50. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 155 West Fifteenth Street, New York, N.Y. 10001.

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

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WINTER 1983

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Jonathan Frankel

Israel: The War and After

Jerusalem

The electoral victory of Menachem Begin in June 1981 (however marginal in voting terms) apparently opened a new era in the history of the state of Israel. In the first Likud government, which came to office in 1977, Begin was balanced by Moshe Dayan, then foreign minister, and by Ezer Weizmann (who became ever more moderate in regard to Arab-Israeli relations), then minister of defense. Its term of office was as much a time of continuity as of change. Even more remarkable, the change meant not only greater intransigeance—as, for instance, Sharon's intensive efforts to settle Jewish colonies in the heartland of the West Bank—but also, on the southern front, moderation of the highest order. It was a government that made peace with the Egypt of Sadat a major priority despite the terrible doubt and dissension in Israel when it came to paying the inevitable price.

But, to an unusual extent, the second Likud government has proved to be monolithic. Prime Minister Begin and Minister of Defense Sharon totally dominate the Cabinet (which they often just ignore), and they have been able to rely in their most controversial moves on new Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and on Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan. Even as the final stages of the peace agreement with Egypt were being completed, this inner leadership group was systematically preparing for the war in Lebanon. In all probability, the ultimate (although by no means only) justification in their eyes for the sacrifice of Sinai was that it seemed to guarantee unfettered Israeli dominance on all other frontiers.

It is true that the Lebanon operation was presented to the Israeli public—and apparently also to the Cabinet and the opposition leadership—as limited in nature, aiming solely to establish a 25-mile *cordon sanitaire* and to bring "peace to Galilee." However, the true nature of the plans had leaked to the press and was published four months earlier. The most dramatic warning of all was probably that sounded by the military correspondent of the newspaper *Ha'aretz*, Ze'ev Schiff, on May 12 (that is, some weeks before the "Operation"):

> With regard to the war in the North [Schiff wrote] Israel is now at one minute before midnight. . . . It is not true that—as we tell the Americans—we do not want to invade Lebanon. There are influential forces, led by the minister of defense, that, with intelligence and cunning, are taking well-considered steps to reach a situation that will leave Israel with no choice but to invade Lebanon even if it were to involve a war with Syria. So long as the war has not yet broken out one must not tire of repeating this; to do otherwise would be unpatriotic.

Schiff went on to explain that the danger of war with Syria arose because the operation was not to be limited in scope but would aim, first, to "root out" the PLO utterly and, second, to make Israel the "policeman of Lebanon"—able "to decide even how the members of the Lebanese parliament vote when it comes to the election of the next Lebanese president." Schiff concluded that all this was a "trap from which it will be possible to extricate ourselves only by the skin of our teeth. Instead of gaining time and wearing down the enemy in a limited war, we shall exhaust ourselves in a big war."

It now seems that even Schiff did not describe the concept underlying the war in its full majesty. Various statements made later by the architects of the operation revealed their conviction that the physical destruction of the PLO in Lebanon would make it far easier than theretofore to impose a highly limited form of "autonomy" on the West Bank and Gaza. With the terrorists out of the way, the Arab Village Leagues would emerge as the dominant political force in the occupied areas and could be put in charge of the "autonomous" Council and other institutions.

In military terms, the war certainly proved successful enough. The PLO has been driven out of

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southern Lebanon and Beirut and, in many thousands, out of the country. The Israeli army has linked up with the areas under the control of the Christian Phalangists. Finally, the Syrian forces—left defenseless from air attack by the wholesale destruction of their Soviet-built antiaircraft missiles—suffered heavy losses on the field of battle.

In political terms, however, it seems safe even at this early stage to say that the grand design has come unraveled. The hope of establishing a stable regime in Lebanon, and of bringing the troops "home by Hanukkah" (as anticipated early in the summer) now has been dashed. Bashir Gemayel was indeed elected president, but only to be assassinated before his inauguration. And the Syrian army as well as many thousands of PLO members who remain in Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley will have to be removed from the country (by highly complicated diplomacy or much brute force) before the writ of the Lebanese government (if it can ever be effectively restored) has force throughout the country. Here, indeed, is the entanglement from which, if we escape at all, it will only be by "the skin of our teeth."

But, of course, the impact of the war on the Palestinian question has proved to be still less in accord with the original blueprint. The PLO, defeated militarily, gained unprecedented publicity during the long months of military operations, and Arafat, far from dead, moved triumphantly from one Western capital to another. Instead of giving the Likud government a free hand to push ahead with the de facto (or even de jure) annexation of the West Bank and Gaza—in exchange for services rendered in Lebanon—the Reagan administration has declared that those areas are Arab and should be linked, in a final settlement, to Jordan (Hashemite, not Palestinian). Meanwhile, there is little sign of an end to the unrest in the territories.

The debit side of the balance sheet reveals that the war has not proved cheap. As of this writing, in mid-September, some 350 Israeli soldiers have lost their lives and over 2,000 have been wounded—and that out of a Jewish population of less than 3.5 million civilians. Untold thousands of civilians, Lebanese and Palestinian, have been killed and tens of thousands rendered homeless. The financial cost of the war is now put at over $1.5 billion and is bound to go much higher before the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) can be disengaged. In Alexander Haig, the Begin government lost its best, perhaps its only, friend (apart from Reagan himself) in the American leadership. And the damage done to the image of Israel as a peace-seeking democracy will not be easily repaired.

HOW WE MIGHT ASK, could any responsible government of a small country in desperate financial straits undertake an adventure of this kind? The answer, regrettably, is very straightforward: this government is acting in a way that is neither responsible nor rational.

We are witnessing here a clear case (by no means rare in modern history, but nonetheless disturbing) of the pathology of nationalism. Nationalist movements carry within them the virus of solipsism that remains dormant only so long as the prevailing circumstances—both objective (the geopolitical environment) and subjective (the internal leadership and culture)—serve to hold it in check. The symptoms are all too familiar. In its pathological state, the nationalist vision of the world progressively narrows down toward a single dimension. All that is seen clearly is the politics of power (above all military) while the other factors that also decide the fate of states—social, economic, moral—are perceived as possessing only a secondary, shadowy existence. At the same time, in this one-dimensional world the tendency is to lose touch with everything external and to reduce reality to the national ego alone. The most crucial safety mechanism—the sense of limits—thus becomes atrophied. There remains only the "I" without the "Thou."

A long series of actions undertaken, and a much longer series of declarations made, by the second Likud government are unfortunately indicative of this syndrome. The annexation of the Golan Heights was carried through within hours on the orders of the prime minister (on the day he completed a two-week stay in the hospital) without any substantive discussion in either the Cabinet or the Knesset of its short- and long-term implications.

The decision to force the Golan Druze to accept Israeli identity cards against their will was then pushed through by the imposition of a military blockade that was maintained over a period of months. This measure (carrying the personal hallmark of Ariel Sharon) was bound to antagonize the important Druze community in Israel itself (which has supplied the IDF and the Border Police with many of its finest troops). It was also marked by actions so undemocratic in spirit—the sudden removal of all telephone communications, the exclusion of the press from the entire area, now just made part of Israel proper—that at least one respected commentator described the entire exercise as a rehearsal, whether consciously conducted or not, for a future military coup.

Even more remarkable is the belief, apparently held by members of the government leadership,

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that the problem of the Palestinian Arabs can be solved simply by a combination of strong-arm tactics and semantic exercises. More Arabs in the West Bank were shot dead by the Israeli armed forces this spring (during violent demonstrations against the new Civil Authority) than during the entire previous 15 years. As with the subsequent assault on the PLO in Lebanon, the assumption seemed to be that the Palestinians would acquiesce in government plans once they were no longer intimidated by the PLO terrorists. And beyond this is the idea, constantly reiterated by Sharon and Shamir, that Jordan is the state of the Palestinians and that the Western Land of Israel (as they call the area from the river to the sea) is all Jewish.

The fact that (leaving Lebanon aside) almost 2 million Arabs are under Israeli rule—the great majority under military occupation—is treated as a matter of marginal significance, as is the fact that Jews form less than 2 percent of the population of the occupied territories. The Jewish people have the "right" to Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; the Arabs have their own state elsewhere; and so this is a problem of only minor dimensions to be solved by an "autonomy" of commensurate scale. That such an attitude is opposed to fundamental principles of democracy and that the permanent subjugation of so relatively large a population is steadily corroding the moral fiber of the nation seems to mean nothing to men who think in terms of frontiers, national symbols, and ancestral rights alone. (All this, of course, is so out of tune with the postcolonial era that, naturally, there is the suspicion that what the leaders really see as the long-term solution is the expulsion of the indigenous Arab population. But given the anachronistic nature of Begin's world view, this is not necessarily the case as far as he personally is concerned.)

The more the government falls out of step with the educated strata at home and the Western democracies abroad, the angrier its rhetoric becomes. There is hardly a Western leader of note (Margaret Thatcher, Schmidt, Mitterrand, Weinberger and, by implication, Reagan himself) who has not come under blistering attack from the prime minister, and the underlying theme throughout is that the critics from abroad are motivated by anti-Semitism and represent nations guilty (directly or indirectly) of the Holocaust.

The domestic opposition, in turn, is accused by the government of a lack of loyalty bordering on treason. And there are clear signs that the existence of a truly free press, which remains stolidly, even heroically, resistant to the regime's political neuroses, is becoming an ever greater irritant to the Likud leadership. Thus an editorial in *Ha'aretz* reeled off the following complaints made by an emergency meeting of the Israeli Association of Journalists in mid-September:

> The closure to journalists of areas in the Golan Heights, Yamit, and South Lebanon; the withholding of information from military correspondents . . .; incitement against the free press which the Minister of Defense has called "poison"; purges among staff of the Army radio station; . . . attempts to use the military censorship for political ends. . . .
>
> Nobody [it concluded] is arguing that the regime has already succeeded in destroying free speech and the freedom of the press—but the public should be warned while the foundations of freedom are being destroyed—not afterward.

So a vicious circle builds up in which irrationality produces resistance; resistance feeds paranoia; and paranoia encourages a Manichean outlook in which everything that is not white is black; everybody who is not for is against; and the choice is between all and nothing.

WHAT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE for a government of this type to come to power, act in this way and retain—and actually increase—its popularity? Although there can be no easy response to such fundamental questions, there is room here to offer some tentative and provisional answers.

First, of course, there is no escaping the contingent, the personal factor. Eitan, after all, was appointed not by Sharon but by Weizmann. And, for his part, Begin hesitated for over a year before deciding to make Sharon the minister of defense. But, be that as it may, it followed that once the four leaders were in control of the state, they would inevitably urge each other on toward maximalist tactics and strategies.

As their biographies show, they represent two separate strands of extremism that run throughout the history of modern Zionism. Begin and Shamir grew up in the Revisionist movement in interwar Poland, and their unyielding attitude to historical frontiers probably owes as much to the tradition of Polish nationalism as to Jabotinsky. After all, there was perhaps no other nationalist movement in East Central Europe that assigned so little importance to ethnic and so much to historical boundaries. And interwar Poland was almost torn apart by the fact that about one-third of its population was made up of non-Poles. In Palestine, Begin became head of the Irgun and Shamir a leading member of Lehi (often called the Stern Gang), two organizations that, whatever their merits, were hardly schools in the art of the measured response or the broad view.

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For their part, Sharon and Eitan are products of the labor movement, both born and bred on moshavim. The moshav movement of cooperative settlements of small-holding farms is associated with the most nationalist wing of the Labor Alignment, perhaps because of the narrow horizons that are historically a concomitant of small-scale farming. Eitan is still a member of his native moshav village, Tel Adashim, which was founded some 70 years ago by members of the Hashomer (The Guard). In its early days, members of Hashomer spoke often of establishing a Jewish version of the Cossack *sech* in Palestine. And Eitan—even more Sharon—can best be understood as the fulfillment of this old dream: the Jewish Cossack who would fear nothing and live dangerously. They are both ex-paratroopers, brave and hardened soldiers, whose whole lives, until recently, were lived on the battlefield. And both share the simplistic belief that the other side understands force alone and that there is, therefore, no point in a territorial compromise on the eastern fronts, for anyway the winner takes all.

In sum, this Likud leadership combines within itself the rhetoric and ideological maximalism of the right-wing Revisionist movement with the practical energy and concerns for results characteristic of Israel's Labor tradition. It would be hard, in Israeli terms, to imagine an explosive mix of greater force than this.

But, of course, below the level of personalities, profound political and social factors have combined to make real what even ten years ago would have seemed to most observers simply impossible. It was the failure of the previous political elite over an entire decade to tackle the basic issues of war and peace, which—together with major changes in the sociodemographic structure of the electorate—permitted Menachem Begin to establish himself as a charismatic leader acting in symbiotic relationship with a very large section of the people.

THE SWIFT AND TOTAL VICTORY in the Six-Day War proved the undoing of the Labor party. It was not that the Labor leaders in the face of that military triumph lost their sense of responsibility or their sense of danger. Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin each in their own way were cautious and thoughtful, endowed with a strong sense of "the other" and of Israel's ultimate vulnerability. The instincts of the gambler were quite alien to them. This was much less true of Dayan and Allon, but they too were possessed of a very healthy respect for the jungle that is the Middle East and the world at large.

Ben-Gurion on Peace

The following is taken from an interview with David Ben-Gurion, first Premier of Israel, which was conducted by John M. Roots and appeared in the New York Times *on February 8, 1975, after Ben-Gurion's death:*

"First," he stated firmly, "never forget that *historically* this country belongs to *two* races—the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews of the world—each of whom, first the Jews and then the Arabs, have controlled it for some 1,300 years apiece.

"Second, remember the Arabs drastically outbreed us, and that to insure survival a Jewish state must at all times maintain within her own borders an unassailable Jewish majority.

"Third, the logic of all this is that to get peace, we *must* return in principle to the pre-1967 borders. We simply haven't the available Jews to populate all Biblical Palestine. So when I consider the future of Israel, I only consider the country before the six-day war. We should return all gains except East Jerusalem and the Golan. And on these we must negotiate."

"All gains?" I asked incredulously.

"Certainly. Except for East Jerusalem for history, and the Golan for security—and considering the strength of Arab sentiment, some degree of accommodation will be necessary even here. As for Sinai, Sharm el Sheik, Gaza, the West Bank—let them go! Peace is more important than real estate. With proper irrigation we now have quite enough land here in the Negev to care for all the Jews in the world—*if* they come. And they certainly will not all come.

"As for security, militarily defensible borders, while desirable, cannot by themselves guarantee our future. Some sections of our people still have not learned this lesson. *Real* peace with our Arab neighbors; mutual respect and even affection; perhaps an Arab-Israeli alliance; in any case a settlement they will not reluctantly agree to live with, but will enthusiastically welcome from their hearts as essential for our common future—that is our only *true* security. . . ." □

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Their problem was different. The tradition of the Labor movement throughout its history since the turn of the century was to push to the very limits of what was both possible and reasonably safe. When it came to it, Mapai supported partition plans in 1938 and again in 1947; the reality of partition in 1949; and military withdrawal from the territory of neighboring states in 1949 and 1956. Moreover, Labor adopted the principle of self-limitation, *havlaga*, when it came to taking military action against Arab violence in the final years of the Mandate. However, these steps were not only opposed by the Revisionist wing of the Zionist movement—which denounced them as treasonable—but also by important groups within the Labor movement itself. And Ben Gurion, for his part, in order to neutralize this opposition, nearly always preferred to present partition and compromise not as a matter of principle—the price to be paid for an almost mononational state and, ultimately, for peaceful coexistence—but as a recognition of *force majeure*, as a concession to Great Power diktat or military imperatives. When, finally, Labor could no longer rely on intractable circumstances to justify flexibility, it proved incapable of practicing that self-limitation. A movement that had developed all the instincts necessary to survive as underdog could not adjust to the much more complex role that comes with the possession of real power.

In 1967, Israel for the very first time had attained the status of a truly sovereign state in the sense that it was now called upon to decide on an order of priorities, to make fundamental choices, and to pay the necessary price. Clearly, as Abba Eban declared right after the Six-Day War, what was needed was "magnanimity," the readiness to exchange the territories (or the great bulk of them, at least) for peace with ironclad guarantees of security. But a movement that had always conceded only in the face of perceived necessity was now paralyzed by having to do so as an act of free will. Perhaps all this can best be understood as a subconscious rebellion by the Jews, who had not known power for almost 2,000 years, against the fact that now they were the masters in their own house, free to make or break themselves, and could no longer slough political responsibility, and blame, onto others.

Labor did not take Eban's advice, preferring Dayan's policy of immobilism—"waiting for the telephone call from Hussein"—and ultimately Allon's plan to settle a very extensive security zone in the West Bank. These policies ensured that so long as Labor was in office it held on to the occupied territories, rather as the British had come to Empire, "in a fit of absentmindedness."

In seeking throughout to gain time and defer decision, Labor blithely played into the hands of the right. Every new settlement established on the West Bank and the Golan Heights lent plausibility to Begin's claim that Labor was no readier than the Likud (or Gahal, which it was in 1967) to make the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement; and that in essence there was no longer any difference on this issue between the two movements.

But matters went beyond this. Labor allowed itself to be maneuvered into providing its bitterest enemies with massive support—and legitimacy—as when it built the new town Kiryat Arba as a suburb of Hebron for Rabbi Moses Levinger (later the mentor of Gush Emunim). And, naturally enough, in their great majority the colonists, planted by Labor, are as opposed to its platform of "territorial compromise" with Jordan as the Algerian "colons" were to the de Gaulle of the withdrawal era. Even more important, perhaps, every passing year added to the number of citizens who could remember no other frontiers than those of post-1967 and could barely imagine a situation in which Israel could survive if Hebron and Nablus were to revert to Arab rule.

Meanwhile, on a totally different level, the demographic tide within the Israeli population was flowing inexorably against Labor. The percentage of Oriental, particularly Moroccan, Jews in the electorate was rising steadily and carrying more and more voters into the camp of the Likud. Extreme nationalism, historians usually agree, has a powerful attraction for a lower middle class caught in the throes of accelerated modernization, especially if the lower class is of different ethnic origin—and, of course, since 1967 cheap Arab labor has become of central importance in Israeli society. To this must be added the fact that in their countries of origin, the Oriental Jews were treated very much as second-class citizens and they do not see any reason why this hierarchical system should be changed just because the roles have been reversed. Again, in the main, they, unlike the European Jews, understand Arabic, listen to broadcasts or watch television from across the frontiers, and are naturally both frightened and embittered by the depths of hostility they so often encounter.

The rapport that Begin has established with a majority of the Oriental Jews is extraordinary. A Polish Jew (in style, a Polish *pan*) enjoys a magnetic hold on this audience. But the influence flows in both directions. The crowds—and the knowledge that the crowd is always there, if not in the public

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squares then before the television screen—lift Begin to ever new heights of theatricality and daring. They share, it seems, the same resentment of the "goyim" who are always ready to do down the Jew, the same need to proclaim pride in one's own and angry scorn for those who dissent. The leader inspires but, in turn, is inspired. He knows that every extravagant demonstration of force he makes will be welcomed—and, if he had any doubts, the opinion polls time and again prove that this is indeed the case.

IS THERE ANY WAY in which this process can be halted in the foreseeable future? So long as Begin leads the Likud and Peres Labor, as the economy escapes visible catastrophe, and the army marches on, the answer must surely be negative. But, conversely, a radical change on one or more of these levels could, perhaps, start a reverse reaction. Navon as leader of Labor could conceivably give even Begin a good run for his money, because in his own totally different style he too can talk to the "people." And it should not be forgotten that, for all the intoxication with nationalist rhetoric, the polls also show that at least half the public consistently supports the idea of territorial compromise with Jordan or the Palestinians. A recent survey published in the newspaper *Yediot Ahronot* indicated further that moderate opinion on this issue has increased significantly since the Lebanese War, presumably because with the PLO removed, people are now much less afraid. This survey's findings, for what they are worth, showed that 39 percent favor annexation of the territories, another 39 percent want "territorial compromise"; 11 percent are willing to accept a Palestinian state. Of course, elections are not referenda, and Labor would be rash to build its hopes on such findings. Moreover, given the exigencies imposed by the coalition system, even a government led by Labor (much chastened, one hopes) would be hard put to do more than freeze most of the settlement activity and seek better relations with Jordan, Egypt, and the Arabs in the area.

It is thus hard to escape the conclusion that nothing short of some major setback in the economic, military, or diplomatic sphere could pave the way to a comprehensive settlement, for it seems that the sense of limits can only be restored when the national ego is brought up short by an immovable reality. But, in such a case, there is always the danger that the cure could prove even more dangerous to the survival of Israel than the disease itself. Meanwhile, moderates have to wait, like Micawber, for "something to turn up." □

After the Massacre

October 25, 1982

THE ABOVE was completed on Friday, September 17, the eve of the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashana), at a time when, unbeknown to us in Jerusalem, Phalange troops were shooting down hundreds of men, women, and children in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila (both in areas of Beirut then occupied by Israel). On Sunday, the second day of Rosh Hashana, the first protest demonstrations were organized (primarily by the Peace Now movement) in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Rosh Hanikra, and on the coast road. I was among the approximately 1,000 people who gathered to protest near the prime minister's home and were dispersed when the police fired tear gas into the crowd. On the following Monday, I began a period of 30 days' army reserve duty in Lebanon and now, with that behind me, I find myself asking what, if anything, has changed as the result of the massacre and the extraordinary furor it unleashed here in Israel.

Clearly, any answer at this stage must be preliminary, if only because the official inquiry commission has just begun its investigation and will not issue its findings for months. But it can already be said with some confidence that there has been a fundamental split between the articulate and the inarticulate reactions; and that the massacres made a far greater impact on the "formal" political world—the government, the Knesset, the media—than on the mass of the people, the "silent majority."

During the ten-day period between the New Year and the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), there was an unprecedented outpouring of anguish and protest. The government's initial refusal to contemplate even the possibility of Israeli error and its insistence on terming every such idea a "blood libel" only added fuel to the flames. Hardly a voice was raised in its defense. The influential evening newspapers *Ma'ariv* and *Yediot Ahronot* (which usually tend to support the Likud) as well as the state-owned television all carried masses of the most deadly criticism of Begin and, above all, of Sharon. Another remarkable development was the sudden appearance of Orthodox (religiously observant) Jews in the front ranks of the protest movement. Their numbers remained small, but the forms of action they chose—street readings from Torah scrolls, for example—lent weight to the widespread feeling that this great movement suddenly taking shape was a manifestation of the mass

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repentance (tshuva) traditionally associated with the period leading up to Yom Kippur. For once, the opposition was the beneficiary of powerful forces welling up from the depths of the national psyche.

The upsurge of anger culminated in the demonstration estimated at 400,000 held in Tel Aviv on Saturday night, September 25 (significantly, well after the termination of the Sabbath). Never before had Israel seen a political demonstration on this scale; and indeed it seems improbable that there is any precedent elsewhere for such a protest by perhaps 10 percent of the total population.

This pressure (supplemented, of course, by reactions abroad, including those of Diaspora Jewry) inevitably shook the stability of the government. One of the liberal ministers, Yitzhak Berman, resigned and at least three other members of the Cabinet (including the two from the National Religious party) threatened to do so. The prime minister and the minister of defense found themselves with no choice but to agree to a full-scale judicial inquiry commission.

The casual observer of the Israeli political scene could be forgiven for concluding that no government could long survive in so hostile a political environment. But this would be a profound misreading of reality. The protest movement represented not the exposed tip but almost the entire bulk of the iceberg—while another, separate, and larger iceberg remained intact, albeit submerged. Supporters of the Likud were dismayed by the turn of events in Lebanon and were unable to produce a coherent response. But, for the most part, they did not blame the government. On the contrary, the bitter resentment against an opposition that chose to criticize the authorities in wartime was now further deepened despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that it found almost no open or articulate expression.

At no time since the establishment of the state has there been so much discussion of the idea that the Jewish population of Israel is sharply divided into two cultures or, *pace* Disraeli, two nations. This thesis must undoubtedly be granted great weight so long as it is understood that the basic divide runs primarily not along the lines of ethnicity (Oriental versus Western Jews); age (the young versus the rest); or class (lower versus higher income)—even though all these factors are most significant—but rather along that of cultural-political attitudes. Both camps, after all, draw their support from all ethnic, age, and class groups, albeit in markedly differing proportions.

Those who support Begin and Sharon generally hold with the axiom: "When in Rome, do as Romans do." And they are profoundly convinced that in order to survive in the Middle East, there is no choice but to act with something like the ruthlessness characteristic of inter-Arab politics. Time and again, one hears from the average Begin supporter the argument (irrefutable in its own terms) that whatever Israel has done to the Arabs pales into insignificance compared with what they would do to the Jews if the tables were ever turned. And this is seen as a conclusive justification for almost any act of coercion or violence.

On the other side, the standard of reference is drawn from the political norms (rather than necessarily from the realities) prevailing in the Western democracies. Hence what is seen as normal and necessary in the one political culture—perpetual military rule in the occupied territories, ferocious bombings of Beirut—is seen in the other camp as an intolerable defilement of deeply cherished ideals, blows at the very *raison d'être* of the state.

According to the polls, there was a sharp drop in support for Begin and Sharon between the beginning and the end of September—a drop of about 15 percent. Nonetheless, they still retain the confidence of well over 50 percent of the electorate while, in contrast, Shimon Peres has gained no significant support and is regarded by less than 5 percent of the population as its first choice for prime minister.

All this means, paradoxically, that Labor is now seeking to form a government within the framework of the present Knesset. It hopes that the religious "swing parties"—Aguda and the National Religious party—will decide out of desperation to bring down Begin and elevate Peres to the premiership. And, in contrast, Begin's main political weapon today is his ability to threaten both his coalition partners and the opposition with early elections. To cap it all, given the prevailing legal status, the prime minister can only dissolve the Knesset if a majority of its members votes to endorse such a step—a factor that again places enormous power in the hands of Aguda and the NRP. Thus the final irony is that Labor talks about the need for elections but, in fact, has every reason to fear them.

This delicately balanced and Byzantine complex of forces could easily be blown apart when the Judicial Inquiry Commission issues its report, commonly described here as a time bomb. What is far less clear is whom the explosion will damage most. Will Begin try to save his government by sacrificing Sharon? Or will they stand—and not necessarily fall—together? And if Peres does form a government without new elections, will the trappings of

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power restore to Labor some of its former prestige? Or rather, and much more probably, will not such a development be taken by the majority of the electorate as yet another proof of perfidy?

President Navon reacted immediately to the massacre by issuing an eloquent call for a full inquiry, declaring it essential to safeguard the national honor and public morale. This was a bold, highly unusual move; and according to the opinion polls, support for him as a potential prime minister rose during September from under 5 to nearly 15 percent. Navon completes his five-year term as president in May 1983; and the view is heard ever more often that he, and he alone, could subsequently lead Labor to electoral victory.

Against Begin's divisive exploitation of one powerful myth—Greater Israel (*Eretz Yisrael*, "the Land of Israel")—Navon can oppose others perhaps more powerful: the idea of Jewish unity, of reconciliation ("*kol yisrael chaverim*") or the vision of peace. On the political stage of contemporary Israel he alone could conceivably carry this off. The Likud would therefore happily reelect him for another five years as president in order to keep him out of politics. Will this *deus ex machina* really be prepared to step down from Olympus? □

Takeover on the West Bank

The following paragraphs are excerpted from a lengthy report by Jerusalem Post *correspondent* David Richardson *of a conversation with* Meron Benvenisti, *former deputy mayor of Jerusalem and a leading Israeli demographer. The full text appeared in the September 10, 1982 issue of the* Jerusalem Post, *with whose permission these excerpts are reprinted.*—Eds.

Benvenisti stresses [that] it's not so much the number of settlements as the type of settlement that is the most significant factor. . . .

During the period of the Labor government the concept of settlement dictated the building of kibbutzim and moshavim, which meant that arable land had to be found for agriculture. Now, under the Likud and their settlement vanguard, Gush Emunim, the emphasis is on urban settlement—dormitories for Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

For this form of settlement arable land is unimportant—bulldozers and dynamite can prepare the most unsuitable terrain for vast building schemes, such as those now in progress in the West Bank, which are rapidly changing the face of the West Bank and of Israel. They make territorial compromise almost impossible for any mainstream Israeli political party.

The current budget for development and building on the West Bank is $100 million, according to Benvenisti's estimates. He bases his figures on the published budgets of the various government ministries and notes that half of this sum has been allocated to the Housing Ministry for building and infrastructure; the next largest slice, some $31 million, is being spent by the Agriculture Ministry.

An often-heard argument is that there are not enough people to move into the new bedroom communities and settlements. But the housing fair in Jerusalem . . . provided evidence to the contrary. Scores if not hundreds of young couples are only too willing to accept the highly attractive terms being offered by construction companies. . . .

The contractors are able to offer apartments at a far lower price than housing inside Israel proper, since the government provides all the infrastructure and basic services free. Prices of housing in the territories are accordingly between one-third and one-half of what they would otherwise be.

Financing a dream home in Judea and Samaria is also an attractive proposition. Up to 80 percent can be arranged in long-term loans, some of which are on a never-never basis—as long as one lives there, the loan does not have to be repaid. . . .

The quality of life and level of services provided in these suburbs will be higher than in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv and environs.

One can now be a pioneer without risk and a speculator without embarrassment, making full use of all of the government incentives to settle Judea and Samaria. . . .

At the current rate of building, 3,000 apartments

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a year are becoming available.... Seeing that 25,000 Jews already live in the West Bank, one can predict that at the present rate of development there will be 100,000 there by 1986.

The social and urban implications of this flow of young couples into the territories mean that the cities are weakened, Benvenisti says. But more significant is the creation of a political lobby that can effectively tie the hands of any major political party in Israel. Can any party afford to ignore 100,000 people? "Political opinions aside, one has to admit that socioeconomically Ma'aleh Adumim, for instance, is an integral, organic part of Jerusalem," Benvenisti adds....

BENVENISTI'S FINDINGS show that, contrary to expectations, the Jews in Israel are increasing at a faster rate than the Arabs in the West Bank. Population growth in Israel is consistent at some 2.3 percent per annum; that of Israeli Arabs is much higher—3.9 percent; but the population of the West Bank grows at 1.4 percent per annum. The large gap is explained by the high rate of emigration, which over the past 14 years has seen an estimated 100,000 Palestinians leave the West Bank.

However, demographic patterns are not consistent throughout the West Bank. Emigration is higher from the Nablus area than from the south. The result is that population growth in Samaria is very low (0.4 percent), higher in the south (2.1 percent); the figure for Jerusalem stands at 3 percent.

"This makes nonsense of the Alignment plan to keep only those areas where there is low-density Arab population," Benvenisti says. "Precisely the areas it wants to keep have high rates of growth."

"The economy of the West Bank may be characterized as undeveloped, nonviable, stagnant, and dependent. It is an auxiliary sector of both the Israeli and the Jordanian economies," Benvenisti concludes.

Twenty-five percent of Israeli exports are sold via the West Bank, which is something of a captive market and the largest single market for Israeli manufactured goods.

The industrial base of the area is undeveloped, since there is no capital investment, no government investment in industrial infrastructure, no credit facilities or capital market, no protection from the import of Israeli goods. There are restrictions on exports to Jordan, and restrictions on the import of equipment and raw materials....

The 15 years of association with the Israeli economy have seen significant changes in the structure of the labor force in the West Bank—mainly the emergence of a real proletariat drawn predominantly from the rural Palestinian peasants and from the refugee population in the West Bank. Half of the employed labor force in the West Bank works in Israel. The number of organized laborers is generally agreed to be 40,000; a further 20,000 are unorganized labor; and an estimated 15,000 are employed "at arm's length" as subcontractors inside the West Bank in small industries and other parts of the Israeli production process.

Examining data collected by the Histadrut, Benvenisti found that one-third of the salaried West Bank labor force has been employed in Israel for more than 10 years....

The patterns of employment have also changed drastically. Parallel to a decrease in the area under cultivation, the introduction of more efficient farming techniques, and the pull of industrial salaries in Israel have resulted in a shift from agricultural to industrial employment. In 1969, 46 percent of the West Bank labor force worked in agriculture; in 1980 the figure was 26 percent.

In 1969, in the West Bank, 11.5 percent of the labor force was engaged in the building industry; in 1980 this had risen to 22 percent. Benvenisti says this reflects the accelerated pace of settlement construction and the pattern has been described as "building other people's homes" by Bir Zeit sociologist Salim Tamari, who recently published a study of what he calls a peasant proletariat.

More than 50 percent of the West Bank labor force in Israel is employed in construction.

A dual legislative, executive and administrative system has already been established, Benvenisti contends, which makes the application of Israeli law irrelevant and unnecessary. A pattern of "ironing out anomalies" that arise when Israelis find themselves living outside the borders of their state is already in existence. Regulations are promulgated and laws amended on a legal basis that is increasingly personal. The same concept will eventually apply to the Arabs—consistent with Israel's view that the autonomy envisaged at Camp David applies to the "inhabitants" and not to the land....

HOW IRREVERSIBLE, then, is the pattern set in motion by the Alignment and accelerated almost beyond recognition by the Likud?

"Nothing is irreversible," says Benvenisti. "It's all a question of cost.... When President Reagan talks of 'freezing settlements' he displays an anachronistic approach to the problem...." Benvenisti repeats his argument. "It is not the announcement or creation of eight more dots on the map but the increasing shift of Israel's urban population into

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[these] areas that guarantees Israeli control over the West Bank and that creates perhaps an insurmountable political problem for any concession-oriented political party in the country. . . . "

Israel's entanglement in the West Bank is not following some master map. "It's an outgrowth of an imperial concept — 'I want this,' combined with the ability to go about taking it," he concludes. □

Letters from Lebanon

What follows is excerpted from letters and postcards written, during the first four weeks of the war, by an Israeli tank officer while serving in Lebanon. They were addressed to his wife, who published them in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, *and with whose permission these excerpts, a small part of the whole correspondence, are here printed.*—EDS.

June 8, 1982 [Postcard]

There is a feeling of security that comes from the mighty power we have at our disposal, and from a desire to be at the center of events. Despite this, I'm bothered by the lack of any rational basis for this mess. If our goal is to drive the PLO out of Lebanon, they still can escape to Turkey, Syria, Iran. . . . If the pretext for starting the war is the assassination of our ambassador [in London], we may even be driving them further away, on into Europe, where they can kill some more of our ambassadors. So it follows that we must drive the PLO from the universe. And in order to do that, we must be able to rule the whole world. . . .

June 13, 1982 [Letter]

. . . . THE MORE the fog of battle clears, the more I am convinced that I knew what I was talking about when I strongly opposed any military action on such a massive scale. . . . With the fog of battle lifting, the price of victory seems very high, and questions multiply. . . .

How can Jewish children go to school happily, as our prime minister has promised, if their fathers have been killed in the war? Once again, Mr. Begin has sold the nation with those homilies that roll so fluently off his tongue. . . . As for the war itself, it was quite a tactical and logistical achievement. But . . . the principal question remains unanswered: Who is the enemy with whom we are to conduct negotiations for a cease-fire? With whom will we negotiate?

Meanwhile, the days pass. Gradually, the economy will feel the absence of the reservists, the reservists will slowly tire, and who knows if our government will know how to exploit our "victory"? . . .

June 13, 1982 [Postcard]

NOTICE HOW they are trying to persuade the people that the principal danger to our existence has melted away. Notice how the Beaufort Castle, which was never anything but a meaningless point on the map, has become a symbol of this war . . . a paranoid symbol [of our] problems. . . .

Begin insisted on going to Beaufort, saying, "I want to see the monster routed." Interesting how a monster is created out of a heap of stones and then is engaged in battle. . . . Maybe Begin is our Don Quixote, creating a monster out of his breath.

June 20, 1982 [Letter]

. . . I BEHAVE like a real soldier—with my feet on the ground, diligent and experienced. Sometimes I am close to tears; then I get in my tank and perform like a professional. This bothers me and I do not understand it. Even now, as I sit and write to you, I am about to break out in tears. Not hysterically, not because of a sudden pain, but out of a burning sadness within me . . . Sadness is the only personal thing that's left to me. . . .

I am strong—a hero. I'm a hero because I don't believe in what is being done here, and yet I function—thoroughly, dependably, and skillfully. Why? . . . I feel like a hero in a Greek tragedy . . . a hero who knows his destiny, and performs his job up to its tragic end. . . .

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June 24, 1982 [Letter]

. . . . THE WAR is entering its fourth week. Maybe it will last longer than the Yom Kippur War. That war, however, was imposed upon us suddenly, thus sparing us the necessity of having to define a political objective short of survival. This war has no clear objective. Maybe Arik [Ariel Sharon] has a clear goal in mind, but he has set this war in motion without sharing his objectives with our political leadership. Since June 6, the government has been operating without any political definition, while the army creates facts that achieve political objectives according to what is happening at the front. . . .

No one here knows where things will lead us. . . . The army spokesmen are silent. Arik continues to pursue his grandiose ambitions. And our soldiers continue to bleed. The names of the dead are periodically announced. How much longer?

No one knows how long; and very few know why.

The Israeli army information office has lost all credibility. In contrast, Radio Lebanon is a very reliable guide to what is happening. I guess the army cannot reveal facts as they really are. After all, how can the army announce that we have exploited a small violation of the cease-fire in order to move our position further north, as we had planned to do all along? The guys are already asking when we are going to reach the Dardanelles.

The army has found a new way to report our losses. They release the facts one at a time. They count on people not adding up the figures. . . . How did we get into this situation where the reportage of the Israeli army, once known for its credibility, now resembles *Pravda* more than Radio Lebanon?

Again, I am prepared to stand behind every word I have written. All that is left of me is squeezed into these letters. I'm not adding anything new to the voices of protest that are now being raised by others. When I write these things, they cannot say that I'm an intellectual lacking in national pride, as they did about Adi Tzemach and Dan Miron and others. My protest is written by a soldier, in the shadow of a tank that is ready to resume fire. No one can say that I am a "treasonous intellectual" who has never seen a battle field. By my protest I speak not only for myself, but also for the many silent voices of other experienced officers in the field who carry the burden of this war. . . . As time passes, the more I see how right I was in my predictions and how right I was when I wrote that there is no spectrum of opinion here [on the front], only two opposing plagues. . . .

Hope to see you soon.

Translated by ARTHUR SAMUELSON □

Mark Kesselman

Socialists in France: An Early Balance

A specter is haunting Europe. It is not a "classic" revolution, with a Communist party storming the Winter Palace. This specter is a peaceful, incremental socialist transformation carried out by ballots, not bullets: a "tranquil revolution," in the words of François Mitterrand, France's Socialist president. While orthodox Communist parties in Western Europe have been eclipsed, democratic socialism has gained increasing credibility. Since 1981, democratic socialist governments have been elected in France, Greece, Sweden, and Spain.

Of course, the democratic socialist trend in Western Europe is neither universal nor ineluctable: in West Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, conservative coalitions elected within recent years are seeking to curtail political and economic gains that workers and other popular forces achieved through decades of struggle.

The diverse socialist coalitions in Western Europe oppose attempts to roll back the welfare state and thereby force the working-class majority to shoulder the costs of restoring capitalist growth. However, some of these recently elected democratic socialist governments also say they reject the Keynesian, social-democratic approach, according to which capitalists run the economy while the state pursues full-employment policies, provides incentives to encourage economic rationalization,

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and redistributes part of the economic surplus through welfare programs. Segments of the European left have begun to believe that, in an era of slow growth where it is essential to conserve resources, the job of organizing production and investment is too important to be left to capitalists. They favor an earlier conception of democratic socialism, in which the public and democratic sphere is extended to the realm of production. But the various leftist coalitions differ on how to organize public economic control.

France is the largest nation to have elected a democratic socialist government and its governing coalition may be the boldest. The Socialist government achieved a brilliant sweep in May–June 1981, which culminated years of rightist decline following the heyday of Gaullist rule. After his return to power in 1958, de Gaulle sponsored an authoritarian modernization of France's archaic political and economic structure. Gaullist policies forced medium-size producers to merge in steel, chemicals, data processing, and other industries, resulting in "national champions" competing in world markets. Within several years, a nation of small shopkeepers, small farmers, and small manufacturers was thoroughly transformed into an industrial giant.

De Gaulle could command a majority in the 1960s thanks to his personal genius, economic growth (in part the result of the expansion of world capitalism), and the disarray of the left. Until the late 1960s, the left appeared destined to be a permanent minority in the Fifth Republic. A major cause was the bitter division between one of the largest and most resolutely Stalinist Communist parties in Western Europe and a Socialist party discredited by its opportunism in the Fourth Republic.

However, popular discontent with the Gaullist regime's conservative policies was steadily mounting, as dramatically illustrated by the May 1968 uprising. The two left parties eventually sought to exploit this opportunity by embracing the new forces and demands arising from May 1968. In a rapid switch, the Communist party (PCF) became an enthusiastic advocate of "bourgeois democracy," saying that it accepted the desirability of a multiparty system, democratic alternation in office, and civil rights and liberties, and calling for a marriage of socialism and democracy in France ("socialism in French colors"). However, even during its brief Eurocommunist phase, the PCF's ostensible commitment to democracy appeared rhetorical, since it was not reflected in democratic practices within the party. In fact, the PCF failed to reverse its slow decline in the 1970s precisely because its democratic professions collided with its continued undemocratic practice. When this became evident to PCF leaders, they abandoned Eurocommunism. The result was a return in 1977 to a sectarian stance reminiscent of the most somber days of the Cold War. The PCF's return to "orthodoxy" was partly designed to weaken support for the entire left, the Socialist party (PS) in particular. Instead, it had precisely the opposite effect: the PS emerged as the only reasonable alternative to the incumbent conservative regime.

Under François Mitterrand's leadership, the Socialist Party embraced a radical reformist program and swallowed its distaste for the PCF by negotiating the Union of the Left electoral accord. Mitterrand calculated that the only way for the PS to reach power was by posing an unequivocally leftist alternative. It was an excellent gamble: the PS quickly overtook the PCF and reversed the balance of forces within the left, gaining support among non-Communist leftists ready to support the PS once it was firmly anchored on the left, as well as centrists disaffected with the incumbent government. Mitterrand was elected in May 1981 on a platform that promised to deal with France's soaring unemployment, represent the largely excluded working class, democratize production, and renovate the ailing French productive apparatus. To what extent has he kept his promises?

THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT has sponsored a number of far-reaching structural reforms that promise to fundamentally improve French economic and political life. Since they have not yet been fully implemented, it is too soon to judge whether they will be effective. A review of four key structural reforms (described below) suggests both the magnitude of the Socialist achievement in its brief tenure in office as well as a critical flaw in the reform dynamic. While the reforms substantially extend the public sphere and increase the functions of elected and administrative officials, they do little to enhance the power of workers and other citizens. If this tendency is not reversed, the regime may find itself increasingly abandoned by its supporters and vulnerable to rightist pressure.

The context for Socialist structural reforms is France's distinctive political culture: a highly centralized state and intense class conflict. The combination is a perfect recipe for political instability: the centralized, interventionist state has traditionally regulated the myriad details of French social life because, given the heated ideological climate, social classes and forces were unable to regulate conflict on a voluntarist, pluralist basis. Yet state

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intervention provokes even further ideological conflict.

The first two structural reforms described below seek to alter this situation by reducing both the state's role and the ideological temperature. The Socialist government introduced a major decentralization of the administrative structure in its first weeks in office. Many governmental functions were transferred from state administrators to elected representatives at municipal, departmental, and regional levels. Because the decentralization reform was extremely ambitious and complex, it was introduced in stages; some key features (notably, the reorganization of tax resources) have yet to be decided. However, if decentralization went no further, it would represent the most drastic increase in local governmental powers in a century.

In parallel fashion, the government has sought to reduce state responsibility for regulating industrial conflict in France by strengthening collective-bargaining machinery. The Auroux reforms (named after the minister of labor, who was responsible for elaborating the legislation) represent a belated French counterpart to the Wagner Act by compelling employers to engage in annual plant-level collective bargaining. The Auroux reforms strengthen union rights and protections, extend the powers of elected works committees, and provide workers with a consultative voice over working conditions and legal protections against arbitrary managerial authority.

THESE REFORMS, ranking with the most important in recent French history, entitle the current Socialist government to favorable comparison with Léon Blum's 1936 Popular Front. But from the perspective of other industrialized capitalist nations, these advances hardly put France in the vanguard: they represent overdue reforms blocked by generations of nearly uninterrupted conservative rule. Yet they by no means exhaust the Socialist government's accomplishments.

The Socialist government has taken an audacious step toward making the economy the public's business (not private business) by nationalizing many basic and high-technology industries, including telecommunications, electrical equipment, building materials, chemicals, aerospace, data processing, steel, nonferrous metals, and synthetic fibers. Possibly of even greater significance, virtually all banks have been nationalized, thereby enabling the state to control credit and investment flows.

Nationalized firms will be organized in a relatively autonomous fashion, to avoid the dangers of a monolithic, topheavy bureaucracy. The government names the chief executive officer. Workers in the firm elect one-third of the firm's corporate board, the government names one-third to represent relevant ministerial departments (especially the ministries of industry and finance), and the government names the remaining third to represent other groups who deal with the firm (such as consumer associations and subcontractors). Each firm will negotiate a plan with the government that sets overall investment, production, employment, and other targets.

By nationalizing a substantial portion of production and finance, the Socialist government seeks to harness the economy to public goals. By extending the planning system (the last reform reviewed here), rational and democratic procedures are specified for elaborating long-range public goals. Previously, the French pioneered in indicative planning. Henceforth, planning will be carried out on a more public and democratic basis. Planning is being decentralized, with regional governments participating in the national planning process as well as elaborating their own plans for regional development.

Each of the reforms reviewed here is important. The result as a whole is potentially even greater than the sum of the parts. The various reforms may facilitate coherence, efficiency, and equity—and not at the expense of democratic participation but in ways that will enlarge it.

Yet it has also been charged that because the reforms will work at cross-purposes, they are less than the sum of the parts. This criticism is partially valid. There will surely be a good deal of conflict and messiness in implementing the reforms. The government has demonstrated more than its share of internal disagreement, hesitation, and inconsistency. For example, shortly after Mitterrand delivered a reassuring analysis of the French economy last June, the government abruptly reversed course and instituted wage and price controls and other austerity measures.

Yet some of the criticism is unjustified and obscures the magnitude of the Socialist project. For example, the government has been taxed with incoherence for decentralizing—thereby reducing the state's role—at the same time that it has extended the state through nationalization and planning. In fact, that is precisely the aim: decentralization and industrial-relations reforms are the mirror image of nationalization and planning. Because the state's role in daily life will be reduced in favor of pluralist self-regulation in factories and communities, it will be more able to assume respon-

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sibility for rationalizing and directing the French productive apparatus.

In the most optimistic scenario, if the government's structural reforms reach fruition and the Socialist coalition receives a fresh mandate in 1986, France may succeed in achieving the distant and historically unprecedented goal described by Mitterrand in his inaugural address as uniting socialism with liberty. What are the chances?

It is too soon to say. If the government has failed to fulfill the fondest hopes of its most fervent supporters, it has avoided confirming the worst fears (and hopes?) of its most fervent opponents. While the Socialist government has nearly completed the task of legislating its structural reforms, they have not yet had a substantial impact. For most French citizens, little has changed since the Socialists took office. Further, the government's short-term economic performance has been only fair: it has succeeded in limiting increases in the unemployment rate, but unemployment remains high. France's international trade deficits are large and growing; so are government deficits. While Reaganomics has wreaked havoc with all major foreign currencies, the franc has been especially damaged (two devaluations within a year). Furthermore, in the political realm, the right's virulent opposition coupled with terrorist attacks in France quite unrelated to Socialist policies (recall that the rue Copernic anti-Semitic attack occurred under Giscard) have kept political tensions at the boiling point.

It was clear from the outset that the Socialist structural reforms could never produce instant results. Part of the government's economic difficulties derive from the fact that it sponsored short-term stimulative measures in hopes of positioning France favorably for a widely predicted international economic revival in 1981–82—which never occurred. However, democratic governments can never forget Keynes's warning about the problem with long-run effects. While the Socialist government can look forward to constitutionally secure control until the 1986 legislative elections, municipal elections in early 1983 will provide an important test of Socialist popularity. The PS is likely to emerge politically weakened and tempted to mount a holding operation to retain power.

There is another possibility. The economic crisis reduces the possibility of redistributing material benefits (which explains why the government resorted to austerity measures in 1982). Yet the Socialists might find a second wind for renewed progressive movement if they redistribute not economic benefits but political power. All the structural reforms reviewed here redistribute power within the narrow confines of elected representatives and interest group officials. But democratic socialism involves the collective appropriation of the means of production, consumption, and administration at all levels. The government has opposed this process, at least for now. For example, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, minister of research and industry (and formerly leader of the CERES left-wing faction of the PS), has declared that what is

American Profile

Since last October, the poor and near-poor in America have lost more than $10 billion in federal support. Some 661,000 children have lost Medicaid coverage; 900,000 poor youngsters no longer receive free or reduced-price school lunches; 280,000 no longer receive free or reduced-price breakfasts; 150,000 poor working families have lost eligibility for government-supported day care; 200,000 fewer pregnant women, new mothers, infants, and children are getting special federal coupons for milk, juice, and other diet supplements. One million people have been dropped from the Food Stamp rolls. In addition, 890 school districts have cut back on special education programs. Three private universities have announced that they no longer will admit able students who cannot pay their own way; 550 public libraries and museums have begun to charge entry fees. Meanwhile, military spending has begun to rise precipitously; by 1984, it will absorb nearly a third of the federal budget instead of the present quarter. America has all but abandoned its stand on global human rights, and has embraced friendly authoritarian regimes the world over. Discussions on banning nuclear tests have been terminated. Export controls on plutonium have been reduced. The Central Intelligence Agency has been allowed to return to its earlier policy of spying on Americans. The public's right to know about government activities has been curtailed. At the same time, Americans with annual incomes exceeding $200,000 have started to enjoy the bulk of a substantial cut in their personal income taxes, while America's 1,700 largest corporations have been major beneficiaries of a drastic cut in their corporate taxes. Antitrust laws have been all but rescinded. And environmental, health, and safety regulations have been stalled or rolled back. . . .

—Robert B. Reich, *New Republic*, Sept. 20, 1982

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needed in the present period is to modernize the Republic, not build socialism.

A bolder course would not be without risks. The government is determined to avoid repeating the mistakes of other glorious—but brief—democratic socialist experiments. (In Mitterrand's words, the regime wants to "govern for the long haul.") More extensive redistribution of power might stiffen opposition on the right as well as redound to the benefit of the PCF, which was outmaneuvered electorally by the PS but retains the most powerful party organization in France. It might thus become the primary beneficiary of reforms diffusing power to the shop floor and community levels.

Yet the Socialist coalition is presently on a downward slide, mostly because government policies have been sufficiently audacious to antagonize the right but not audacious enough to mobilize popular support; the process may accelerate without fresh initiatives. Structural reforms already accomplished provide a fine opportunity further to democratize French society. (An excellent place to start would be reorganization of production processes in the nationalized industries.) If the PS were to assign priority to democratizing relations of production, the specter haunting Europe would doubtless become more threatening for some—but more inspiring for many. □

G. P. Glyde

On "Goodput" and "Badput"

Information and data collections, which in part guide our social and economic policies, tend to focus on the most obvious problems of society and on issues for which data can be readily collected. For example, unemployment data are easier to come by than data on underemployment. And data on occupational accidents are easier to find than those on occupational illness, where time may elapse between exposure to conditions that lead to the illness and its manifestation. Pollution that destroys lovely vistas is a more obvious target for remedy than pollution that slowly, and less obviously, poisons the environment over time in more disastrous ways.

A parallel bias would occur if one were to look down on a street at night that is illuminated only here and there by periodic, fixed, artificial lights. Because of the distribution and intensity of the light, only certain problems on that street appear to need urgent solution; other, perhaps more significant problems are suppressed and hidden in the dark. Moreover, debris from the illuminated sections of the street could easily be removed into the dark areas without any apparent negative effects—like dirt swept under the rug.

A reduction in illumination tends to keep society ignorant of certain problems. Such ignorance may generate harm to all, as in the case of unseen atmospheric pollution; or harm may be unequally distributed, as in the case of occupational hazards to which particular workers are exposed. In the case of unequal distribution, a remedy is hard to come by, since we must also overcome the problem of ignorance, in addition to persuading the majority to care about the problems of a minority.

Let's apply some of these ideas to supply-side economics and to its methods of measuring the cost of living and the level of productivity. Supply-side economics stresses the "market solution," with minimized government intervention (regulation). Less government regulation and less taxation will reduce the cost of doing private business—that is, the *measured* cost. Prices may rise less rapidly than if regulations were imposed. Productivity rates also may rise because of deregulation—that is, the *measured* productivity rate may rise.

Our cost of living (and inflation) is measured by an "index"—such as the Consumer Price Index. In a given base year, say 1977, the index is set at 100, and subsequent years then are compared and measured in relation to this base year. The index represents the weighted average price of a representative cross section or bundle of consumer goods—such weighting being necessary because

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consumers tend to spend more income on some goods than on others. If the weights are adjusted, reflecting changes in consumer spending, the index is altered. This sparked the recent controversy over mortgage rates and their weight in the Consumer Price Index. Less weight on steeply rising mortgages means less *acknowledged* inflation and, not inconsequentially, lower cost-of-living adjustments in wage contracts and other payments tied to the index.

THIS CONTROVERSY illustrates an important point. The debate over the Consumer Price Index is focused on refining the more obvious data. The "social" costs of production—such as the cost of pollution, accidents, illness, and plant closings—which are not borne by the firm, are not considered in the Consumer Price Index. And so, since the firm doesn't pay for them, these very real costs of production don't appear in the price of the product and the measure of inflation.

The same omission occurs in the measuring of productivity (output per work hour). If a firm has no need to use its work force to rectify certain hazards, productivity will be higher than otherwise. Actually, the firm's output is comprised of both "goodput" and "badput," the "goodput" being the obvious, productive output—the "badput" being that output's ill effects: pollution, accidents and illness, and so on. Supply-side measures of productivity focus on "goodput"; they ignore most of the "badput." So the Cost of Living Index prices "goodput"—not "badput." That is, since the cost of producing "goodput" must be covered by the

Football's First Strike

As a child growing up in Ohio, I thought of the Cleveland Browns as gods. In that belief I was no different from most of my school friends. Our fall Sundays were spent watching the Browns on television or, if someone's father could be persuaded to take us, from the upper deck of Cleveland Stadium. It was not until I was 13, however, that I got to see the Browns close up. It was early August, and my uncle, who was friends with Otto Graham, the Browns' star quarterback, took me to the team's training camp to watch their annual intersquad game. It was a shock. Not the size of the players. Nor their speed. Nor Otto Graham, who had the kindly, worn face of a minister rather than the look of an athlete. The shock was the violence of the game. I had expected heroics and perfection. What I saw instead was what television and huge stadiums conceal, the degree to which every professional football play—each tackle, each block, each run—is dominated by collisions so fierce that 20 and 30 yards away you can hear the thud of flesh against flesh, flesh against hard plastic.

I did not stop watching professional football because of that afternoon, and although I live in New York City, I continue to root for the Cleveland Browns. But I know that the pleasure pro football and the Browns give me cannot be separated from a deliberate blindness on my part. Even now, I am still not anxious to acknowledge the realities of the game.

So with most fans and so, too, with their cool reaction to this fall's National Football League strike. It is the associations of childhood that as adults draw most of us to football, and to be reminded of the game's cost—of pensions and bonuses and crippling injuries—is to be deprived of the willed naiveté fanship requires.

Certainly, the issues raised in 1982 by the NFL Players' Association's 57-day strike were not naive ones. They centered on nothing less than the question of worker control in an industry whose 1,500 worker athletes, because they are so well-known, have the power to influence the country far out of proportion to their numbers.

A look at the structure and operation of the 28 football teams of the NFL makes the reasons for the strike clear. Unlike Chrysler or International Harvester, the NFL is an industry where profits are on the upsurge. The average team plays in stadiums (many of them financed by local taxes) that in contrast to the nation's factories operate at 94 percent of capacity. Above all, there is the matter of television. The 28 teams of the NFL do not negotiate separately with the networks but have a joint contract that guarantees them $1.6 billion over the next four years and pays each team (in a true socialism-for-the-rich plan) equal revenues regardless of its quality or fan appeal. Finally, because of the NFL's immunity from antitrust law, a team has for all practical purposes the power to control a player's service for his entire football career. Free agency has never been part of pro football, and so, despite its dangers (the average career lasts 4.6 years), its players are paid less (an estimated $84,000 per year) than either baseball or basketball players.

THE NFLPA STRIKE DEMANDS were designed to change this situation in two areas:

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price of the product but the cost of "badput" need not be, the index does not consider the latter.

Supply-side policies, favoring deregulation, emphasize private market costs, prices, and outputs—the "goodputs." The more comprehensive social costs of production, including the "badputs"—which are made more visible by regulation—are suppressed. Deregulation suppresses "badputs" by making firms less accountable for them. The effect of this policy is to lower the rate of measured inflation (prices don't have to cover "badputs"), and to raise the level of measured productivity (less of the work force is required to reduce "badputs" and so can be devoted to producing "goodputs").

Suppose there were cost-of-living and productivity measures that included the suppressed social cost as well as the more obvious private costs that are incurred. Let's call these two more comprehensive and accurate measures of inflation and productivity the "social cost of living indicator" and the "social productivity indicator." The reduced costs to the firm via deregulation would now count as increased social costs captured in the "social cost of living"; both private and social costs would be captured in this measure. There may simply be an internal transfer of costs and prices within the "social cost of living" indicator from private to social. Deregulation may bring about no effective change in the true cost of living. The apparent success in our current measures, brought about by deregulation, may in fact be illusory.

Doing away with effective regulation in such areas as pollution control, occupational health and safety control, and consumer safety could reduce

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• *Sources of revenue:* The NFLPA's key demand here was for a linkage between revenues NFL teams pull in and salaries paid out to players. The union recognized that at a time when football is being financially transformed by technology (network television and the prospect of cable television), it is essential for players to share in the transformation. Otherwise they are in danger of losing their bargaining power, of conceding control over the most expansive economic force in their business.

• *Distribution of pay:* In this area the NFLPA sought to reverse a situation in which players negotiate their contracts individually and are subjected to a system that results in wide variations in pay. The players' union sought to minimize the gross differences between what a quarterback and a lineman, a star and an average player receive by introducing a wage scale based on seniority. Under the NFLPA proposals differences in quality would have been acknowledged not through individual contracts but by a bonus system that would take into consideration everything from how many games a player started to whether his team made the Superbowl.

In a sport that emphasizes endurance, team play, and the sacrifice of ego, the lessons of the playing field would have been carried to the marketplace with remarkable ingenuity by the original NFLPA proposals. What would have been lost would not be the incentive to excel but the owners' right to reward excellence as they saw fit and to pay (in an effort to keep rival leagues from forming) their highest bonuses to untried rookies.

The results are instead a mixed bag for the players. What they have formally conceded in the agreement they signed are their most far-reaching proposals: a share of television revenues and a wage-scale arrangement the NFLPA would administer. What they have gained, however, is a variation on these original demands. Their five-year $1.6 billion contract amounts to an estimated 46 percent of the NFL owners' gross—down 10 percent from their first strike demand but an improvement over the owners' counteroffer.

The minimum NFL salary is now $30,000 for a rookie but, most significantly, the minimum increases $10,000 per year to a maximum of $200,000 for a player with 18 years of service. Equally important, players are now eligible for severance pay after two years in the league. Thus the incentive to hire an inexperienced rookie and replace a veteran (who after 12 years could receive $140,000 in severance pay) is reduced, and players who are cut by teams leave the league with the financial means to begin new careers.

That the NFL owners should have fought the NFLPA so bitterly and been prepared to cancel the season is not surprising. Professional football's early teams, Chicago, Green Bay, Hammond, Dayton, were funded by companies seeking to reduce worker discontent by fostering team loyalty, and throughout its history the League has constantly opposed serious organizing efforts by its players. In 1982 the problem for the owners was that the athletes they had hired were not local toughs who could be replaced nor workers whose labor could just as easily be done in Taiwan or Haiti. Rather, they were the central figures of a glamour industry, who realized that unless they organized themselves with a blue-collar solidarity, they were in danger of having their professional status undermined.

NICOLAUS MILLS □

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the measured rate of inflation and increase measured productivity and, at the same time, result in an increase of the "social cost of living" and a cut in "social productivity." This contradiction can occur when incremental benefits of deregulation (savings to society) are outweighed by the incremental costs of deregulation (losses society incurs by forgoing regulation). The relative losses and gains from deregulation will depend on the effectiveness of the original regulation in accounting for social costs.

THE POLITICAL GAINS of reducing inflation, as measured, and raising productivity, as measured, through deregulation are not illusory, even though real social losses may be incurred and these gains may exist on paper only. Voters cast their votes in response to published changes in inflation and productivity; they are not apprised of the "social cost of living" and "social productivity."

All people, in fact, do not consume the same bundles of "goodputs" and "badputs." The extent of "badputs" consumed is in many respects involuntary—it depends on where one lives, what job choices are available, the type of products one consumes, and on the level of one's income. The point is: if a group doesn't consume too many "badputs," it most likely will not push for measuring the cost of living so as to include social costs.

Consumers of "goodput" are to some extent subsidized by consumers of "badput". For example, if workers, or their families, or the society at large will pay for occupation-related illnesses, the consumers of the products involved are receiving a direct subsidy. That is, the full costs of production are not reflected in the price of production because the firm is not paying the costs of occupation-related illnesses. Only if all production costs are fully incorporated into pricing will the subsidy disappear. And full-cost pricing is less likely to happen under deregulation than under regulation.

Politically, the rise in measured productivity occasioned by supply-side deregulation is very important. Deregulation does increase "goodputs"; "badputs" are not measured, and so it doesn't matter that they rise too. "Social productivity," however, takes into account not only the possible rise in "goodputs" stemming from deregulation but also the concomitant rise in "badputs," which have to be subtracted from any increase in the measure of "goodputs." The apparent rise in measured productivity may be mirrored in a less significantly rising, constant, or declining "social productivity," depending on whether "badputs" production exceeds "goodputs" production as a result of deregulation. Yet success in raising measured productivity can be politically rewarding even if "social productivity" has declined.

An important implication of this analysis is that some (not all) of our recent poor economic performance on the price and productivity front represents progress, not regress. How so? The use of more resources through regulation in order to reduce "badputs" can be expected to increase measured inflation and to reduce measured productivity. The fall in productivity is a consequence of labor's and capital's compliance with new regulations. Consistent with a lower productivity are higher unit costs; these costs are passed on to consumers, and thus the rise in inflation. Assuming that the regulations are in fact socially desirable, we are nevertheless better off, even though our imperfect current methods of measuring our well-being suggest otherwise.

The link between supply-side economics and the theory of street illumination is clear. Supply-side economics emphasizes the more illuminated areas in our economy—the private costs of production as reflected in supply-side standard measures of inflation and productivity. The focus is on "goodputs," not on "badputs." Regulations designed to illuminate the "badputs," and to account more fully for the true costs of production, tend to be suppressed. In order to improve our measured economic performance, the lights tend to be dimmed over the less obvious costs of production. Success in effecting "positive" changes in inflation and productivity brings political dividends as long as people are uninformed about more comprehensive ways of measuring—ways that might measure such things as the "social cost of living" and "social productivity."

Emphasizing private costs of production at the expense of social costs of production, with resulting illusory victories over inflation and in productivity, is a classic case of legerdemain. Turn up the lights! □

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"A Path for America"

Three Comments on Michael Harrington's Article and His Reply

Robert B. Reich

Two choices will predominate in America over the next decade—one economic and one political. The economic choice is between preserving an industrial base that is growing increasingly uncompetitive in the global economy, or pushing that industrial base into higher-valued and more competitive productivity. The political choice concerns how we execute the first choice: either throug corporatist planning or democratic planning. Corporatist planning is secretive, undertaken by an elite that is accountable to the public only indirectly at best; democratic planning is open and transparent, undertaken by people directly representative of the citizens.

The two choices are related. The nature of the political choice surely will dictate economic outcomes. But democratic nations face a dilemma, because—all too often—democratic planning (or what passes for democratic planning) results in economic stagnation. This is true for the simple reason that economic change is often painful and disruptive—particularly for the least mobile factors of production, like low-skilled labor. While capital can move with relative ease, the fact is that a job in danger of being lost by a worker with no ready alternative livelihood represents a far more potent political force than a future job—even one promising more pay. Those who are threatened by economic change almost always outnumber those for whom change brings direct and palpable benefits.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the fate of capitalist democracies has been to grow more protectionist over time, unless or until a corporate elite manages to insulate the planning process from popular demands for preserving the status quo. This particularly has been the case in recent years, during which oil shocks and Third World industrialization have rocked the foundations of advanced economies. Corporatist planning predominates in modern-day Japan and West Germany, and within the world's largest multinational corporations. Accordingly, economic adjustments are occurring more efficiently in these systems.

At present, the most articulate proposals to restore the American economy call for either tax reductions or targeted industrial policies. The "supply-siders" seek higher levels of capital formation; the targeters are more concerned with how capital is allocated. But it is important to understand that both visions derive from a similar philosophy. The neoconservative supply-siders seek to place authority for economic adaptation in the hands of the Federal Reserve and America's largest corporations. The neoliberal targeters want to vest authority in a reconstituted Reconstruction Finance Corporation or within tripartite industrial boards representing Big Labor, Big Business, and Big Government. Both visions are corporatist, but the corporatism has been obscured from view because the political choices underlying the visions have not been made clear.

Thus the challenge: how to combine democratic planning with a dynamic economy.

Michael Harrington is characteristically insightful in his essay, "A Path for America." He correctly debunks the now fashionable notion that our economic problems stem from too much consumption and too little investment; it is the pattern of investment that is awry, not the level. Harrington's programs to achieve full employment, allocate credit toward productive uses, eliminate tax loop-

Michael Harrington's article, "A Path for America," appeared in our Fall 1982 issue. It is also available as an FSISI *Dissent* pamphlet.

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holes, and provide notice of plant closings are all premised on his more fundamental prescription that we democratize the planning process. But the question remains: how do we render the planning process more democratic without inviting just the sort of preservatives—tariffs, quotas, orderly marketing agreements, bailouts and tax breaks for declining industries, "buy America" provisions, domestic content requirements, restrictive licensing—which already are distorting the pattern of investment in America and thereby retarding the nation's economic development?

SHORT OF DECIDING that we do not want economic growth (surely a plausible political position, but one that received far more respect and attention a decade ago when we were enjoying the fruits of growth than now, when we are experiencing withdrawal pangs), the answer, it seems to me, is for America to develop an assortment of mechanisms for systematically compensating those on whom the burdens of economic change initially fall, and thereby alleviating the pain of adjustment. In effect, through these compensatory mechanisms, those who stand to gain from industrial development would strike a bargain with those who bear the direct cost—a bargain through which some of the benefits of the gain would be redistributed to the losers. This bargaining would be open and explicit. (By contrast, the only systematic means through which economic gainers now compensate economic losers in America derives from the law of torts and of eminent domain, both administered by the courts.) The substance of the compensation might take the form of aid in job retraining, assistance in relocating, funds for new regional industries to absorb the newly unemployed. The goal would be to ease the social transition to a new industrial base, but do so democratically, rather than succumb either to political demands for blocking economic change or to corporatist planning for accomplishing change.

To conclude simply that we need democratic planning, as does Harrington, therefore begs the critical questions—all of which concern how we structure this bargaining process to ensure economic growth. Should the bargaining occur within annual nationwide negotiations? To what extent should it occur within states, regions, and communities? What is the role of workplace democracy in such bargaining? How can we ensure adequate representation of all affected interests? How can we ensure that those who administer these bargains are also accountable?

It is becoming clear that the elaborate governmental system we have inherited is not up to the task of coping democratically with rapid industrial change on a worldwide scale. If we wish to preserve both democracy and prosperity, we must find an alternative to both protectionism and corporatism. Harrington brings us part way to an answer, but not quite far enough. □

Lester C. Thurow

While there is much to agree with in Harrington's article, a major portion of it is unfortunately based on (1) a failure to understand that the world has changed and (2) a simple mathematical mistake. Harrington tells us that we do not need to take actions to raise the American savings rate because plant and equipment investment is slightly higher than it was in America's golden age (the 1960s) and a lot of money is being used for speculation to rearrange assets rather than to increase assets.

In America's golden age, the United States did not have to operate in a world of economic and technological equals. It still had the advantage of a huge technological gap that let it get by with actions (less attention to quality control) that are simply no longer viable. It still had a per capita income that was much larger than that in the rest of the industrial world. It could afford to do things the rest of the world could not afford to do.

Last year the average American family saved 6 percent of its income. The savings rate was 11 percent in the next worst industrial country (Canada). Germans saved 14 perNent while the Japanese were saving 22 percent. The Japanese are as

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smart as we are; they work as hard as we do; they are now our technological equals. If they save 22 percent while we are saving 6 percent we will simply be economically beaten at home and abroad.

Our 6 percent savings rate used to be multiplied by a much larger per capita income, so that a low savings rate did not lead to low investment relative to the rest of the world. But that is no longer true. The rest of the industrial world now has a per capita income as large or larger than ours.

A 6 percent savings rate simply isn't viable any more. If you aren't willing to admit that fact and design a *progressive* way to raise America's savings rate, you simply aren't facing the facts of life and Reagan's *regressive* techniques for raising the savings rate will be implemented by default.

The mathematical error comes from not making a sharp distinction between real and financial resources and from failing to follow a transaction through to the end. If U.S. Steel spends $6 billion to buy Marathon Oil it is neither subtracting from nor adding to the resources available to the American economy. When the purchase is made, the shareholders of U.S. Steel take $6 billion from the U.S. capital markets and give $6 billion to the old shareholders of Marathon Oil. The old owners of Marathon Oil now have $6 billion that they return to the capital markets. The money available to be borrowed by real investors has neither risen nor fallen.

Financial transactions where old assets are bought and sold also in no way impact new real investment in plant and equipment. Real investment is made possible by not consuming the real resources (capital, labor, and material) that are necessary to build factories and equipment. To see the financial gyrations on Wall Street as central to America's current economic problems is to simply see a mirage that is irrelevant to reality.

The problem with speculation is not that it uses up financial or real resources (it doesn't), but that it draws off scarce human resources (managerial talent) that could be better used building new factories or that it adds to monopoly power. America needs its managers on the factory floor and not in the counting houses arranging financial deals. That is the central case against speculation.

While the matter of savings is not the only source of America's economic problems, it is unfortunately one of them. Reagan happens to have focused upon it as the only one, but the left cannot allow Reagan to co-opt the issue and dominate how it is resolved. The issue has to be recognized and solved by the left. Harrington's refusal to even admit that the issue exists does not help.

SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS are under attack for two reasons.

First, as designed, they simply are unviable in a no-growth world. Social Security assumes growth and a larger GNP to support an increasing number of retirees at a higher and higher standard of living. If growth does not occur, workers—regardless of their political persuasions—simply won't be able to afford to pay the taxes that the program will require. They will cut off their own parents because they won't have any choice. Social Security will be broke by next summer not because Social Security was poorly planned, but because the economy is operating poorly and is poorly planned. If growth cannot be quickly re-started, the social welfare programs are either going to die or be severely pruned.

Second, Reagan has been successful in persuading much of the public that the social welfare programs and too much big government are the cause of the economy's current problems. This isn't true, but the left has failed in articulating its explanation of why the economy has failed. What did go wrong? Harrington jumps to the cures without giving a persuasive explanation of what went wrong between 1965 and 1982. That explanation has to be given or the cures just don't seem persuasive.

The problem is not a lack of planning, but stupid planning. In the 1970s all governments, Democratic or Republican, fought inflation by deliberately engineering recessions to raise unemployment and idle capacity. Idle people and equipment were supposed to stop prices from rising. Even the current French Socialist government has just announced that it will follow this strategy in the coming year. What is the left's realistic solution for fighting inflation? Not an easy problem to solve but one that must be solved if growth is to be restored.

There certainly are "fixed price" markets, but unfortunately the largest is the labor market. If economies are to operate without inflation and a shock such as OPEC I or OPEC II comes along, wages can only fall. More of the American GNP must be given to OPEC and there is simply less for Americans to divide among themselves. How is this to be arranged in a socialist world? It is fine to blast

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capitalistic fixed-price markets, but you also have to deal with the fixed-price markets that benefit those who are supposedly within the left-wing orbit.

The standard left-wing answer is wage and price controls, but these are (1) opposed by the labor movement and (2) have proven ineffective whenever they have been used in democratic countries outside of wartime. Perhaps they could be made to work, but someone has to spell out in detail exactly how it is to be done and no one has.

I think the correct answer is to move to a system of wages where a part of the wage is a bonus that depends on some measure of productivity such as value added per hour of work. Since value added is basically sales revenue minus materials costs, an increase in oil prices would automatically reduce value added per hour of work and reduce wages by the necessary amount. But here again I do not know Harrington's solution since he isn't willing to confront the problem.

If Reaganomics fails and we remain mired in our present stagnation, planning and industrial policies will undoubtedly be the issue of the 1980s. But as the experience of the current French government should warn us, to be in favor of planning even when you own 35 percent of industry and all of the financial community does not necessarily lead to success. □

Gus Tyler

"A Path for America" comes in two parts: the first is analytic, the second prescriptive. As an activist who invariably asks, *What's to Be Done*, I listen most intensely to the second part and feel impelled to say, Amen. On proper reflection, I probably would modify that to say, Amen But.

Yet to overemphasize my "buts" would be quibbling. So, in the all, I would say: right on—or maybe left on, comrade.

Mike's thesis that our present problems flow from the "late" stage of capitalism in which we find ourselves is not likely to go unchallenged. The sad '70s may not at all be a "stage" in the development of capitalism; that decade may merely be a moment in the class struggle when the haute bourgeoisie took over key posts in the economy and decided to use those posts to beat down the proletariat and the petite bourgeoisie *ad majorem gloriam et pecuniam* of the economic elite. The key posts were the presidency of the United States and the governorship of the Federal Reserve Board.

As president of the United States, Richard Nixon, in his 1970 Report to Congress, called for an "actual growth" that would be below the "potential growth" to offset the excessive growth of the late 1960s. It was the first time in the nation's history that a president had ever moved consciously and publicly to manufacture unemployment. The governor of the Federal Reserve Board, Dr. Arthur Burns, proceeded to enforce the proposal by raising interest rates. Since then, every president and every Fed governor has pursued this policy—to control inflation by putting a tourniquet on the economy. The consequences have been gangrenous.

But they were not, in my opinion, inherent in any stage of capitalism. If Hubert Humphrey had been elected in 1968, he would not have proposed to control inflation by creating unemployment. The inflation rate was only 4.5 percent; we were still in Vietnam; price and wage controls would have been adequate if inflation warmed up. A liberal president, naming a Fed governor who shared his point of view, could easily have contained inflation. And yet, we would still be living in the same "stage" of capitalism.

While I would agree that our present mess is the work of the capitalist mind, once it is allowed to go its greedy way, I do not believe our condition is inherent in capitalism per se at this stage. What the '70s should teach us is that you can't entrust capitalism to the capitalists at any stage.

The strategy of a deliberate depression is less a "stage" of capitalism than a political moment when a capitalist-minded conservatism decided to reverse the trend toward creeping socialism by cashing in on the failures of "the left" during the long liberal era from 1933 to 1969.

The central failure of American liberalism was its neglect of national planning in the complex age of today. In the last generation, "planning" became

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a dirty word in the U.S., even as West Germany and Japan turned to planning in the postwar years as the *sine qua non* of their resurgence.

IN HARRINGTON'S CALL for a "democratically determined economic plan," he sketches crucial areas of action. He urges the "creation of entire new industries," in particular a "national commitment to renewable energy sources" and the "construction of a new rail system." It is possible, even necessary, to expand this list of items to be covered by a national economic plan: agriculture, housing, food, water, soil, physical infrastructure, coal ports, basic research, education. But as I suggested in my opening, to lengthen the list is secondary to the primary concept of planning per se. Once we seriously address ourselves to the process, we will discover many new needs (immediate and future) and also discover the inevitable interrelatedness of the separate sectors.

In carrying through a "plan for rebuilding America," Harrington proposes that "corporations should receive subsidies." I suggest two caveats:

First, it is risky, even dangerous, to subsidize a corporation just because it "moves into a community in distress and starts hiring." This seemingly constructive suggestion can too easily become the basis for "enterprise zones," such as those proposed by Maggie Thatcher and, in the United States, by Congressmen Kemp and Garcia. Exploitative entrepreneurs rush into such distressed areas, employ distressed people at distressing wages, pick up "generous public subsidies," and then proceed to compete against producers who pay higher wages and get no subsidies. The end result is to redistribute unemployment and, overall, to lower wages—at public expense. Subsidies to employers to spur employment in areas of excessive unemployment have to be handled with care, selectivity, and as part of a total national scheme.

Second, corporate subsidies may become the wave of the future, the darling of capitalists who, while claiming the returns derived from the "risk" of their capital, refuse to take any "risks" and prefer, through a variety of subtle and not so subtle devices, to pass the "risk" on to the government—local or federal. The rationale, as in the case of Eisenhower's building a highway system, will, as always, be national security. And once the plant is established, the private sector will expect, as in the case of nuclear plants, to continue as the sole owner and operator of the publicly sired enterprise.

I am certain that Harrington is aware of the danger here. Indeed, in his discussion of railroads he proposes that the end product should be run by "publicly owned corporations." The question is whether he also proposes this for steel, chips, computers, coal liquefaction and gasification, the redesign of irrigation, solar and wind and tidal and geothermal and synfuel and peat and biomass and photo-voltaic and other forms of energy—all of which require massive capital investments that the private sector refuses to undertake.

If Harrington wishes to apply his railroad formula to all the sections of the American economy that are likely to lean heavily, even primarily, on public financing, then he might as well go the whole way and propose full socialism—perhaps exempting those sectors that are still small and competitive and labor-intensive. If he wishes to find some middle way, he might consider applying the simple capitalist rule that the biggest investor ought to have the biggest voice in the ownership and control of the "company." In such a case, the government might be just another shareholder in possession of 49 percent of the stock.

In a national economic "plan," I do think it is necessary to include monetary policy; Harrington does touch on this lightly with his proposal to reform the Federal Reserve Board. But I think that the positive—and negative—roles that can be played by control over the money supply deserve more attention. Although monetarism as a means of fine-tuning the money supply to cope with stagflation is pure fantasy, the use of monetary instruments can—and has—in a *gross* way been the root cause of the sorrowful '70s. And because monetary policy—like high interest rates artificially set by the Fed—can and did depress the total economy, monetary policy profoundly affected fiscal policy. Indeed, if the economy had not been drained of vital blood in the 1970s by monetary policy and had continued to grow as in the '60s, there would have been enough money coming into Washington to fund all those social programs contained in the budget of the Black Congressional Caucus, without touching tax expenditures (although these loopholes for the elite should be closed), and to put the Social Security system solidly in the black. Simply, if unemployment were at the same 3 percent rate as it was when Nixon came in, we would—in the absence of a Vietnam—be running a *surplus*.

I know that Marxists are somehow uncomfort-

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able about discussing monetary policy. But it is not possible to devise a national economic plan without knowing how to manipulate monetary levers.

Finally, Harrington, quite properly, stresses the international dimension of modern economies. By my rough calculations, close to 30 percent of the American economy is involved in international trade and investment. This internationalization of economies changes many rules of the economic game: the federal government, for instance, might, in Keynesian fashion, pump more money into the system to stimulate buying only to discover that Americans are using this extra buying power to import products from overseas; or a new tax bill to speed capital formation may make many new millionaires who choose to invest their money in Mexico or Moscow.

In approaching the economic question internationally, however, most of those in this country who stand left of center tend to fall into two self-contradictory positions:

First, because they are "internationalists" they are inclined to be "free-traders," although they are constantly reminding themselves and informing their audiences that the free market under modern capitalism is an illusion. In analyzing the "system" domestically, they understand the nature of combines, conglomerates, and cartels; but when viewing the same system internationally, they suddenly find themselves echoing the clichés of Adam Smith or David Ricardo, whose economic theories liberals and certainly radicals rejected many decades ago.

Second, in discussing the Third World, "modernization" and "development" are customarily equated with "industrialization." Yet many of the "left" who identify factories with progress are sharply critical of those multinational corporations that use the Third World as industrial sweat shops. In the last three decades of "development," rapid industrialization has done little or nothing to elevate the living conditions of the great mass of people in the poor countries but has done much damage to the necessary "agriculturization" of these nations, whose rural populations could have gained greater economic independence if they had—as some now try to do—concentrated on the development of their natural resources and talents.

The whole question of international trade and investment has, like monetary policy, been neglected by "the left" on the general assumption that "socialism" or something like it is the answer. We can no longer take that easy way out because there are too many Marxist nations—socialist, communist, or semi-demi versions of the two—that are in deep trouble because of the present anarchy in world trade, investment, and development. The world economy has become a zero-sum game in which one nation can gain only if another loses. What is needed is a design for planetary plenty that factors in population, production potential, income distribution, and limited resources. None of this can even begin to happen through global laissez faire.

I do hope that these comments will help carry forward the discussion that Mike has so ably initiated in his provocative piece. □

Michael Harrington Replies

The comments on my article all agree that we are in a time of radical change and that fundamental new departures are required. On that we are in accord and one only hopes that this news will eventually reach the Democratic National Committee and convince it that the current strategy of counting on Ronald Reagan to help elect a Democratic president without a platform or plan is not quite adequate to the age.

I quite agree with Gus Tyler that a Humphrey administration in 1969 would have been better in every way, including economic policy, than a Nixon administration. The fact that capitalism is in a new "stage" does not mean that this structural transition determines everything. It does mean that an increasingly centralized, monopolistic, multinational capitalism in the throes of a technological revolution and a restructuring of the world division of labor is totally different from the capitalism of Franklin Roosevelt's time, or of Johnson's and Humphrey's era.

On corporate subsidies, perhaps I did not speak

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clearly enough. I think the "enterprise zone" concept is (a) reactionary and (b) ineffective. And I certainly do not want the public to provide "risk" capital to corporations making investments according to their usual criteria. But—and I borrow the notion from the Swedish socialists in the '60s and early '70s—when a corporation actually makes an innovative and risky investment that will generate jobs in an area of great need (high unemployment, high poverty rates, and so on), I am for a handsome tax credit. Second, and conversely, when a corporation runs out of a community simply to maximize the bottom line I am for stripping it of all tax breaks, including the right to count the cost of this antisocial move as a legitimate business expense. Third, I very much agree with Gus that Free Trade arguments are both irrelevant and reactionary in a world economy manipulated by multinational oligopolies, usually with government backing.

Robert Reich raises some difficult and important questions. My article was as broadly focused as it was because in Ronald Reagan's America the case for democratic planning has to be made before we can detail exactly how it will be done. However I very much want to respond to a couple of Reich's particulars. (I should acknowledge a debt: many of the statistics on the welfare state in my analysis were taken from the fascinating book, *Minding America's Business*, by Reich and Ira Magaziner. I disagree with some of its proposals but find it most valuable.)

There is no question that a worker-controlled—or even influenced—approach toward investment will be "conservative" about writing off jobs. Therefore Reich is quite right to say that, as decision-making becomes more democratic, provisions must be made to allow those affected by decisions to make hard choices without committing suicide.

The Swedish socialist "active labor-market policy" has tried to do more or less what Reich suggests. By requiring corporations to put aside funds in good times in anticipation of recessions and/or structural shifts in industry, displaced workers in Sweden were assured retraining and new jobs at least as good as the ones they lost. This enabled the labor movement to agree to a rather rigorous, efficiency-oriented policy that shut down unproductive plants.

However, the Swedish socialists ran into real trouble with this approach in the 1970s, which was one reason they were retired from office. The recession of 1974-75 was much deeper and more protracted than earlier downturns in Sweden; the amount of restructuring was greater than in the past; and the cost of the old approach became extremely high. That is one reason why Olof Palme's new government will seek a more radical response to the problem: wage-earner funds that will gradually make democratic collectivities of workers and community representatives into the dominant force on corporate boards of directors. One of the possibilities this opens up (and this relates to Lester Thurow's comment on wages) is that workers in control, not simply of the way in which transitions are made but also of the benefits of the transition, will be more likely to go along with needed changes.

One last point—in some ways it applies to Tyler and Thurow as well as Reich. I was, I think, insufficiently radical in not stressing the need for a planned reduction of the working week, year, and life, in the face of a technological revolution that could well shatter the traditional link between work and income during the next two or three decades.

Lester Thurow's comments are, as always, thought-provoking even if one disagrees with some of them. Lester sees a low *family* saving rate as the case of a general shortage of capital in American society. But family saving in this country has normally been in the form of investments in houses, and it can be argued that overly generous federal subsidies, particularly to the upper middle class and the rich, diverted resources from more rational uses. Second, the chief sources of non-residential fixed business investment have been retained profits, pension funds, and massive institutional investors such as the insurance companies.

That gets to my mathematical "error." Is it true that the "Pac Man Takeover" initiated by Bendix has nothing to do with real resources since the money changing hands is still available for real investment? I think not. I am not simply talking about the huge fees paid to bankers and lawyers (the London *Economist* estimates that such people received about $30 million for several weeks' work during the Pac Man caper). It is not even simply a matter of the impact of tens of billions in borrowed take-over dollars on the interest rate, that is, the way in which speculative games make real investments more costly and perhaps less likely. What about the enormous diversion of talent and attention from the real to the fanciful? As a former director of Bendix told the *Wall Street Journal*,

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"who the hell is running the show—the business of making brakes and aerospace equipment—while all this is going on?"

Martin Marietta had to pay very real money—which could well fetter, or even cripple, the operations of a previously efficient corporation—in order to resist the Bendix bid. Because it lavished $5.9 billion in debt on the Marathon Oil take-over, U.S. Steel now has a $1 billion annual interest charge on a total debt of $7.9 billion. It is not, I think, a mathematical "error" to argue that these speculative corporate gains misuse and waste real resources.

Second, Lester assumes that historical rates of saving and investment are required in the future. But, as *Fortune* pointed out in October, investment in high-tech industries, like electrical and electronic equipment and nonelectrical machinery, has doubled since 1975. Is it possible, as the Systems Dynamic Group at MIT has suggested, that there is now *over*investment in the traditional industries? Will a high-tech economy have the same investment contours as a mass-production economy?

Third, what about wages? They were indeed "sticky" during the 1974-75 recession—thank God. However, there is currently a decline in real wages and a ferocious management offensive to drive them down even further. One "solution" to the current crisis would be to turn organized workers making $10 dollars an hour into unorganized workers receiving the minimum wage. That would lower the unemployment rate and the workers' standard of living at the same time. I think workers will rightly resist sacrifices required to provide investment funds to the current managers of American capitalism in a process that can only benefit those managers. But if there were structural changes in this country—perhaps in the Swedish mode—and if workers participated in the decisions and the benefits, that would help the entire society.

I AM GRATEFUL for the comments—and more convinced than ever that the democratization of investment through the effective participation of workers and citizens in choices that have up until now been made in boardrooms is a key demand. It is not only good social ethics; it is sound economics. □

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Theda Skocpol

Legacies of New Deal Liberalism

The United States, as Louis Hartz argues in *The Liberal Tradition in America*, may have been born liberal, and it may have grown up over two centuries confined within an unself-conscious Lockean consensus about an "American way of life" based on private property, individual freedom, and equality of opportunity for everyone to race ahead in the free market unencumbered by state controls.[1] Nevertheless, "liberalism," as an explicit political stance defined in opposition to "conservatism," emerged only during the New Deal of the 1930s—ironically, at the very historical moment when U.S. politics was pushing beyond the antistatist presumptions of classical liberalism.

During the grave crisis of the Depression, Franklin Roosevelt needed a new political label to symbolize the "bold, persistent experimentation" of the New Deal. His program called for the federal government to intervene in markets and society to promote the rights and welfare of nonprivileged groups and to ensure socioeconomic security and political stability for the nation as a whole. As the careful research of Ronald Rotunda has demonstrated, Roosevelt and other New Dealers deliberately chose the "liberal" label over possible alternatives. Prior to the 1930s, "liberalism" had been used occasionally as a synonym for "progressivism." It could tap progressive support yet still symbolize innovative departures. And "liberalism" was a good alternative and antidote to "socialism," allowing New Dealers to parry accusations of bureaucratic coercion and rigid collectivism, while competing with Herbert Hoover and other conservative critics of the New Deal for the claim of best representing the traditional American values of individualism and liberty.[2]

Their governmental activism, New Deal liberals asserted, protected democratic liberties and individual well-being and opportunity better than did the cold-hearted laissez-faire pieties of conservatism. In short, as Sam Beer sums up:

> [I]t is from the New Deal that liberalism in its contemporary American usage has acquired its principal meaning. . . . The liberalism that has been a really significant power in American politics, both as a set of ideas and a social force, has been . . . the *practical liberalism* [emphasis mine] brought into existence by the New Deal. And the stress on economic balance and economic security that was characteristic of the New Deal remained essential to the meaning of liberalism in its later embodiments in Truman's Fair Deal and the programs of the Kennedy–Johnson administrations.[3]

Indeed, from the 1940s through the mid-1970s, it appeared that this "practical liberalism" of the New Deal had irreversibly established the terms and limits of debate for U.S. domestic national politics. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that Democratic party liberals continuously held power or usually got their way. There were the Republican presidencies of Eisenhower and Nixon; and the conservative congressional coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats defeated quite a few liberal initiatives (and eviscerated many others), even when liberal Democrats sat in the White

This essay was originally prepared for a conference on "Liberalism: Does It Mean Anything Today?" sponsored by the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland, April 1-3, 1982. It will appear in *Liberalism Reconsidered*, edited by Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills, forthcoming. Amy Gutmann, Albert Hirschman, William Hixson, Jr., Douglas MacLean, and Claudia Mills all made helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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House. All the same, from 1940 onward even most Republicans and conservatives accepted the inevitability of basic New Deal accomplishments, such as Social Security, legalized labor unions, federal farm-price supports, and housing and urban-development subsidies. Arguments were not over *whether* the government should undertake basic "positive" programs, but over the details of *how* government should act (e.g., direct federal controls versus indirect subsidies to private actors or to local and state governments), of *who should benefit* (e.g., middle-class suburbanites and well-to-do commercial farmers versus the poor), and of *how federal expenditures should be financed* (e.g., deficit spending versus increased taxes, and taxes of what sorts, collected from whom?).

Certainly, post-New Deal liberals and conservatives struggled over many important issues between 1940 and the mid-1970s, and conservative victories stymied or modified most liberal initiatives. But it was still a comfortable era for the heirs of New Deal "practical liberalism." For all of the battles were, so to speak, on their terrain. And in politics, as in warfare, advantages of terrain count for a great deal. They can insure against losing the war even when many engagements are forfeited. During the entire era from the Fair Deal through (and beyond) the Great Society, "practical liberals" could face defeats, setbacks, and partial victories with equanimity. For they determined the issues around which the battles would be fought. After bandaging their wounds, resting their forces, and (they hoped) bringing up reinforcements through victories in the next election, they would surely return to fight again another day.

Well, now, in the early 1980s, post-New Deal "practical liberals" can no longer be so complacent. The terrain of American political battles has suddenly shifted, and modern U.S. liberalism—the New Deal's commitment to social and economic betterment through partial, gradually extended federal government interventions—has come into question, especially from a resurgent new right, but also from an occasionally heard democratic-socialist left. Not surprisingly, the New Deal figures prominently in the current debates about where America should go politically from here. This is not merely because 1982 was the centennial of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's birth, but also because spokespersons of all political persuasions rightly sense that the era of New Deal liberalism is coming either to an end or to a fundamental watershed.

Yet the New Deal still resonates so potently in the American public imagination that virtually everyone involved in reexamining the legacy of "practical liberalism" is, at the same time, trumpeting an intention to recapture—or continue—the New Deal's true spirit. Thus from the anti-welfare-state right, Ronald Reagan tells us that the true FDR was, at heart, a budget-balancer reluctant to extend government handouts to the poor beyond strictly temporary "relief," for fear of permanently undermining the moral fiber of the American people. And from the socialist left, Alan Wolfe tells us in his provocative recent book, *America's Impasse,* that New Deal liberalism lost its soul only in the aftermath of World War II, when Democrats failed to reassert the genuine New Deal program of government planning and income redistribution.[4]

Finally, today's "liberal" Democrats (although not sure that they want to call themselves that anymore) are groping for tactics to continue "practical liberalism" in the new climate. Much of what the *New Republic* has to say these days embodies this effort, and according to that journal's recent editorial reexamination of Roosevelt, his "largeness of democratic spirit" is what today's Democratic party should continue. It shouldn't become a party of minorities, hung up on socioeconomic redistribution, but should imitate Roosevelt's "inclusiveness and universality of . . . social vision" by respecting "the real discontents of the American middle class—the fear of crime, the disgust with lousy schools, the creeping sense of social and economic disintegration." And by emphasizing, in response, policies of "human capital" development, of "equality of opportunity," and of limits on bureaucracy, it should strive to cement the link between the Democratic party and that broad American "middle class."[5]

In sum, much as Roosevelt himself in the 1930s hoped to capitalize upon the ambiguous

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resonances of the "liberal" label with "progressivism" and "liberty," contemporary U.S. political innovators try to avoid the appearance of fundamental ideological departures by claiming to reconnect with what was best about the New Deal, even as they discard the undesirable or outmoded tenets of "practical liberalism" that came down to us from that era.

My own view about the connection between the New Deal and the political choices Americans in and to the left of the Democratic party now face is rather more hard-headed and less sentimental than the views of those trying to define and recapture the New Deal's true spirit. While the New Deal is certainly responsible for many of the best things that have been achieved in 20th-century U.S. politics (with the crucial exception of the civil rights breakthroughs of the 1960s), it is now time to dissect its flawed achievements, its failed possibilities, and its contradictory unintended legacies. We must come to understand exactly why the "practical liberalism" of the New Deal was never politically coherent or self-sustaining in its own terms. Once this is done, we should be able to see the best way forward for defending and building upon the New Deal's achievements—achievements such as establishing federal government responsibility for socioeconomic security and national economic well-being, and extending new benefits to the socially and politically excluded. The way forward will require much more ideologically and politically coherent choices than any that might be embodied in either a romantic return to the spirit of the 1930s or a slightly refurbished version of New Deal and post-New Deal "practical liberalism" propounded by an unreorganized version of today's Democratic party.

The Political Failings of the Domestic New Deal, 1932–39

IT IS BY NOW a commonplace that the New Deal failed to bring full national economic recovery to America. It came only with World War II. Everyone would agree that, since recovery was one of the New Deal's most persistently declared objectives, it was, even in its own terms, an "economic failure." Less often recognized, but equally significant, are the *political* shortcomings of the New Deal. They are obscured because World War II brought America international triumphs and national economic expansion. Yet as the heading for a recent magazine article cleverly put it: "Between Dr. New Deal and Dr. Win-the-War was Dr. Stalemate."[6] From 1937 to 1940, Franklin Roosevelt had to use all of his personal political skills to ride out a period of repeated defeats for his domestic (and international) political program.

In the 1932, 1934, and 1936 elections, Roosevelt's increasingly reformist New Deal programs scored a succession of ever-greater electoral triumphs. By 1936, the New Deal electoral base had expanded to a degree unprecedented in 20th-century America; this support was truly national and proportionately stronger as one descended the socioeconomic scale.[7] After the 1936 election, FDR and the Democratic-dominated Congress were ostensibly set to launch a series of programs to extend and secure the social reforms of the Second New Deal. These efforts faltered from the very start: Roosevelt's plans for "reforming" the Supreme Court and for reorganizing the executive branch were stymied; redistributive spending measures were increasingly trimmed back; an extension of TVA-style regional planning was defeated; and key programs favoring labor, poorer farmers, blacks, and consumers of low-cost housing were blocked or severely circumscribed by conservatives in Congress.[8]

Then, from the 1938 election on through 1946, New Deal liberals lost regular increments of electoral support. Roosevelt squeaked into World War II just ahead of the antiunion, anti-New Deal "Communist" hunters in Congress. And, although many core New Deal reforms—such as legalizing labor unions—were solidly institutionalized during the war, many others, especially those moving toward national social and economic planning, extended welfare provisions, guarantees of national full employment, and aid to poorer farmers, farm tenants, and farm laborers, were eliminated by Congress during or immediately after the war.[9] Essentially, all of the New Deal's significant post-1936 redistributive and state-strengthening efforts were stymied or trimmed away during the very period from 1937 to 1946, when Roosevelt secured his

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personally triumphant place in the annals of the U.S. presidency, and when the "practical liberalism" of the Democratic party came to set the terms and limits of discourse for U.S. politics in the mid-20th century.

What happened to the reformist New Deal immediately after 1936? Why didn't the huge electoral triumph translate into greater and sustained momentum for further socioeconomic redistribution, for broader planning, and for well-institutionalized social-democratic Keynesian styles of government taxing and spending? Many historians would point to FDR's poor tactics in attacking the Supreme Court when and how he did, or would argue that the American electorate didn't really want further New Deal reforms. While there may be correct insights in these explanations, both fail to underline the more important *constraints of U.S. governmental structure and of Democratic party organization* that underlay the sudden stalling of the domestic New Deal between 1936 and 1939. Although neither FDR nor "urban liberal" New Dealers fully knew or willingly accepted it (that is why they kept *trying* to do reformist things), the New Deal by 1936 had squeezed just about all of the sociopolitical innovations it could out of the existing U.S. political structures. Indeed, within the bounds of those structures, it had, through its own earlier achievements and initiatives, set in motion counterforces that would stop the further progress and would erode the enduring foundations of liberal reforms.

LET ME SPELL OUT what I mean in a bit more detail by talking briefly about three key areas of political failure in the New Deal, suggesting how the structures of the U.S. government and of the Democratic party helped to produce these shortcomings.

(1) *The New Deal failed to create a stable political coalition between farmers and urban workers.*

Anyone who reads through FDR's political speeches of the early 1930s can see that he was trying to make the Democratic party appealing to both farmers and urban workers. He often stressed ways in which the economic welfare of nonprivileged urban and rural Americans was tied together. Ironically, however, New Deal agricultural policies ended by politically strengthening conservative rural interests that would from 1936 onward oppose many key elements of urban-liberal programs favoring unionized workers and the poor. The early New Deal's major effort to raise farm prices—the Agricultural Adjustment Act—was successfully implemented with largely preexisting federal government resources, through the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the federal/state Extension Service.[10] An unintended effect was to greatly strengthen the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), an interest group based especially on richer commercial farmers in the South and Midwest.[11] Because of this group's increasingly effective lobbying, and because Roosevelt was never willing to antagonize Southern Democrats in Congress, New Deal agricultural programs to help black tenants in the cotton South, or poorer farmers anywhere, were shunted to the margin and ultimately whittled away by Congress between 1937 and 1945.[12] No sooner, moreover, had richer farmers recovered from the worst Depression ravages with New Deal aid—which they did by 1936—than they and their congressional representatives began to turn against further New Deal reforms. Thus just as liberal, urban-based Democrats hit their legislative stride in 1936, they faced decreasing rural support for their programs.[13]

Had blacks in the South been able to vote, or had earlier New Deal farm programs strengthened organizations representing tenants or poorer farmers, a strong urban/rural liberal coalition might have locked into place by 1936. As it was, however, the USDA's and the Extension Service's symbiotic ties to the AFBF, and the politically expedient efforts of early New Deal farm programs to avoid ruffling the feathers of congressional Democrats elected by the cotton-planter-influenced white oligarchies of the South, proved too effective. These unchallenged "givens" of the federal administrative structure and of Congress and the Democratic party channeled the New Deal away from the farmer/worker coalition implicit in its electoral appeals and implicit in the enthusiastic support the New Deal received in 1932, 1934, and 1936 from poorer farmers and workers in the United States as a whole.

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(2) *The New Deal failed to link its "urban-liberal" reforms to an institutionalized system of federal economic planning.*

From 1935 to 1938, a number of "urban-liberal" measures passed that created new bases of political support for New Deal liberals and mandated permanent flows of social spending. Examples include the Wagner Act, legalizing labor unions, the Social Security Act, providing federal welfare subsidies and establishing old-age and unemployment insurance, the Wagner Housing bill, and continuing appropriations for public works and emergency relief. By the time of the 1937 recession, moreover, many New Dealers, including the ever-reluctant FDR, were somewhat persuaded that Keynesian-style federal deficit spending could help achieve economic recovery and sustained economic growth.

What the federal government of the 1930s sorely lacked, though, was established administrative capacity to plan social and economic programs and to coordinate and implement them through functionally streamlined federal agencies. During the New Deal, academic experts pressed upon Roosevelt ideas for permanent, authoritative organs of national and regional planning.[14] He responded favorably to a number of concrete proposals and translated them into legislation or executive agencies. Still, unless various planning agencies could be linked to strong executive controls over budgeting, administration, and spending, they would mean little in practice.

However, FDR's comprehensive executive reorganization scheme, drawn up by professionals interested in social and economic planning and introduced after the 1936 election, was defeated in Congress. Congressional representatives, cabinet officials, and established interest groups were all afraid to disrupt their established mutual relationships, their little "iron triangles" of votes traded for piecemeal legislative benefits.[15] Even key urban liberals such as Robert Wagner opposed the very executive reorganization that might have made social-democratic spending and planning possible, because they feared for the "independence" of the National Labor Relations Board as a semiautonomous bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, those advocating national or regional planning in the New Deal period (and after) were never very realistic about how to fit their schemes into the existing U.S. political system.[16] They often advocated regional planning agencies because they hoped to bypass "politics" altogether—avoiding Congress, local urban machines, the states, all in the name of "expert authority" and "neutral administrative efficiency." Planning advocates were, in part, hampered by an illusion of the professional middle class carried into the New Deal from the Progressive era. This illusion was that good administration and wise planning could not go along with democratic politics.[17] Progressive era reforms had fought patronage-oriented, popular and democratically based machines.

In the New Deal, it might have been possible to garner a new kind of national democratic support for planning—especially for a goal like full employment. But expert planning advocates instead tried to stay away from "politics" as something implicitly dirty and contrary to their aims. Hence they failed to achieve stable support for planning agencies. And eventually, in the 1940s, Congress destroyed the last of the comprehensive planning boards set up by FDR—ironically, soon after it published a social-democratic Keynesian plan for *Security, Work, and Relief Policies,* to be implemented by liberal Democrats after the war![18]

(3) *The New Deal failed to legitimate new national welfare programs in communal terms.*

In an excellent essay called "The New Deal and the American Anti-Statist Tradition," James Holt has analyzed the evolving symbols and arguments invoked by New Dealers over the course of the 1930s to characterize and justify their new federal economic interventions and welfare reforms. Holt explores the extent to which "the difficulty of explaining and defending a complex and novel program of federal action in the face of deeply entrenched anti-statist traditions impeded the Roosevelt administration's efforts at reform."[19]

The New Deal was up against antistatist traditions in the 1930s, not just because Americans were ideologically prejudiced against strong public authority but also because, his-

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torically, they had not experienced (for good or ill) the impact of policies implemented by a centralized, bureaucratic national state. In 19th-century America there was no such thing, and even though federal administrative activities did expand markedly in the 20th century, Congress and the federal system always circumscribed direct, coordinated "national state" activities.[20] Americans thought of practical sovereignty as divided, and of ultimate sovereignty as residing abstractly in "the law" and "the Constitution," because these ideas in fact made the best sense possible of the actual conditions of the kind of political organization with which they lived.[21]

But FDR's New Deal made direct federal governmental activities an immediate reality for all Americans, and *the justification and portrayal of these new programs in New Deal rhetoric was a portentous ideological development in U.S. history*. As Holt shows, in the early New Deal FDR and his fellow politicians relied heavily on images of cooperation, combined with constant stress on the "experimental" activism of New Deal efforts. Things had to be done to promote economic recovery and relieve distress; only a distant, heartless federal government would fail to act boldly; and FDR's government would "roll up its sleeves" and "keep them rolled up," acting in the name of values of neighborliness that would bring the whole nation together in response to the emergency. As Holt astutely points out, this early New Deal rhetoric, although rather thin and expedient in many ways, did have a component of moral regeneration. For New Dealers called upon Americans to put aside selfish, competitive individualism in the name of solidarity and cooperation across sectional and class lines.

However, as the early New Deal—launched around the ultimately unsuccessful National Recovery Administration—gave way to the second, reformist New Deal of 1935 and after, the rhetoric changed. It became more focused on *political conflict*—the people against the "economic royalists"—and on *social security* for "the one-third of a Nation ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-clothed," not to mention the many still unemployed. In these ways, the rhetoric of the by now explicitly "liberal" New Deal became undeniably more radical. But, as James Holt underlines, in another way it simultaneously became more conservative. For the New Dealers after 1935 mostly gave up the rhetoric of collective solidarity as an antidote to excessive individualism, and instead sought to justify New Deal reforms as better means for achieving or safeguarding traditional American values of liberty and individualism. Their nascent national welfare state, New Dealers told Americans, was not the attack on basic American values that conservatives were saying it was—rather merely an excellent instrument for furthering those values by avoiding anarchy or dictatorship in the Depression crisis, striking down the excessive privileges and power of "economic autocrats" and relieving economic necessity so that Americans in distress could really be free and exercise their rights to equality of opportunity.

Now, obviously, New Dealers turned to this *instrumental* justification for their welfare-state reforms, tying them to established values of healthy market capitalism, individual rights, and equality of opportunity, precisely because New Dealers felt ideologically pressured from the right from 1934 on. They were operating in an individualist and antistatist political system. And they were facing increasingly vociferous conservative opponents with many political levers at their disposal in Congress and in the Democratic (and Republican) parties. Just as the comfortable ambiguities of the word "liberal" were a convenient way for the New Dealers to defuse rightist criticism, so was an essentially instrumentalist strategy for legitimating the new "practical liberal" welfare state.

In fact, it is possible—even probable—that the instrumental approach to legitimating the new state activities established by the New Deal actually was the safest way to stabilize and modestly extend "practical liberal" policies in U.S. domestic politics between 1937 and 1975. For between 1937 and 1940, liberal New Dealers were not able to beat conservatives in head-on collisions. And during and after World War II, liberal Democratic gains generally depended upon taking advantage of the rosy climate of national economic expansion and U.S. international hegemony to push through some reformist measures along with

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national spending programs to benefit not only blue-collar workers and the poor but also the more "middle-class," more suburban, and richer supporters of the Republicans. In these circumstances, non-collectivist visions of liberalism and the welfare state were no doubt the only rhetorically workable ones.

To have achieved more of the essentially social-democratic goals that they began to strive for in the post-1936 New Deal, New Deal liberals should have been much less "practical" than they were *at the very start of their period of power*. Roosevelt should have attempted a liberal reorganization of the Democratic party from 1933 to 1936, rather than waiting (as he did) to make a feeble, thoroughly unsuccessful effort in 1938. All New Dealers, especially urban liberals, should have striven from the start to make structural changes in Southern agriculture and race relations, and through these to reform and liberalize—indeed revolutionize—the Southern wing of the Democratic party. Would-be planners and reorganizers of the federal government should have tried to make explicit popular political appeals from 1934 to 1936. And New Dealers should have clothed their positive federal actions throughout in rhetoric combining class appeals and visions of national socioeconomic security with explicit new definitions of *state action as a desirable and enduringly necessary instrument of national public good* as well as of individual well-being. People's inevitable dependence upon one another and upon a healthy public life should have been stressed to legitimate welfare efforts.

Now, of course, I am not denying that there were many historical factors at work to make the New Deal happen the way it actually did. But it is still useful to set up an ideal counterfactual scenario, not only because it suggests how history might have unfolded differently, but also because it may help us to understand the problematic legacies that New Deal liberalism has bequeathed to us, now that the comfortable 1940 to 1975 interlude of steady U.S. national economic growth and international hegemony is over. For now, in the 1980s, the chickens of the New Deal's flawed accomplishments are coming home to roost. To deal with the hard political choices that are upon us, we must become as clear as possible about what harm (as well as good) the New Deal's timid "practical liberalism" may have done. And we must learn as much as possible from the New Deal reformers' political blind spots and strategic failures, in order to see how reformers today might do better if they ever get another chance to try.

The End of New Deal Liberalism and Where to Go From Here

A RECENT *Chicago Tribune* column by feature writer Anne Keegan, entitled "New Deal Has a Fit of Depression," highlights the contradictory legacies of New Deal liberalism in one small Texas town.[22] New Deal, Texas—"a town where just about everyone makes his living off cotton farming"—did not exist back in the 1930s.

> It was merely a stop along the railroad where cotton was loaded up to be shipped off to the mills. . . . "No dwellings at all" says Ora May Hindman, the town's self-appointed historian. "Nothing around here but family farms." . . . But then came the Depression. And Roosevelt. And the New Deal. "Back in the Depression when nobody had much of anything and no jobs and Roosevelt was handing out money," says Zo Clary, the school assessor, "he handed out some this way. And they built a consolidated schoolhouse right here, and they called it New Deal. People moved in, and the town grew up around it."

Cotton farming was good over the next several decades, in an era of national growth, with price supports in place. Fathers did well and passed on prosperous family spreads to sons. But now another economic depression has hit, and bankruptcies are spreading in New Deal.

> The bad economy, . . . the inflated cost of farm equipment, the high cost of fuel and the prohibitive interest on bank loans—and farmers live on loans until the harvest comes in—are breaking these farmers.

And how do the threatened denizens of New Deal interpret their situation? Anne Keegan reports:

> Not only are these long-time cotton farmers afraid of being forced to go broke, sell out and

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maybe lose their cherished land, they are also afraid of what that will mean—the extinction of the *independent farmer* [emphasis mine]. [Moreover,] if there is fear among these men now, and pessimism and even an uncharacteristic cynicism—it is not directed toward Ronald Reagan, their president. . . . "Hell, what he is contending with is what we saw building up for years," mutters one of the farmers. "Too many handouts in this country. Too much something for nothing. Food stamps, welfare, federal programs growing bigger. . . . Too much bureaucracy. Too much getting soft and lazy. That's what led us to this. Reagan is trying but he's fighting a building up over the years. He can't turn it around overnight. He's doing what has to be done. And about time, by God."

Roosevelt may have poured money into New Deal back in the old Depression and done the town some good, but that's not what these farmers want for New Deal in this new depression. "Just the opposite," says [one of them]. "We don't want handouts. We don't want food stamps or welfare. We just want a little help in having the interest rates dropped down for farmers. . . . "

These reactions from Texas cotton farmers —whose town was built upon New Deal public works and cotton price supports but who now oppose government spending, welfare, and bureaucracy, and merely want federal interest subsidies for farmers—also echo among blue-collar unionists and middle-class suburbanites helped by "practical liberal" programs, ranging from the Wagner Act to home mortgage subsidies. The unionists want particular jobs in particular industries saved through federal bail-outs, but oppose "welfare handouts." And the middle-class suburbanites want college loans preserved, but oppose "bureaucratic quotas" enforcing affirmative action for blacks. And so forth.

The basic political shortcomings of the New Deal's "practical liberalism" matter very much now that federal spending does not appear to guarantee a healthy economy and a steadily growing pie of revenues and opportunities from which every interest group can benefit with no hard public chores. The absence of strong political coalitions across urban and rural, black and white, middle-class and poor is glaringly apparent. The absence of authoritative governmental centers for national economic planning and for the coordination of social and economic interventions makes continued confidence in federal "bureaucratic meddling" difficult to sustain. And most obvious—and dangerous—of all is the incomprehension of all too many Americans that, as Michael Walzer eloquently puts it, "the welfare state . . . expresses a certain civil spirit, a sense of mutuality, a commitment to justice. Without that sense, no society can survive for long as a decent place to live—not for the needy, and not for anyone else." Walzer continues:

> The idea of the welfare state isn't exhausted by a modest effort at income redistribution, risk control, relief for the poor, and health and employment insurance. The word "welfare" means "the state or condition of well-being," and well-being is a moral as well as a material condition. Communal provision is required for the whole range of social goods that make up what we think of as our way of life. Not my way of life or yours, but ours, the life we couldn't have if we didn't plan for it and pay for it together. Not subsistence only, but science, culture, schooling, communication, travel, natural beauty: all this is public business. . . . The ideology of selfishness has no answer to the question, how shall *we* live?[23]

Unfortunately, given the legacies of the New Deal's political shortcomings, Reaganite proponents of the ideology of selfishness are having an easy time attacking "practical liberalism" from its right flank. Incoherent, piecemeal government regulations and subsidies may promote partial securities for mutually isolated groups, each of which will fiercely defend its own government programs. But they do not add up to the reality or the appearance of effective public planning for societal health or national economic readjustment in an era of crisis. Nor can the welfare state—the entire collection of programs expressing social compassion and solidarity—be easily defended against individualist, market-oriented, anti-statist attacks when it lacks clear political and cultural legitimation.

What are "practical liberalism's" direct heirs, especially the denizens of the Democratic party, doing about the crises of their governmental system and their long taken for

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granted political creed? As one possible indication, a recent issue of the *New Republic* offering "ideas, themes, and proposals that the Democratic party ought to be debating as it looks toward 1984 and beyond," suggests that they may be far from thinking radically enough. The *New Republic* suggests a refurbishment and continuation of long-established "liberal and democratic values," and declares that the "challenge after Reagan remains what is has always been, to make those values the living substance of our common life."[24]

Nowhere in this special issue, and nowhere in its distinctly social-democratic articles by Michael Walzer, Lester Thurow, and Robert B. Reich, do we find any mention of a need for basic *political reforms* such as federal government restructuring, reorganization of the Democratic party, mobilization of new political alliances, or reexamination of the basic "practical liberal" values, public rhetoric, or ideological self-understandings with which the Democratic party has long been operating. Thurow complains briefly about the misguided industrial policies adopted by congressional representatives anxious simply to preserve existing jobs and companies in their districts, no matter how economically inefficient.[25] But when he and Reich call for new regional public investment banks, they, like the Progressives and New Deal planning proponents of old, say nary a word about how, politically, to fit these into the existing or a reorganized system of democratic government. In his eloquent moral defense of the communal values of "the welfare state—taxes, bureaucrats, rules and regulations—the whole thing," Walzer mentions the steady decline in U.S. political participation.[26] Yet he has nothing practical to say about how to mobilize and organize new levels of political participation or how to inspire morally reeducated public commitment to the welfare state. Are we to believe that the existing Democratic party—with its recent reforms partly revoked to strengthen the hand of already elected party officials—can serve as an adequate organizational and ideological vehicle for creating, enacting, and supporting a social-democratic vision of the welfare state, not to mention planned national economic renewal? The notion really strains the imagination.

Much more likely is that any unreformed Democratic party that comes back to power after an immediate Republican/Reagan debacle in 1982 and 1984 will do no more—and, really, *aim* to do no more—than reinstate or slightly extend the old, pre-1980 "practical liberal" measures of federal social spending, especially those wanted most by the white-collar and professional middle classes: college loans, research monies, environmental programs, and federal programs for the arts and urban development. Nor would anything more than defensive, status quo oriented programs of security for declining industries seem at all likely from the existing Democratic party working through the structures of congressional representation. Since none of this would address the fundamentals of the current U.S. economic crisis, or mobilize significant new support for the Democratic party, the rightist critique of the old "practical liberalism" would probably remain strong, perhaps sweeping neo-Reaganites, or worse, back into power after a few years.

Back in 1976, *Commentary* magazine ran a symposium called "What Is a Liberal—Who Is a Conservative?" in which 64 intellectuals commented on the current meaning of these political terms. My favorite answer was Robert Lekachman's explanation for why he, a few years before a convinced "liberal," now preferred the label "radical":

> The pillars of my liberalism circa the mid-60s included moderate confidence in the reforming capacities of enlightened Democratic presidents and Congresses, exaggerated attachments to Keynesian techniques of economic manipulation, reliance upon sustainable economic growth at generous rates to create enough tax revenues to finance Great Society programs, and faith that, none too soon, racial injustice and financial poverty were about to be exterminated.
>
> Why, then, a decade or so onward, do I embrace radicalism and bid farewell to liberalism? . . . Although much of . . . [the] fashionable [neoconservative] catalogue [of criticisms of Great Society-type liberal reforms] impresses me as either overstated or plain wrong, . . . I concur, though for different reasons, in the judgment that the liberal strategies still in vogue are unlikely to attain their aims. I shall call radical the lessons I derive from recent

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> experience: . . . contemporary (and largely justified) demands for group equity are too large to be satisfied at probable rates of future economic growth without substantial redistribution of income and wealth, and such transfers can occur only in the context of serious democratic planning for sustained full employment. . . .
>
> [I]n the 70s and later, familiar liberal objectives, notably equality of opportunity and full employment, can be approximated only after substantial structural alterations in the relation between public and private economic activity. Liberals accordingly can either trim their goals because their attainment involves changes they deplore, or they can perservere by advocating means that imply radical change. . . .
>
> It may be that the time has come to retire honorably the word liberal and continue the debate as a dialogue between radicals and conservatives.[27]

I quite agree with Lekachman's gentle valedictory for "liberalism" as we have known U.S. politics since the end of the New Deal, and I would only add a couple of further thoughts in conclusion.

First, today's and tomorrow's postliberal reformers—those committed to deepening rather than backing off from socioeconomic equity in this country—need to think and speak "radically" (in Lekachman's sense) not only about desirable new economic and social objectives for U.S. politics, but also about basic governmental and party reorganizations. Planning for economic security, national industrial regeneration, and greater social equity is, for example, a fine *goal* to articulate. But it cannot be widely supported, enacted, or effectively implemented within U.S. governmental and political arrangements as they are now.

Thus effective democratic reform politics today will require (as a fully successful reformist New Deal would have required) basic changes in U.S. political arrangements. Congressional elections and politics need to be reorganized to discourage representatives from simply brokering the established interests of the privileged and well-organized in each local constituency, and to encourage representatives, instead, to support sustained party programs in the interests of broad, national alliances of social groups. Political parties need to be reorganized to establish regular communication between grass-roots communities and workplace groups, on the one hand, and elected officials willing to engage in dialogue about policy proposals and policy implementation, on the other.

Finally, today's conservatives are not wrong in saying that levels of governmental responsibilities in the federal system need to be reexamined and ultimately rearranged. It is just that, from a reformist perspective, reexamination should result in an *expansion* of community, regional, and national planning and in an explicit legitimation for a *broader*, rather than narrower, public sphere in U.S. capitalism and American society. And such expansion of public authority must be accompanied by an extension of political participation (in elections, at least) into the huge and growing ranks of those Americans, disproportionately less privileged, who now avoid politics altogether.

My second thought about Lekachman's call for a new, post-liberal reformist politics is that, as a practical matter, and also in the interests of clear communication, the label "radical" will not do for those who want to continue and deepen social and political reforms in this country, rather than retreat into conservatism. "Radical" connotes for all too many Americans mindless, even violent, militancy. It brings to mind lurid images of bra-burners, street-demonstrators, and bomb-throwers. More important, it is silent symbolically on what reform politics should be striving *for*. "Democratic planning" and "social democracy" are less frightening and more positively evocative terms for reformist postliberals to adopt. And they are also more honest and courageous. They imply—as they should—a clear departure from previous "liberal" treatments of public action and the welfare state as merely convenient instruments for the pursuit of individualistic benefits. And they indicate a determined commitment to work steadily toward a certain kind of good society.

The New Deal liberal reformers in the 1930s were stopped short of many of their best objectives, in part because they failed to work for governmental and party reorganizations from the start. Moreover, they failed to offer a sustained vision of new state actions as expressions of *public* interests and the well-being of

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the national *community*. By presenting the welfare state as a set of experimental instruments for the pursuit of traditional American individualist values, they left themselves and their "practical liberal" successors vulnerable to conservative counterpressures, especially now that New Deal-style government programs do not seem to ensure or be comfortably associated with economic growth.

NOW, IN THE 1980s, the problems faced by reformers are in many ways different from those that confronted the New Deal reformers in the 1930s. Today the objectives of reform politics are necessarily different in most respects. America's economic difficulties are different, and the demands for social equity have evolved. Besides, reformers today must contend with the unintended ill consequences of the New Deal's halfway victories. Still, present-day reformers can learn lessons from the New Deal—not by romantically harking back to its "true spirit," but by seeking to avoid analogous mistakes in political strategies. A renewed (or continued) commitment to a purely pragmatic "neoliberalism" at this time would not only repeat the mistakes made by reformers in the 1930s. It would ensure the steady further diminution of any firm commitment to socioeconomic equity on the part of the Democratic party. And it might facilitate the displacement of the Democrats by post-Reagan Republicans.

Robert Lekachman is right that, in one way or another, genuine political debates in America will continue not between conservatives and liberals but between conservatives and radicals —or, I would say, between conservatives and social democrats. Reformers at the progressive cutting edge of the Democratic party, the traditional home of liberals since the 1930s, should not fear this. They should embrace it. The "practical liberalism" we have had since the 1940s has exhausted its distinctive contributions and visionary appeal in U.S. politics. The time has now arrived for hard political choices. And the opportunity is here to set forth a vision of American democratic politics committed to using public authority to regenerate industrial development (not just growth) and committed to ensuring economic security and cultural opportunities for *all* Americans, in bad times as well as good. This vision is not anticapitalist. But it is social democratic, and it definitely implies a restructuring of many aspects of existing U.S. capitalism, as well as a restructuring of our polity. Such social-democratic restructurings are going to prove necessary to get us out of our present economic and political impasse—and I, for one, see no reason why reform-minded postliberals should not be willing to say so, loud and clear.

Notes

[1] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955).

[2] Ronald D. Rotunda, "The 'Liberal' Label: Roosevelt's Capture of a Symbol," *Public Policy* 17 (1968): pp. 377–408. For a time, critics of the New Deal from the right insisted upon calling themselves "the true liberals." But from the late 1930s on, they accepted the label "conservative" for their position.

[3] Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," in *Left, Right and Center: Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States*, Robert A. Goldwin, ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 145-46.

[4] Alan Wolfe, *America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), esp. chap. 2.

[5] The Editors, "The Roosevelt Century," *New Republic*, January 27, 1982, pp. 5-9; quotes from p. 9.

[6] James MacGregor Burns and Michael R. Beschloss, "The Forgotten FDR," *New Republic*, April 7, 1982, pp. 19-22.

[7] James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 199–222; John M. Allswang, *The New Deal and American Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), chapter 3; and Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935).

[8] See esp.: Richard Polenberg, *Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government, 1936-1939* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966); Richard Polenberg, "The Decline of the New Deal," in *The New Deal: The National Level*, John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody, eds. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975); William E. Leuchtenburg, "Roosevelt, Norris and the 'Seven Little TVAs,' " *Journal of Politics*, August 1952, pp. 418-41; James T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), chap. 3 and following chaps.

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[9] David Brody, "The New Deal and World War II," in *The New Deal: The National Level*, Braeman, Bremner, and Brody, eds.

[10] See the full discussion of Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal," *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 1982, pp. 268-75.

[11] Robert L. Tontz, "Memberships of General Farmers' Organizations, United States, 1874-1960," *Agricultural History*, July 1964, pp. 154-56; and Grant McConnell, *The Decline of Agrarian Democracy* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), chap. 7

[12] McConnell, *Agrarian Democracy*, chaps. 8-10; Sidney Baldwin, *Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Administration* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968). A good overview of the New Deal's agricultural programs, their political underpinnings and effects, is Richard S. Kirkendall, "The New Deal and Agriculture," in *The New Deal: The National Level*. Braeman, Bremner, and Brody, eds.

[13] See Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism*.

[14] There are many aspects, complexly interwoven, to the story of attempts at planning and administrative rationalization in the New Deal. For overviews, see: Marion Clawson, *New Deal Planning: The National Resources Planning Board* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Otis L. Graham, Jr., "The Planning Ideal and American Reality: the 1930s," in *The Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial*, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, eds. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974); and Barry Karl, "National Planning in the New Deal" (unpublished paper, American-Soviet Conference of Historians, April 1981).

[15] Polenberg, *Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government*; and Barry D. Karl, *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

[16] Some sense of this comes through in Barry D. Karl, *Charles Merriam and the Study of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), chaps. 12-13.

[17] A discussion of the Progressive era's governmental reforms that is especially sensitive to the tensions between expertise and "efficiency," on the one hand, and politics and democracy, on the other, is Martin J. Schiesl, *The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America: 1880-1920* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).

[18] *Security, Work, and Relief Policies*, Report of the Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies to the National Resources Planning Board (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942).

[19] James Holt, "The New Deal and the American Anti-Statist Tradition," in *The New Deal: The National Level*, Braeman, Bremner, and Brody, eds.

[20] See Stephen Showronek, *Building a New American State* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[21] A good discussion of these aspects of American "political culture" appears in Ira Katznelson and Kenneth Prewitt, "Constitutionalism, Class, and the Limits of Choice in U.S. Foreign Policy," in *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, Richard R. Fagen, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), pp. 27-33.

[22] *Chicago Tribune*, February 17, 1982, pp. 1, 4. All quotes are from the article.

[23] Michael Walzer, "The Community," *New Republic*, March 31, 1982, pp. 11-14.

[24] "The Agenda After Reagan" (seven-article section) *New Republic*, March 31, 1982, pp. 11-33.

[25] Lester Thurow, "The Economy," *New Republic*, March 31, 1982, pp. 24-25.

[26] Walzer, "The Community," pp. 11 (quote) and 14.

[27] *Commentary*, September 1976, pp. 76-77. □

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Irving Howe

From Roosevelt to Reagan

In slightly changed form, this article was first given as a speech at a national convention of Americans for Democratic Action several months ago. — EDS.

No one said: we will now establish a welfare state. The phrase "welfare state"—that is, a state assuming some direct responsibility for the socioeconomic welfare of its citizens—was not commonly used in the early 1930s. What characterized the Roosevelt administration was a readiness to improvise and occasionally listen to eggheads. The new president was far from certain where he wished to go, but he grasped intuitively that it would be disastrous simply to wait for those mysterious workings of "free enterprise" in order to bring the country out of the depression. There followed the alphabetical agencies, from NRA to TVA—some lasting and others forgotten, some valuable and others mere nonsense. Out of this confusion and improvisation emerged the welfare state or, as I would say, the semi-welfare state that we have had, far less generous or comprehensive than that of poorer countries in Europe.

But here we must note a crucial point: there was improvisation, yes, but it did not come out of the blue. For several decades a significant part of American political thought had been devoted to envisaging the kinds of social change that a ruthless capitalist economy required, changes that would not involve a total transformation but might at least introduce a measure of humaneness and responsibility. From the Progressives to the Socialists, from Paul Douglas to Frank Norris to Norman Thomas, in the *New Republic* and the *Nation*, proposals for social legislation were being tested out. So that *even before the New Deal was begun, there was a program waiting for it.* Without the speculative coherence of earlier thought, there could not have been the useful confusion of the early Roosevelt years.

Historians have often remarked that major historical actors do not really know what they do until they have done it. All Roosevelt really wanted was to find ways of coping with the immediate crisis; but since he was imaginative and impatient—two qualities essential for the moment—he found himself moving in a sort of zigzag pattern toward the welfare state. Where else could he have gone?

Neither the right nor the left understood very well what was happening. Big business customarily regarded Roosevelt as its enemy, while in fact he was its (somewhat oppressive) savior. The American right was still in the grip, as it remains today, of what I'd call right-wing Emersonianism, a vision of things that may have had some point in 1830 and perhaps not even then. The right dreamed of a glorious time in the past when government allowed the free market its imperial way. For such sincere primitives the New Deal meant the end of the world they cherished—a world without social legislation or trade unions, a world in which individualism signified the free reign of robber barons, where freedom rested on the ethic of social Darwinism. Their behavior confirmed the wisdom of the great conservative economist Joseph Schumpeter who once said that if capitalism was to be saved, it would have to be saved from the capitalists.

As for the left, it had become so accustomed to responding to this ideology during the Coolidge and Hoover years that it could not adapt

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itself readily to the sophistication of Roosevelt. Part of the left collapsed uncritically in admiration of the New Deal—especially the Jewish trade unions, about which someone quipped that they believed in three worlds, *di velt, yene velt, un' Roosevelt*. Another part of the left took up a posture of intransigeant sectarianism, the rectitude of the pure, which has been so heavy a curse of American radicalism. It rejected the New Deal as a mere tinkering with a broken-down system. No doubt, it was mere tinkering, and at least some of Norman Thomas's criticisms were right. But there ought to have been a way—I speak with the assurance of retrospective wisdom—for democratic radicals both to support what was valuable in Roosevelt's program and criticize the rest.

A simple distinction suggests itself. Most of the New Deal economic measures were ineffective. "The New Deal," writes the historian William Leuchtenberg, "certainly did not get the country out of the Depression. As late as 1941, there were still 6 million unemployed, and it was really not until the war that the army of the jobless finally disappeared." But the social measures of the New Deal were of the greatest consequence—things people now take for granted—Social Security, unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, the right to organize unions. It is here that we come upon the lasting contribution of the Roosevelt era—*the socialization of concern,* the vision of society as a community, not based as yet on truly egalitarian principles but at least modulating the heartlessness of "rugged individualism."

I put all this abstractly, but those of us who have reached a certain age can also testify from our own experience. As the son of Jewish garment workers who suffered the full weight of the Depression, I know how much it meant to my parents when they could receive Social Security at the age of 65: it meant the difference between humiliating dependence and a modest independence. Whenever I hear that reactionary snob William Buckley on TV drawling his distaste for "government handouts" I fly into a rage and want again to mount my old soapbox. . . .

What mattered, then, in the New Deal was not this or the other economic measure but a new social principle—new, at least, for the United States. Roosevelt was open to many severe criticisms: his refusal to support legislation admitting refugees from Nazi Germany was a scandal; so was his attitude toward Loyalist Spain; so too the incarceration of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War. People like us should have been criticizing Roosevelt on these grounds, while supporting the social legislation that he was nonetheless introducing.

Let me turn a little more abstract. What do we mean by a welfare state? I'd say that it represents a phase in the development of capitalist society. Yes, but a capitalist society partly transformed and humanized through the pressures of internal, democratic insurgencies. Behind Roosevelt there were constituencies in turmoil, especially the rising industrial unions. The welfare state preserves the essential traits of the capitalist economy in that the interplay of private or corporate owners in the market remains primary, but it also modifies the workings of that economy in that the powers of free disposal by property owners are politically regulated. Creating thereby a certain tension between government and economy, state and society, the welfare state acts to save capitalism from its own self-destructive excesses.

But more. It creates a climate in which new values of communal responsibility can flourish ("Yes, I am my brother's keeper" rather than "Screw you, Jack").

None of this is utopia. Basic inequities remain, such as large disparities of income and wealth, from which flow major differences in political power. There also remains the lack of democratic participation in the life of the corporation and factory. But a beginning has been made, a ground for further advance.

Always, there is tension, imbalance, struggle within the welfare state. Some theorists of morality bemoan the loss of national unity and purpose that follows from the scramble for group privileges within the welfare state. There is a little something to this, but not much. Far more consequential is that in this scramble it's usually the dispossessed, the oppressed, the underprivileged who now speak up—those who were mute now find their voices.

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Society is "invaded" by those it has kept down or out. These "invaders" don't try to change the basic rules, but in wanting more, in staking out their claim for an entitlement, they gradually modify the basic rules. I think this constitutes a historic advance: from the early years or first phase of the welfare state undertaken mostly by economic interest groups—the workers and their unions—to a later phase undertaken by "status" or "value" constituencies—such groups as the women's movement, the environmentalists, the gays—which all speak in far-reaching moral terms. Straddling these two phases of the welfare state are the blacks, who rightly speak in behalf of both interests and values.

A few days ago a Texas professor, whose major claims to distinction are that he was nominated to head the National Endowment for the Humanities and that he dislikes Abraham Lincoln, said that he opposed egalitarianism on the ground that, since men could never really be equal, it was likely to foster constant restlessness. I loved that, since it's one of the reasons I favor egalitarianism—for it provides norms and goals, visions of a practical utopia, toward which to strive. And in its own way, the welfare state enables that striving.

BUT SUCCESS, as we know, also breeds failure. Many things went wrong with the welfare state, and it would be feckless to deny it.

- Sometimes the welfare state is so pinched in its financing that its measures must necessarily fail.
- Necessarily experimental, the welfare state makes mistakes. And there are always unforeseen negative consequences to the most positive actions.
- The welfare state operates within an economy geared to maximizing profit, and often there are deep, if little-noticed, conflicts between the policies of government and the dynamics of the economy in which it is the latter that proves dominant.
- It may be that we are living through a *systemic* crisis in the welfare state, one caused not by accidental or transient factors but by its intrinsic characteristics. The traditional economic crises of old-style capitalism had a self-regulating character—market glut, overexpansion, plunge into depression, reserve armies of unemployed, "disciplining" of labor, depressed wages, gradual lowering of inventories, reopening of factories, a new boom, and then the same thing all over again. These did "purge" the economy, though at terrible human costs, and each time with a greater need for governmental "medicine." Now under the welfare state there occurs a politicizing of crisis, so that fiscal, monetary, banking, employment and investment policies undertaken by the federal government turn out to be the political equivalents of those aspects of the relatively autonomous workings of the economy that under traditional capitalism hastened or slowed economic crisis.
- The welfare state operates mainly within the limits of each national economy, and hence finds it very hard to cope with the increasing number of socioeconomic problems that seem soluble only on an international level.
- Most immediately troubling, the welfare state satisfies its constituencies to different extents and at different rates, so that their variations of interest become sharper and often conflict, or are seen as conflicting. Coalitions break down through which electoral victories had been won.

THAT IS where we are today. Let me suggest a very rough distinction between what I call the first and second stages of the welfare state. In the first stage conflicts seem relatively clear: we need elementary social benefits, we need them to survive, we need them to have a half-decent old age. In the second stage—that's where we are now—things are not so clear. There is a pervasive sense of malaise, there are sudden new and puzzling modes of discontent, and there is a tendency for insurgencies to break up into smaller sects and one-issue movements. The sociologist C. Wright Mills once made a keen distinction between issues and troubles. Issues are precisely formulated, troubles are strongly felt but hard to dramatize into a slogan or demand. In the first stage of the welfare state—the Roosevelt-Truman stage—the liberal/left groups were able to articulate issues effectively. In the second stage we express our sense of trouble but still have not

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succeeded in transforming that sense into clear or dramatic issues.

THE CENTRAL TASK of the next several years, then, is to work out the programmatic basis for this second stage of the welfare state—to be bold enough to move forward conceptually and not retreat, like Senator Tsongas, into a holding pattern that will neither solve social problems nor arouse renewed enthusiasm.

One thing should be clear: a modern industrial society must accept a large amount of governmental intervention in socioeconomic life. (Reagan has not really cut down the amount, he has only changed the direction.) All that remains to be determined is whether this intervention will occur in behalf of the underprivileged, the modestly paid workers, the bulk of the population, or the national and multinational corporations.

And a last point; We oppose Reaganism not just on concrete socioeconomic grouns, nor because we believe it won't "work"—in some sense, it may "work" only too well. We oppose Reaganism because we find its vision of life nasty and brutish. The vision of "free enterprise" that it articulates hides a thrust of greed. The ideology of the New Federalism is nothing but a device for dumping the poor. The world view of the new conservatism is that of a conglomerate of Captain Ahabs rushing blindly to destruction in pursuit of a White Whale of power and profit.

There is another vision, and that is of a humane community, a widening democratization of economic life, a greater equality for all citizens. It is a vision of a new liberalism with a tincture of social democratic policy, or to use another vocabulary, a social liberalism. We want it not just because it will enable people to survive but also because it embodies a worthy sense of how people should live. □

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Ryszard Kapuscinski

The Emperor

In The Emperor *(which will be published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich this winter and from which we here reprint several excerpts), Ryszard Kapuscinski recounts the career of Haile Selassie from the primitive barbarism of his early years on the throne to the limousine-equipped barbarism of his late years, both resting on the misery of the Ethiopian people. The author sometimes speaks in his own voice (as in the first excerpt below); more often, though, he simply records the words of those he interviewed—the courtiers and menials (whose narratives are introduced by initials) recounting palace intrigue and court life under His Venerable Majesty, His Distinguished Majesty, His Magnanimous Majesty, His Benevolent Majesty. By turns funny, ludicrous, pathetic,* The Emperor *achieves a remarkable portrait of an anything-but-benevolent tyrant. When, in 1974, insurgents invade his palatial office, they find the carpet resting on a layer of American dollars; dollar bills float out of hundreds of frisked Bibles. The rebels press the old man for his Swiss bank accounts. Frail, the end coming close, his lips remain tightly sealed; he isn't giving anything away. The excerpts below come from three different parts of the book, the last leading us up to the point where His Distinguished Majesty nears the end of his reign—and his life.*

Ryszard Kapuscinski is Poland's most prominent foreign correspondent, spending the better part of the last 20 years or so in journalistic "hot spots"—Latin America, Africa, the Near East. (Andrzej Wajda's film Without Anasthesia *is presumably based on Kapuscinski's career, a reporter always away, covering a story in a distant land, removed from the turmoil of office politics and domestic, and personal, affairs.) Over the years, Kapuscinski published a number of volumes, mostly based on his reporting, occasionally visiting Poland, spending more time there while writing his books.* The Emperor *was a big success. It was followed by a book on Iran,* Shah of Shahs, *from which we quote (with the help of his publisher here): "Iran—it was the twenty-sixth revolution I had seen in the Third World. In the smoke and loud noise leaders changed, governments failed, new people sat in the easy chairs. But one thing was unchanging, indestructible—one dreads saying it—eternal helplessness."*

We haven't read the book on Iran, but the quotation evokes something that is conveyed subliminally but strongly in The Emperor. *Poland is never mentioned. Yet the reader cannot escape the sense that behind the lines of text on Ethiopia something is being said about Poland as well. Since the publication of his book, the paper for which he wrote,* Kultura, *ceased publication as martial law was imposed on the country. Without a paper to write for, he now devotes his time to "Poland 2000," a group futuristically looking ahead. He is reported to be at work on a book, entitled* World at the Boiling Point, *about the universalization of the sort of social problems and conflicts associated with the Third World.* — Eds.

In the evenings I listened to those who had known the Emperor's Court. Once they had been people of the Palace or had enjoyed the right of admission there. Not many of them remained. Some had perished, shot by the firing squad. Some had escaped the country; others had been locked in the dungeons beneath the Palace, cast down from the chambers to the cellars. Some were hiding in the mountains or living disguised as monks in cloisters. Everyone was trying to survive in his own way, according to the possibilities open to him. Only a handful remained in Addis Ababa, where, apparently, it was easiest to outwit the authorities' vigilance.

I visited them after dark. I had to change

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cars and disguises. The Ethiopians are deeply distrustful and found it hard to believe in the sincerity of my intentions: I wanted to recapture the world that had been wiped away by the machine guns of the Fourth Division. Those machine guns are mounted next to the drivers' seats on American-made jeeps. They are manned by gunners whose profession is killing. In the back sits a soldier taking orders by radio. The jeeps are open, so the drivers, gunners, and radiomen wear dark motorcycle goggles under the brims of their helmets to protect themselves from the dust. You can't see their eyes, and their bristled ebony faces have no expression. These three-man crews know death so well that the drivers race their vehicles around suicidally, making abrupt high-speed turns, driving against the flow on one-way streets. Everything scatters when they come careening along. It's best to stay out of their range. Shouts and nervous screams blare amid crackles and squeals from the radio on the knees of the one in the back. You never can tell if one of the hoarse screams is an order to open fire. It's better to disappear. Better to duck into a side street and wait it out.

I penetrated the muddy alleys, making my way into houses that from the outside looked empty and abandoned. I was afraid. The houses were watched, and I was afraid of getting caught along with their inhabitants. Such a thing was possible, since they often made a sweep through a neighborhood or even a whole quarter of the town in search of weapons, subversive leaflets, or people from the old regime. All the houses were watching each other, spying on each other, sniffing each other out. This is civil war; this is what it's like. I sit down by the window, and immediately they say, "Somewhere else, sir, please. You're visible from the street. It would be easy to pick you off." A car passes, then stops. The sound of gunfire. Who was it? These? Those? And who, today, are "these," and who are the "those" who are against "these" just because they are "these"? The car drives off, accompanied by the barking of dogs. They bark all night. Addis Ababa is a dog city, full of pedigreed dogs running wild, vermin-eaten, with malaria and tangled hair.

They caution me again, needlessly: no addresses, no names, don't say that he's tall, that he's short, that he's skinny, that his forehead this or his hands that. Or that his eyes, or that his legs, or that his knees. . . . There's nobody left to get down on your knees for.

F.:

IT WAS a small dog, a Japanese breed. His name was Lulu. He was allowed to sleep in the Emperor's great bed. During various ceremonies, he would run away from the Emperor's lap and pee on dignitaries' shoes. The august gentlemen were not allowed to flinch or make the slightest gesture when they felt their feet getting wet. I had to walk among the dignitaries and wipe the urine from their shoes with a satin cloth. This was my job for ten years.

L. C.:

THE EMPEROR slept in a roomy bed made of light walnut. He was so slight and frail that you couldn't see him—he was lost among the sheets. In old age, he became even smaller. He weighed fifty kilograms. He ate less and less, and he never drank alcohol. His knees stiffened up, and when he was alone he dragged his feet, swaying from side to side as if on stilts. But when he knew that someone was watching him, he forced a certain elasticity into his muscles, with great effort, so that he moved with dignity and his imperial silhouette remained ramrod-straight. Each step was a struggle between shuffling and dignity, between leaning and the vertical line. His Majesty never forgot about this infirmity of his old age, which he did not want to reveal lest it weaken the prestige and solemnity of the King of Kings. But we servants of the royal bedchamber, who saw his unguarded moments, knew how much the effort cost him.

He had the habit of sleeping little and rising early, when it was still dark outside. He treated sleep as a dire necessity that purposelessly robbed him of time he would rather have spent ruling or at Imperial functions. Sleep was a private, intimate interval in a life meant to be passed amid decorations and lights. That's why

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he woke up seeming discontented with having slept, impatient with the very fact of sleep. Only the subsequent activities of the day restored his inner balance. Let me add, however, that the Emperor never showed the slightest sign of irritation, nervousness, anger, rage, or frustration. It seemed that he never knew such states, that his nerves were cold and dead like steel, or that he had no nerves at all. It was an inborn characteristic that His Highness knew how to develop and perfect, following the principle that in politics nervousness signifies a weakness that encourages opponents and emboldens subordinates to make secret jokes. His Majesty knew that a joke is a dangerous form of opposition, and he kept his psyche in perfect order. He got up at four or five and, when going abroad on a visit, at three in the morning. Later, when things grew worse in our country, he traveled more often. Then the only business of the Palace was to prepare the Emperor for new journeys. Upon waking, he rang the buzzer on his nightstand—the vigilant servants were waiting for the sound. The lights were turned on in the Palace. It was a signal to the Empire that His Supreme Majesty had begun a new day.

Y. M.:

THE EMPEROR began his day by listening to informers' reports. The night breeds dangerous conspiracies, and Haile Selassie knew that what happens at night is more important than what happens during the day. During the day he kept his eye on everyone; at night that was impossible. For that reason, he attached great importance to the morning reports. And here I would like to make one thing clear: His Venerable Majesty was no reader. For him, neither the written nor the printed word existed; everything had to be relayed by word of mouth. His Majesty had had no schooling. His sole teacher —and that only during his childhood—was a French Jesuit, Monsignor Jerome, later Bishop of Harar and a friend of the poet Arthur Rimbaud. This cleric had no chance to inculcate the habit of reading in the Emperor, a task made all the more difficult, by the way, because Haile Selassie occupied responsible administrative positions from his boyhood and had no time for regular reading.

But I think there was more to it than a lack of time and habit. The custom of relating things by word of mouth had this advantage: if need be, the Emperor could say that a given dignitary had told him something quite different from what had really been said, and the latter could not defend himself, having no written proof. Thus the Emperor heard from his subordinates not what they told him, but what he thought should be said. His Venerable Highness had his ideas, and he would adjust to them all the signals that came from his surroundings. It was the same with writing, for our monarch not only never used his ability to read, but he also never wrote anything and never signed anything in his own hand. Though he ruled for half a century, not even those closest to him knew what his signature looked like.

During the Emperor's hours of official functions, the Minister of the Pen always stood at hand and took down all the Emperor's orders and instructions. Let me say that during working audiences His Majesty spoke very softly, barely moving his lips. The Minister of the Pen, standing half a step from the throne, had to bend his ear close to the Imperial lips in order to hear and write down the Imperial decisions. Furthermore, the Emperor's words were usually unclear and ambiguous, especially when he did not want to take a definite stand on a matter that required his opinion. One had to admire the Emperor's dexterity. When asked by a dignitary for the Imperial decision, he would not answer straight out, but would rather speak in a voice so quiet that it reached only the Minister of the Pen, who moved his ear as close as a microphone. The minister transcribed his ruler's scant and foggy mutterings. All the rest was interpretation, and that was a matter for the minister, who passed down the decision in writing.

The Minister of the Pen was the Emperor's closest confidant and enjoyed enormous power. From the secret cabala of the monarch's words he could construct any decision that he wished. If a move by the Emperor dazzled everyone with its accuracy and wisdom, it was one more proof that God's Chosen One was infallible. On

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the other hand, if from some corner the breeze carried rumors of discontent to the monarch's ear, he could blame it all on the minister's stupidity. And so the minister was the most hated personality in the court. Public opinion, convinced of His Venerable Highness's wisdom and goodness, blamed the minister for any thoughtless or malicious decisions, of which there were many. True, the servants whispered about why Haile Selassie didn't replace the minister, but in the Palace questions were always asked from top to bottom, and never vice versa. When the first question was asked in a direction opposite to the customary one, it was a signal that the revolution had begun.

But I'm getting ahead of myself and must go back to the moment when the Emperor appears on the Palace steps in the morning and sets out for his early walk. He enters the park. This is when Solomon Kedir, the head of the Palace spies, approaches and gives his report. The Emperor walks along the avenue and Kedir stays a step behind him, talking all the while. Who met whom, where, and what they talked about. Against whom they are forming alliances. Whether or not one could call it a conspiracy. Kedir also reports on the work of the military cryptography department. This department, part of Kedir's office, decodes the communications that pass among the divisions—it's good to be sure that no subversive thoughts are hatching there. His Distinguished Highness asks no questions, makes no comments. He walks and listens. Sometimes he stops before the lions' cage to throw them a leg of veal that a servant has handed to him. He watches the lions' rapacity and smiles. Then he approaches the leopards, which are chained, and gives them ribs of beef. His Majesty has to be careful as he approaches the unpredictable beasts of prey. Finally he moves on, with Kedir behind continuing his report. At a certain moment His Highness bows his head, which is a signal for Kedir to move away. He bows and disappears down the avenue, never turning his back on the Emperor.

At this moment the waiting Minister of Industry and Commerce, Makonen Habte-Wald, emerges from behind a tree. He falls in, a step behind the Emperor, and delivers his report. Makonen Habte-Wald keeps his own network of informers, both to satisfy a consuming passion for intrigue and to ingratiate himself with His Venerable Highness. On the basis of his information, he now briefs the Emperor on what happened last night. Again, His Majesty walks on, listening without questions or comments, keeping his hands behind his back. He approaches a flock of flamingos, but the shy birds scatter when he comes near. The Emperor smiles at the sight of creatures that refuse to obey him. At last, still walking, he nods his head; Habte-Wald falls silent and retreats backward, disappearing down the avenue.

Next, as if springing up from the ground, rises the hunched silhouette of the devoted confidant Asha Walde-Mikael. This dignitary supervises the government political police. He competes with Solomon Kedir's Palace intelligence service and battles fiercely against private informer networks like the one that Makonen Habte-Wald has at his disposal.

The occupation to which these people devoted themselves was hard and dangerous. They lived in fear of not reporting something in time and falling into disgrace, or of a competitor's reporting it better so that the Emperor would think, "Why did Solomon give me a feast today and Makonen only bring me leftovers? Did he say nothing because he didn't know, or did he hold his tongue because he belongs to the conspiracy?" Hadn't His Distinguished Highness often experienced, at cost to himself, betrayal by his most trusted allies? That's why the Emperor punished silence. On the other hand, incoherent streams of words tired and irritated the Imperial ear, so nervous loquaciousness was also a poor solution. Even the way these people looked told of the threat under which they lived. Tired, looking as if they hadn't slept, they acted under feverish stress, pursuing their victims in the stale air of hatred and fear that surrounded them all. They had no shield but the Emperor, and the Emperor could undo them with one wave of his hand. No, His Benevolent Majesty did not make their lives easy.

As I've mentioned, Haile Selassie never commented on or asked questions about the

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reports he received, during his morning walks, about conspiracies in the Empire. But he knew what he was doing, as I shall show you. His Highness wanted to receive the reports in a pure state, because if he asked questions or expressed his opinion the informant would obligingly adjust his report to meet the Emperor's expectations. Then the whole system of informing would collapse into subjectivity and fall prey to anyone's willfulness. The monarch would not know what was going on in the country and the Palace.

Finishing his walk, the Emperor listens to what was reported last night by Asha's people. He feeds the dogs and the black panther, and then he admires the anteater that he recently received as a gift from the president of Uganda. He nods his head and Asha walks away, bent over, wondering whether he said more or less than what was reported by his most fervent enemies—Solomon, the enemy of Makonen and Asha; and Makonen, the enemy of Asha and Solomon.

Haile Selassie finishes his walk alone. It grows light in the park; the fog thins out, and reflected sunlight glimmers on the lawns. The Emperor ponders. Now is the time to lay out strategies and tactics, to solve the puzzles of personality, to plan his next move on the chessboard of power. He thinks deeply about what was contained in the informants' reports. Little of importance; they usually report on each other. His Majesty has made mental notes of everything. His mind is a computer that retains every detail; even the smallest datum will be remembered. There was no personnel office in the Palace, no dossiers full of personal information. All this the Emperor carried in his mind, all the most important files about the elite. I see him now as he walks, stops, walks again, lifts his head upward as though absorbed in prayer. O God, save me from those who, crawling on their knees, hide a knife that they would like to sink into my back. But how can God help? All the people surrounding the Emperor are just like that—on their knees, and with knives. It's never comfortable on the summits. An icy wind always blows, and everyone crouches, afraid that his neighbor might hurl him down the precipice.

W. A.-N.:

... AND SO, having finished the Hour of Assignments, His Indefatigable Majesty would move on to the Golden Hall. Here began the Hour of the Cashbox. This hour came between ten and eleven in the morning. His Highness was accompanied by the saintly Aba Hanna, who in turn was assisted by his faithful bag bearer. Someone with good ears and a good nose could tell how the Palace rustled with money, smelled of it. But this called for special imagination and sensitivity, because money was not lying around the chambers, and His Merciful Highness had no inclination to spread packets of dollars among his favorites. No, His Highness cared little for that sort of thing.

Even though, dear friend, it might seem incomprehensible to you, not even Aba Hanna's little bag was a bottomless treasury. The masters of ceremony had to use all sorts of stratagems to prevent the Emperor from being embarrassed financially. I remember, for instance, how His Majesty paid the salaries of foreign engineers but showed no inclination to pay our own masons after the construction of the Imperial Palace called Genete Leul. These simple masons gathered in front of the Palace they had built and began asking for what was due them. The Supreme Master of Palace Ceremony appeared on the balcony and asked them to move to the rear of the Palace, where His Magnanimous Highness would shower them with money. The delighted crowd went around back to the indicated spot—which enabled His Supreme Majesty to leave unembarrassed through the front door and go to the Old Palace, where the court awaited him.

Wherever His Majesty went, the people showed their uncontrolled, insatiable greed. They asked now for bread, now for shoes, now for cattle, now for funds to build a road. His Majesty liked to visit the provinces, to give the plain people access to him, to learn of their troubles and console them with promises, to praise the humble and the hardworking and scold the lazy and the disobedient. But this predilection of His Majesty's drained the treasury, because the provinces had to be put in order first: swept, painted, the garbage buried,

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the flies thinned out, schools built, the children given uniforms, the municipal buildings remodeled, the flags sewn, and portraits of His Distinguished Highness painted. It wouldn't do if His Majesty appeared suddenly, unexpectedly, like some poor tax collector, or if he merely came into contact with life as it is. One can imagine the surprise and mortification of the local dignitaries. Their trembling! Their fear! Government can't work under threat, can it? Isn't government a convention, based on established rules?

Imagine His Worthy Highness's having the habit of arriving unannounced! Let's say our monarch is flying north, where everything has been prepared, the protocol spruced up, the ceremonies well rehearsed, the province gleaming like a mirror, and then suddenly in the airplane His Distinguished Highness beckons to the pilot and tells him, "Son, turn this plane around. Let's fly south." In the south, there is nothing! Nothing ready! The south is loafing around, a mess, in rags, black with flies. The governor is off in the capital, the dignitaries asleep, the police have slithered off to the villages to plunder the peasants. How badly His Benevolent Majesty would feel! What an affront to his dignity! And, not to mince words, how ridiculous! We have provinces where the people are depressingly savage, pagan, and naked; without instructions from the police they might do something that would offend His Highness's dignity. We have other provinces where the benighted peasantry would flee at the sight of the monarch. Just imagine it, friend. His Most Extraordinary Majesty steps off the airplane, and around him—nothing. Silent emptiness, deserted fields, and everywhere you look, not a living soul. No one to speak to, no one to console, no welcoming arch, not even a car. What can you do? How can you act? Set up the throne and roll out the carpet? That would only make it more ridiculous. The throne adds dignity only by contrast to the surrounding humility. This humility of the subjects creates the dignity of the throne and gives it meaning. Without the humility around it, the throne is only a decoration, an uncomfortable armchair with worn-out velvet and twisted springs. A throne in an empty desert—that would be disgraceful. Sit down on it? Wait for something to happen? Count on someone's showing up to render homage? What's more, there isn't even a car to get you to the nearest village to look for the viceroy. Our distinguished monarch knows who he is, but how to find him? So what remains for His Majesty to do? Look around the neighborhood, get back into the plane, and fly north after all, where everything waits in excitement and impatient readiness: the protocol, the ceremonies, the province like a mirror.

Is it surprising that in such circumstances His Benevolent Majesty did not sneak up on people? Let's say that he would surprise first one, then another, here and there. Today he would surprise the province of Bale, in a week the province of Tigre. And he notes: "loafing around, filthy, black with flies." He summons the provincial dignitaries to Addis Ababa for the Hour of Assignments, scolds them, and removes them from office. News of this spreads throughout the Empire, and what is the result? The result is that dignitaries stop doing everything except looking at the sky to see whether His Distinguished Highness is coming. The people waste away, the province declines, but all that is nothing compared to the fear of His Majesty's anger. And what's worse, because they feel uncertain and threatened, not knowing the hour or the day, united by common inconvenience and fear, they start murmuring, grimacing, grumbling, gossiping about the health of His Supreme Highness, and finally they start conspiring, inciting others to rebel, loafing, undermining what seems to them an uncharitable throne—oh, what an impudent thought—a throne that won't let them live. Therefore, in order to avoid such unrest in the Empire and to avoid the paralysis of government, His Highness introduced a happy compromise that brought peace to him and to the dignitaries. Nowadays, all those who destroyed the monarchy point out that in each province His Most Worthy Majesty maintained a Palace always ready for his arrival. It is true that some excesses were committed. For instance, a great Palace was constructed in the heart of the Ogaden Desert and maintained for years, fully staffed with servants and its pantry

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kept full, and His Indefatigable Majesty spent only one day there. But what if His Distinguished Majesty's itinerary were such that at some point he had to spend a night in the heart of the Desert? Wouldn't the Palace then prove itself indispensable? Unfortunately, our unenlightened people will never understand the Higher Reason that governs the actions of monarchs.

U. Z.-W.:

IN THE PALACE, dejection, discouragement, fearful waiting for whatever might happen tomorrow—when suddenly His Majesty summons his counselors, reprimands them for neglecting development, and after giving them a scolding announces that we are going to construct dams on the Nile. But how can we erect dams, the confused advisers grumble, when the provinces are starving, the nation is restless, the Talkers are whispering about straightening out the Empire, and the officers are conspiring and rounding up the notables? Immediately, audacious rumors are heard in the corridors saying that it would be better to help the starving and forget about the dams. To this the Finance Minister replies that if the dams are built, it will be possible to let water into the fields and such an abundant harvest will result that there will be no more death from starvation. Well, yes, murmur those who had been whispering, but how long will it take to build the dams? In the meantime the nation will die of hunger. "The nation isn't going to die," explains the Finance Minister. "It hasn't died yet, so it isn't going to die now. And if we don't build the dams," he asks, "how are we going to catch up and surpass?" "But against whom are we supposed to be racing, anyway?" murmur the whisperers. "What do you mean, whom?" says the Finance Minister. "Egypt, of course." "But Egypt, sir, is wealthier than we are, and even Egypt couldn't put up dams out of its own pocket. Where are we supposed to find the funds for our dams?" Here the minister really lost his temper with the doubting, and began lecturing them, telling them how important it is to sacrifice oneself for development. Besides, His Majesty has ordered, has he not, that we all develop constantly, without resting even for a moment, putting our hearts and souls into it. And the Minister of Information immediately announced His Venerable Majesty's decision as a new success, and I remember that in the twinkling of an eye the following slogan appeared in the streets of the capital:

> As soon as the work on the dams is done,
> Wealth will accrue to everyone!
> Let the slanderers spew their lies and shams—
> They will suffer in hell for opposing our dams!

Nevertheless, this affair so infuriated the conspiring officers that the Imperial Council established by His Unrivaled Highness for the special purpose of supervising the dams was thrown into jail a few days later, on the grounds that nothing could come of the dams but increased corruption and more starvation among the people. I have always been of the opinion, however, that this action on the part of the officers must have brought particular grief to His Majesty. He felt that the years were burdening his shoulders with an ever-increasing weight, and so he wanted to leave an imposing and universally admired monument after himself. That way, many years hence, everyone who could get to the Imperial Dams would cry out, "Behold, all ye! Who but the Emperor could have caused such things to be done, such extraordinary, wondrous things, whole mountains flung across the river!" Or, to look at it from another angle, were he to give ear to the whispers and murmurs that it would be better to feed the hungry than to build dams . . . well, the hungry, even if they are satiated at last, will eventually die, leaving behind not a trace—neither of themselves, nor of the Emperor. □

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From the Prisons of Poland

Two Activists Tell What Happened After Martial Law

The following extraordinary accounts have come to us from Gustaw Moszcz, Polish affairs correspondent for the English periodical New Statesman and Nation. *Mr. Moszcz, who has translated a series of documents from the "horizontal structures' movement" in the Polish United Workers' party (Poland's CP), still lives and works in Poland.* — Eds.

Introduction

I have been working in Poland as a free-lance journalist for longer than I care to recall, and certainly for longer than the brief period of Solidarity's legal existence. I was there when martial law was imposed, and I had the rare opportunity to study the reactions not only of colleagues and friends but of a whole society, as it slowly underwent a forced silence all the more depressing when contrasted with the previous period of totally open debate and discussion.

The two interviews here were held with people of apparently opposing political views. The first was with a secretary of the PZPR, the Polish United Workers' party (the formal name of the Polish CP), who was interned largely for his activity on behalf of greater democratization in the PZPR. Like so many other PZPR activists at lower levels, Witold is a committed socialist with high ideals that have been shattered by measures of martial law. It has been reliably calculated that over 30 percent of the PZPR had mobilized itself for great internal changes in both the party and the workings of the Polish state. This movement, known as the "horizontal structures' movement," was crushed at the start of martial law, and the hope that the PZPR might eventually become a unique post-Stalinist Communist party, prepared to share power with genuine representatives of the working class, was lost with this destruction. The second interview, with a woman worker at a senior level inside Solidarity's Warsaw branch, is understated and low-key, and may stand as representative of many other persons' experiences during the first few months of military rule. Both persons are not referred to by their real names.

What is perhaps surprising for many people in the West is that both the PZPR ordinary rank-and-file membership and long-standing opposition figures (the two "extremes" represented here) concur in their views as to the most viable solution for Poland's political situation. The enemy for the regime imposed by General Jaruzelski has always been open political debate and widespread democracy through the election of genuine representatives of the Polish working class. The two people interviewed here conducted their political lives in the open, did not seek the forcible overthrow of the state, and committed no crime. They were silenced by the only weapon left to the Polish political conservatives: prison and, when that failed, social isolation. They were fortunate—many of their colleagues suffered physical violence.

Much has happened since these interviews were held and yet, as I write in September 1982, the future is still unclear for Polish aspirations toward political freedom. At one point Hannah says that neither "side" in the conflict knows what to do. It's a stalemate that cannot last and, frighteningly enough, it seems clear that neither side is prepared to compromise.

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We can hardly expect Solidarity to offer compromises when it has been forced into an "illegal" position. The regime cannot retreat to a state of relaxation, even though this is the only route that offers anything less than an eventual civil war on a scale considerably more serious than occurred in Hungary in 1956. There are still as many as 6,000 people imprisoned in Poland on purely political charges, and the state has recently initiated prosecutions of leading intellectual dissidents on spurious charges of attempting to overthrow the state by force. The regime is laying the ground for its own destruction.

I would like to thank not only Witold and Hannah but also several Polish friends who cannot be named here—but I trust that if they ever have a chance to read this, they will know whom I mean. Without them it would have been impossible to publish these documents.

GUSTAW MOSZCZ □

Witold's Story

On December 12, 1981, I was attending a meeting in Warsaw at the Sejm (parliament), where I met, among others, the vice-marshal of the Sejm, Andrzej Werblan. I learned that the day before General Jaruzelski had met with Gucwa, the Sejm marshal, since on Monday, December 14, there was supposed to be a session of the Sejm. Jaruzelski informed Gucwa that there would be no demand for the passing of legislation granting Extraordinary Powers to the state at the session.[1]

While at the Sejm, Reiff called on the phone and asked what the schedule was for the Monday morning session. At that time Reiff was still the leader of PAX, and also a member of the Council of State. Reiff didn't know exactly what was going on, and already seemed to have been thrust aside, and excluded from political affairs. I didn't feel that he or Werblan had any indication of what was going to happen, and I later learned that he was to know about it at midnight, when he was called by Rakowski.[2]

After this meeting I returned home, very tired, and went to sleep. The next day, on December 13, I was awakened at about 7:30 A.M. by a relative who, on learning about the declaration of martial law, had come to see if I had been taken or not. We had been discussing the situation some days previously, even weeks ago. I was mentally prepared that, if anything

[1] Andrzej Werblan, though a socialist in his youth, has served Poland's Communist party (PZPR) since 1948 in various capacities: as a member of the Secretariat and one of its principal ideological spokespersons, as director of the Marx-Lenin Institute, and as one of the deputy speakers (or marshals) in the Sejm, Poland's parliament. In June 1968 he published an article in *Miesciecznik Literacki* (Literary Monthly), in which he provided the ideological rationale for the anti-Semitic campaign then sweeping the country. Jews, wrote Werblan, always disproportionately represented in the PZPR, have been the carriers of "cosmopolitan" and "unpatriotic" attitudes. In 1981 he executed yet another *volte-face* by joining the ranks of the party "liberals" and urging a reconciliatory policy toward Solidarity. This time he miscalculated. By early 1982 he was dismissed from the Sejm and the Marx-Lenin Institute, though he was allowed to keep his chair as professor of history in the Polish Academy of Sciences.

[2] PAX, a pro-regime Catholic lay organization, was founded in the late 1940s. It was headed, until his death in 1979, by Boleslaw Piasecki, who had been the leader of the prewar fascist party ONR-Falanga. In late 1980 his successor, Riszard Reiff, disavowed Piasecki's hard-line and anti-Semitic policies and, after ridding PAX of some of its most objectionable leaders, came out fully in favor of Solidarity and the "renewal." Soon after Jaruzelski's putsch, Reiff was replaced by the more pliable Zenon Komender, who steered PAX back to its traditional pro-Moscow, pro-regime (though no longer markedly anti-Semitic) stand.

Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, a gifted political journalist, became editor of the relatively open-minded and liberal weekly *Polityka* in 1958—a position he held until his resignation in late 1982. At first an articulate champion of Solidarity, he turned against the union after his appointment to deputy premier in February 1981, in time becoming one of Jaruzelski's closest advisers.

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of this nature were to happen, I would be among the first on the list.

About two or three weeks earlier I had been participating in a discussion organized by *Meritum*,[3] which is now dissolved, of course. We had come to the conclusion that the next few weeks would bring a decisive turning point for the whole Polish experiment. I had the strong feeling that there was a close analogy between what was happening in Poland and what befell the French Revolution, up to the moment when there was shooting in Paris aimed at peaceful demonstrators, and I expected something like that to happen. We too were experiencing a social revolution, and everything pointed to the time when there would be a clash between society and the authorities.

On that Sunday, December 13, I got up and dressed and went to see a friend who was first secretary of our party committee. We decided to try and protect the university in some way, and our first thought was to ask the rector what information was available. We collected a couple of other people and went together to the university. The rector was already there. He had been awakened at 2 A.M. by students who told him that at midnight there had been an action by ZOMO forces, who had arrested students.[4] Since at that time no one knew what was going on, the students immediately formed a protest committee, which went to the rector for help. At about 3 A.M. the rector went to the MO base in the city and demanded a meeting with the commandant. Highly nervous, the commandant refused to explain anything, merely saying that soon everything would become clear. The rector went back to the university in the face of this stone-walling. He and the vice-rectors stayed on until 6 A.M., when the radio first announced what was going on.

This group was in total confusion when we arrived. They knew that the students had formed a protest committee, and when the first announcements of martial law came through they were in a very difficult position, since the students had already put into action something illegal. So we, the party committee, came uninvited, but there was a sort of unspoken understanding that we should all work together as the rector had respected our activities in the past, even though he was not a party member.

At about 10 A.M. we decided, after hearing the rector's report on the night's events, that the only thing we could do was to get as much information as fast as possible. With regard to the students we decided that, even without central instructions from Warsaw, we should cut the term short, since it was very close to Christmas. We decided the students should be given permission to return home that same day. The students were in such a state of shock, we knew they would not be able to arrange any kind of demonstration, and we preferred that they go home because we feared there might be reprisals if they stayed and organized protests. We decided to hold a meeting of the university senate at 4 P.M. on that Sunday, December 13.

We decided that we would go to the party's Voivodship committee to try and learn what precisely was going on, as well as to ask if there had been any central decisions about what was to happen to the universities and students.[5] I had responsibility for liaison with students, particularly those who had organized an ad hoc protest committee. The new conditions under which we were living altered the degree of danger for both the students and the university in general. About 10:30 A.M. all three secretaries of the university's party committee went along to the Voivodship committee. There we met the first secretary and a delegate of the Politburo, who were terribly emotionally over-

[3] *Meritum* was one small indication of the short-lived thaw. This enterprising, new philosophical journal gathered up many leading young socialist intellectuals who sought a reform of Communist policies. It was banned, along with other new intellectual developments, by the military rulers, after only two issues.

[4] The front-line troops used by the regime to crush strikes and any opposition are the motorized units of Milicja, or ZOMO (Zmotoryzowane Oddziały Milicji Obywatelskiej), created by Gomulka in 1957. They proved to be extremely brutal in many actions, and as full-time professionals they are the most "reliable" forces (estimated to number 25,000–30,000 men) at the disposal of the regime.

[5] Poland is divided into 49 sectors, geographically arranged, called Voivodships, which are the next rung down from the central government.

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wrought. They gave to our first secretary from the university a special Politburo instruction, at which he was permitted to glance for merely a few minutes. This instruction in fact annulled the statutes of the PZPR and gave unlimited power to the executive body of the party at local and regional levels—which meant that all power was then vested in the two people standing in front of us. They had sole authority.

We were there at the time of day when the decree concerning martial law, not yet being ready, so far had not been posted all around the city. It was, however, shown to us there. We concentrated on trying to read it quickly and take notes from it. We demanded that these two people obtain information for us as rapidly as possible concerning what should be done with students and the university. When we went into the Voivodship committee base we said, "Look, we're not children, we've come here of our own volition, and what we want from you is information that will help us to be in a position where we can protect the university from any unnecessary violence." They said that they took this as a gesture of goodwill, to which we said that we weren't interested in discussing any gestures with them. We had said to the rector earlier in the day that we knew what a declaration of martial law meant, and that we had such strong emotional and political objections to it that as individuals we would choose to return our party membership cards immediately; but that we also felt that so long as our staying in the party made it possible for us to offer some protection to the university and the students, we would stay in the party and get what we could. But I said that I reserved the right to decide when I would leave the party.

The two party officials at the Voivodship committee said that they knew already of some publishing activity going on at the university, organized by an illegal student protest committee. They stated that if this group was not dissolved immediately then a ZOMO battalion would "have to pacify the university." I said that we needed time to meet with these students, and we demanded that no decision be made concerning the use of ZOMO until the afternoon.

My own feelings were wrapped up in what we were trying to do, but I recall feeling that something terrible had happened, something important had collapsed and for the last time. It had been the aim of the horizontal structures' movement in the PZPR to avoid a confrontation between the party and Solidarity, with particular stress on the need for the party to rid itself of its confrontational elements. And it had been my view that the size and speed of the radicalization of society would be determined by the behavior of the authorities. Obviously, the imposition of martial law signified that the extremist personalities in the party, those seeking confrontation, had finally triumphed.

We were, of course, emotionally torn two ways: whether immediately to return our party cards or to hold off with this personal response for the sake of seeing what we could do for the university. We decided that we had no choice and that so long as holding onto the party membership meant we could do something to protect the university, we must do it. This was a time when our rector had absolutely no contacts with anyone else from the party, which had isolated him. So we had the uncomfortable task of organizing the first few hours of life under military rule. For many weeks I had been writing articles arguing the need to avoid confrontation, and I felt that what I was doing now was consistent with that role. In the first day or so I had no time to sit back and consider my preferences. I simply had many things to do that *had* to be done. We spent about an hour at the Voivodship party committee, and during that time the TV broadcast Jaruzelski's speech, which I'd had no time to listen to until then. We listened in silence.

Afterward we returned to the student hostel, where there was a gathering of students, about 20 to 30. In another room there were about 10 people of the leadership of NZS.[6] There was some in-fighting between the two groups, and a splinter group was leaving as we entered. We arrived and the students who had left returned. After a very short time the two groups merged,

[6] NZS is the acronym for the Independent Students' Union (Niezalezne Zwiazek Studentow), which came under severe attack by the regime before it was made illegal after martial law.

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agreeing that it wasn't the time for factional struggles.

I felt that everyone there now relaxed a little, since we were the first people who did not propose to keep them in the dark. I told them of the university senate meeting later that afternoon and, of course, the most vital task for me was to make contact with the students of the protest committee. I said that some form of protest action might be essential in the future but that first we needed to know what the reaction from the workers would be, since only that would determine the scale of reaction to martial law.

I argued that if the authorities had decided on martial law, we should not be so naive as to think they would hesitate to eliminate such a small, insignificant group as university students. Therefore I strongly insisted that they follow this plan of action. This was after I had learned in a very friendly and informal way (since they all knew and trusted me) what their plans and intentions were. I asked the students to ascertain quickly what the feelings of the students as a whole were. Would they be willing to go home? I also asked them not to become involved in any protest committee, since this was already regarded by the authorities as a conspiracy. I invited them to send a representative group from their midst to the senate meeting in the afternoon. We also gave advice on the legal status of martial law, as well as an interpretation of the events so far, at least as we were aware of them, which was not much. Nevertheless we were the first direct source of information as to what martial law meant, since the TV-announced decree didn't give a total breakdown of the regulations.

None of the students wanted to make an immediate street protest. They wanted to engage in some kind of protest, but they rapidly became aware that the whole context had changed. I said that I had come to see them to modify our position because in a few hours the ZOMO battalion was going to arrive. At the party headquarters they had left us in no doubt about this "pacification." As I was speaking to the students we heard that a large truck with ZOMO troopers was already stationed outside the student hostel, and we thought that it was perhaps already too late to prevent violence. I insisted that the students do everything they could to discover what was happening in the factories, since that was the only concrete form of action we could take—to try and gather information and contact people in danger. Only later might we perhaps do something more.

I said it was important that the students see what help the workers needed, and that students didn't simply offer their own heads to be cut off. I also asked them to put me in touch with the student protest committee that had been formed earlier, and an intermediary who spoke for the committee arrived and spoke with us. I felt that I had to let them know that students were still needed, and that anything could happen with our participation, including open street protests, but that such a decision could not be taken in isolation from the workers. In the first hours of martial law we had, however, to be very conscious of the fact that those who imposed the regime would be quite prepared to smash any form of weak opposition, and this had to be avoided.

All this took us to about two or three in the afternoon of December 13. We missed lunch, didn't even think about such things as food. We went to the university senate about 4 P.M. We weren't members of the senate but that didn't matter. I managed to talk to the rector and tell him the course of the discussions I'd had with the students. At the senate meeting a group of students was present that was representing the protest committee. These students said that they had no intention of stopping their protest action. I was eager to give a very strong speech. I emphasized that although we needed the skill and determination of students, we must make sure that students were protected from any direct violence, because both they and the university itself were defenseless. It's not a factory where barricades can be erected.

I said that we needed students to make contacts with the workers, but that this couldn't be done under the formal heading of a "protest committee." The students didn't agree to this, and after the senate meeting ended we carried on the discussion in the corridor, where I insisted that they drop this absurd form of protest. The discussion was very heated, but

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eventually they came round to my way of seeing the situation and agreed to drop the committee idea. Of course, it is very difficult to say that the committee was finished, since a structure may be formally dissolved but the people involved still in place. But they made this political declaration, and the whole debate was necessary to tell them exactly how dangerous things were—that they needed to be twice as clever in the future about how they organized and in their political thinking, and that street fighting is pointless with this type of regime, at least now.

About 7:30 P.M. we went back to the Voivodship party building to tell them what had been decided and that the protest committee was done with. Of course, all messages had to be transmitted by word of mouth since there were no phones at that time. We had learned that at least two people from the university had been interned, and that one of them was seriously ill and due to be hospitalized on December 14 for surgery. We spoke at the Voivodship committee on his behalf and demanded that he be sent to the hospital as planned. We offered political guarantees for that man. The other internee was a senior party member, democratically elected at city level.

When we arrived at the party HQ, the people in charge had just received news concerning how things had gone across the country on the first day of martial law. The picture they had been given by the Warsaw authorities was much more optimistic than they had expected. They said there was some disorder in Gdansk and public transport was not operating there. They knew something was going on round Lodz and near Radom, and they knew of two strikes in Silesia. They also said that negotiations had already started with Walesa and that the outlook was very positive on this score too. This was still the first evening, December 13. It wasn't a question of trusting or not trusting this information but observing the expectations and aims they had in mind. I had learned during the day that so far there had been no strikes in our city, so it was quite possible that the picture they presented for us was credible. The next day I learned that there *had* been an attempt at a strike in one of the major factories outside the city, but that this had been rapidly quelled when the factory was surrounded by a ZOMO batallion, which threatened that if work didn't begin in 30 minutes there would be a "pacification." And the people went to work.

We demanded from the city party authorities that they give us a list of university internees as soon as possible. But they wouldn't talk to us on this matter; they merely said that it wasn't they who were interning people, and that it wasn't a party matter at all. They were still very nervous and behaving as if under extreme pressure, without any control over events. Everything, they said, was beyond their control. They "could do nothing." This admission of political impotence was later contradicted by a friend of mine who that same day was at a hospital in the city. He went to the city commissar appointed by Warsaw, a general, to try and get the commissar to arrange for a delivery of coal to the hospital. The general said to him, "Why come to me? We haven't taken power, we're not the authorities. Go to the party and see them about it." We didn't know what or whom to believe, and perhaps they didn't either. But both the military and the party denied they had any power in this situation.

Anyway, that evening we stated there was no need to attack the university since the students were all going home. Our intervention concerning the internees from the university was, shall we say, nervously rejected as being wrongly addressed. This brought us to about 10 P.M. After visiting a friend's house I returned home at about 11 P.M. It didn't matter to me what time it was, despite the curfew, starting then at 10 P.M. in our city, because I had an official permit to move about during curfew. I also had my party card with "party secretary" stamped inside it. But in the short distance between the friend's house and my own I was stopped by an army patrol, and I showed them my curfew permit and party card. They were commissioned officers, led by a major, not ordinary soldiers. During these early days street patrols were frequently led by very senior officers, sometimes even colonels, as if the military needed to have such officers on the streets to keep watch on the actions of private troopers. The patrol spoke to me in a very friendly manner, as if I were one of them. The major

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said, "Watch out if you're going home, and make sure there are no marks on your house since we know that Solidarity extremists have marked certain homes as containing people suitable for revenge actions." In fact, there were a lot of buildings with markings on them, especially where Milicja and military families lived, painted crosses, circles, all kinds of things. Of course, they could easily have been provocations by the security services, I don't know. I came home and there was no mark on my house.

I was terribly tired and I turned on the radio to see if there was any news, but it was all so vague that it seemed nothing much was going on. I couldn't get to sleep, and I was thinking over what we could do. It seemed that at the moment the best thing was to establish some kind of unofficial structure to care for the families of the internees. I decided that we should try and exert some kind of pressure on the Voivodship authorities in this direction, by writing a letter. Early next morning I drove with a friend to the university to see the rector; we said that we should try and push the authorities in charge of martial law into dealing directly with him, since we party members did not want to get into the position where we seemed to be administering the regulations of martial law. I decided that morning to type a document, with two main points. The first stressed that the rector had behaved very responsibly in the current situation. The second was that, since we were politically responsible for what happened to the university, we party members in the university demanded a precise list of the internees and the basis on which they were interned. We also declared that we would be taking care of the families of the interned people.

I didn't have much time in which to think, "Why haven't I been arrested?" And it was only on the Monday morning, December 14—when people kept coming up to me and said, "Are you still free?"—that I began to realize that, well, I didn't understand my freedom either. We wrote the letter to the Voivodship party committee, and a colleague came with me to deliver it. He took it in while I waited outside. After half an hour he came back and told me that the letter was rejected by the committee. Not only this, but the two people we had met the previous day were absolutely furious with us for writing such a letter about the internees. Their reaction was so hostile that later that day I told the rector I no longer saw any way of defending myself, never mind the university.

This day passed in a whirl, and I didn't get home until about 10 P.M. By this time I had the strong feeling that it was now worthless being a member of the PZPR. It wasn't only the fact that the letter had been rejected, but while we were waiting outside the Voivodship building we had noticed that all those sectarian party functionaries who had long ago been democratically voted out of office were now back.

Back home that night came the moment when it struck me that if they were going to arrest me, then this would be the time. So I took a bath, tried to calm myself down, and said to myself that if they came it would be about three in the morning. I decided to read until about 1 A.M., then eat something, find a book I would like to take, get myself ready. But they came at 11:30, four of them. There was a knock at the door—I was sitting reading some theoretical book—and I had the distinct feeling that now they'd come. I asked who was there and they just said, "Milicja." I opened the door and the only thing I really wanted to say to them was, "You're early," but I didn't. They came in, asked for my documents. They told me to dress and said I must go with them. I said I was a secretary of the PZPR and asked them if there was any mistake. "No mistake," they said.

They led me to a waiting car and one sat on either side of me in the back seat. We drove to the Milicja station where they placed me in a small room along with two other civilians. There were two ZOMOs guarding us. Both were armed with long white clubs and machine pistols. My documents, including the party card, were taken away. I sat there for 90 minutes. During that time one of the civilians was taken away, then came back and said, "They've interned me, the bastards. They wanted me to sign something but I refused." Then he was taken out. The other man was

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reading a Bible, and after a while he too was led away. Then he came back and collected his bag and said, "See you in the camps." The two ZOMO troopers were chatting about the awful weather, how many people might be coming in tonight, and how they wanted to be home. They gave each other cigarettes and offered one to me but I refused as I don't smoke. They weren't aggressive and asked me where I worked. I wanted to let them know that party secretaries were being arrested so I told them who I was. They were impassive.

After about two hours someone came and just held out a pair of handcuffs toward me. I didn't protest, just looked at the cuffs and thought to myself, "So this is how it is." I held out my hands and the cuffs were put on me, and I was led out to a waiting car. All the time I was thinking I had to imprint this picture on my mind, since it's not every day a party secretary is handcuffed by the party he is a member of. I thought to myself, "Well, there used to be Stalinism, why are you shocked by all this now?"

We drove to another jail where some officers gave me my papers. The people on duty at the jail took away all my things. The person dealing with me seemed to be very confused and disturbed, and dealt with me very softly. When he took the cuffs off and I held my hands up he just said, very quietly, "There's no need for that." He gave me over to another warder who was very hostile, shouting very loudly, giving orders in monosyllables. When we arrived at a cell he opened it and pushed me in.

Of course, it was dark inside but later it emerged that it was a three-person cell with seven inside it, then me, making eight in all. The warder pushed me inside and said, "A place must be found for this one too!" This was about three in the morning of December 15. Everyone in the cell was asleep but one woke and said to me, "Come on, we'll find somewhere for you to sleep—we're all in the same boat now."

At about 6 A.M. the same loud warder came along and shouted out, "Go wash yourselves!" and we were given pea soup. Only then did I discover who I was with. One of the people in the cell was a regional leader of Solidarity, who had escaped the roundup in Gdansk on the 12th, after the national meeting of the National Commission of Solidarity, and had made his way to our city, where a relative of his lived. There were a couple of other people there whom I knew very well too, so the atmosphere was very friendly.

At about 8 A.M. they called us out and we collected our things, which had been removed the night before. They gave me my party card, and I said, "You can keep it, I don't want it any more." They didn't like this and refused to take it. Then they handcuffed us all, in twos, and I found myself handcuffed to the Solidarity leader. It was a fine moment—a leader of Solidarity chained to a secretary of the PZPR. We were put on a bus, having been led from the jail between two ranks of armed ZOMOs. On the bus, which was windowless, we were chained to the seats. That morning I had been shown a paper by an SB agent, stating I was to be interned, and where.[7] The document stated that I was being interned since my freedom would endanger the security of the state, since my former activities had been directed against the government's authority, and that I had encouraged people not to obey the legitimate rule of the regime. There was nothing to discuss when he said, "Sign it." I refused. Then he said that I should sign a paper saying that I had seen the internment notice, and I wrote at the bottom of it, "I have seen this," and signed my name.

So, handcuffed together, about 15 of us, we were driven to a camp. This camp originally was built by the Nazi forces in the last war, though it's now a regular prison. As we set off, the ZOMO officer in charge told us where we were headed, that there would be no stops on the way, and he used a Polish idiom to encourage us to be quiet—he said, "You should be quiet because, remember, a peaceful calf can get milk from two cows." On the way there was in fact one stop, at a camp where they were keeping women, since there was one girl among us. When they stopped the truck and began to take her off, she protested, probably because she didn't know where she was. She was saying

[7] SB—the secret police (Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa) or political police of the Security Office (UB), since the mid-1950s part of the Ministry of the Interior.

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"No, I don't want to go here alone, I want to stay with the men." A ZOMO took her away saying "Look at this whore—she wants some men does she?"

At the prison we had to go through the usual ritual, repeating our personal details and being searched again. During the bus journey the Solidarity leader told me his escape story, how, during the search at the first jail, the ZOMO officer had flicked through his wallet and found a picture of Walesa. The ZOMO was going to remove the photo but the Solidarity man protested, saying that it was his personal property. The ZOMO trooper gave it back saying, "Well, if that's the kind of family you have then keep it."

The atmosphere among the prisoners in the camp was like that of a large, united community. Although the cells were locked, we could circulate letters and notes since there were holes in the walls next to the central heating pipes. During exercise we could walk outside for 30 minutes each day. They tried to force us to accept the normal prison regulations; for example, we should stand when spoken to by prison officials. We refused to comply with that or any other routine prison behavior. In the evenings we often sang hymns and had communal prayers. When the Wujek tragedy happened, and we heard about it over the radio, there was praying and a speech from a window by one of the leaders of Solidarity.[8] The radio was switched on from 6 A.M. to 10 P.M., switched on and off from a central point outside the cells.

I met many people there whom I knew but even more who knew me or of me. For some it was a shock to see me there, and there was one incident that sums it up for me. One day I was going along to see the prison doctor—I wasn't ill, it just made a break sometimes to get a tablet, and sometimes you could steal some paper—and in the corridor I met an ordinary convict. He was serving a heavy sentence for some serious crime, and prison was normal for him. He sized me up and then asked me what kind of people had been interned in this camp. I told him, and said that there were also some party secretaries there. He said simply, "Those fuckers can rot here, but why are they jailing innocent Solidarity people?" I was shocked for a moment, not by the language but by the strength of feeling. Then he said, "If they're jailing party people then the whole world really is going crazy. Those bastards really don't have a clue what they're doing, do they?"

Some people tried to have political discussions in the cells, about what was going to happen, what they could do, what the mistakes of Solidarity were, and we even had clandestine bulletins distributed in the cells. But I was so depressed that frequently I preferred just to lie on my bunk and pretend to sleep, simply to avoid discussion.

We began to fear that we could be there for months, even years.

There were days when I was so frustrated I didn't even want to talk. Of course there were moments when we joked around, and in our cell there were excellent people, including two peasants who always had the best jokes. One, who was perhaps 18, had been taken from a very small village. He had done nothing at all, only stuck up some Solidarity posters when it all started back in August 1980. Nothing since then. Even so, he was on the list of those to be taken. The manager of the local state foodstore chain was also in our cell. The SB were furious with him because he was a close friend of the regional leader of Solidarity, and had permitted Solidarity to put up posters inside the food stores. He had also refused to fire a member of KOR who worked in the food stores, whom the SB had been harassing for ages. When this manager had been taken the SB treated him well, making it clear they didn't really want to intern him, and that he could go free if he signed a paper saying he would desist from "anti-state activities." They couldn't make him sign it so they jailed him.

I played a lot of chess, tried to teach a cell mate English, and gave a lecture or two in my academic discipline. There were moments of great depression, I could see no decent resolution of all this—and I still can't. I didn't have any books, and the few books in the prison

[8] Wujek is a mine where eight workers were killed on December 17, 1981, after the institution of martial law, by government troops.

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library were junk. The SB had some talks with us and after a few days they took a few people away with them and tried to make them sign the usual declarations; but everyone refused. When my turn came, I said I would not sign something implying that I had ever carried out anti-state activities. The interrogator asked me what I wanted changed in the text. This was five days after my arrest. He said, "Take this piece of paper and just write on it what you are prepared to sign." I wrote that I was not going to enter into anti-state activities, and then he asked me to sign *his* piece of paper. I refused and said that I couldn't sign his paper unless what I wrote, stating that I had never engaged in anti-state activities, was an integral part of it. He agreed to this, and I signed his paper only after I had made some pen strokes indicating my additions and stating that what I wrote was an integral part of the whole document and must be accepted as such. This was a complete contradiction, since what I wrote was, "I accuse you of martial law and state that you must accept all responsibility for all its effects, now and in the future."

The SB interrogators generally acted as if they were grateful that anyone even agreed to see them. The one I met complained that often internees were abusive. He asked me what my plans were and I said, "It depends on how much time I have to consider my plans." He questioned me about the party colleagues I had but I refused all cooperation, and I told him that despite his beliefs there was no plot in the party. There were no threats made against me but one of the peasants in my cell later said that during his interrogation the SB had said, "You went on strike to demand constitutional guarantees that you can own your land—see where it's led you? We have you here, we can do what we like with you. If you don't sign this paper then we can take your farm, we can keep you here as long as we like, your wife will be forced to look after the farm by herself . . . " and more such things. Even this had no effect on these tough peasants. Almost no one signed the paper in the form that it was presented and later the SB were almost begging us to sign. At the end they were asking us for oral declarations that we weren't interested in politics, things as weak as that.

After 10 days I was freed, in one of the first batches to be released. I had had enough examples of the typical day there, which went like this: We were awakened at 6:30 A.M. and our clothes were given back. (I refused to give my clothes up at night, as we were supposed to do.) Then two people brought round the food. Breakfast was at 8 A.M.—something hot, usually soup, and we had some bread that was given to us the night before. The only place where I ever had really fresh bread was in jail, since there was a bakery on the premises. The food in that camp was starchy, aimed at filling rather than giving nourishment. We suffered most from the lack of something to drink—only one cup a day of something made from powder, which was disgusting. Until about 10:30 A.M. we played chess and then had a 30 minutes' walk. Between one and two in the afternoon we'd go to the library or the doctor. Dinner was at six and then at eight singing and prayers; lights out at ten. There was simply nothing to do: no visits, no newspapers, no parcels, nothing at all.

All that time, we knew nothing of what was happening outside, except what we could hear on the radio, which was less than revealing. After the first week, official newspapers began to appear, and there was a violent reaction in the prison when we read that an official government spokesman, Jerzy Urban, had announced at a press conference that conditions inside the camps were excellent. There was almost a riot when this news circulated.

You could buy things from a cart that went round—some jam, soap, an onion, things like that. I spent most of my time just willing myself to go through each day, just to survive the tedium. Nobody ever expressed any regret about their activities, and we all recognized that we were the same people. We tried hard to learn each other's specific problems and language, and this was a fantastically useful exchange. The political debates during those first ten days were limited to analyzing the news from the radio, trying to determine what was really happening outside, as opposed to what the media said was happening. People knew that if "they" said that something was going on, then something really big was happening.

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We could grasp that there were very serious clashes, and the first reaction was fury that these bastards could reach the point of shooting down workers. We all felt that now they could never retreat, and that after Wujek everything was simply so much the worse for the regime, since people would never forget this. Never. Later we reflected that if the situation had reached this point, then either the Russians would intervene or at the very least we would never see the outside world again, not for a long time anyway. But I was released.

The day following my release I had to report to the Milicja where I was again interrogated by the SB, a man I knew. He again tried to get me to collaborate, to tell him about my contacts with factories and journalists, but I refused. He became very angry and said, "If you knew what your friends are doing against you . . . " but I interrupted him and said this was no argument for me, and what they did was their concern. Before I left I told him that I had given back my party card, and this really angered him. He actually said that this would damage the party. I could hardly believe he was spouting this absurdity.

Hannah's Story.

A week before December 13 there was an open meeting of Solidarity delegates in the Warsaw region, and I was present. The atmosphere was very tense, one could feel it, cut it almost. The meeting was held just a day after the attack on the Warsaw Firefighters' Academy.[9] The dominant mood was that we were now putting aside our factional differences inside the Union's Warsaw branch, and that we had to find new forms of self-defense. There were suggestions that we should form worker-guards in case the authorities staged an attack on the large factories. This proposal was accepted by the overwhelming majority. At the same meeting the idea was expressed that we should make December 17 a day of protest against the decision of the authorities to again "solve" social problems by force. Everyone knew that the government was preparing an Emergency Powers Act, which had a number of elements threatening the very existence of Solidarity.

On Saturday, December 12, I was at Solidarity headquarters in Warsaw, on Mokotowska Street. We were unsure, earlier in the week, if the meeting of the National Commission at Gdansk would take place. It went ahead, and the situation was such that we felt sure that the authorities would take some action to try and prevent its happening at all. When it actually started there was a massive relief.

On Saturday telexes began arriving at Mokotowska Street, from all over Poland. All reported large-scale movements by the Milicja —not the Army. Sometimes the telexes came with urgent requests to pass this news on to the Gdansk meeting, because the regions themselves were not in touch with Gdansk. So we tried to send on these messages, but all the lines were engaged between Warsaw and Gdansk. I later learned that several National Commission delegates in Gdansk had received such information via their own monitoring services and from people in contact with them. So generally the Gdansk meeting was well informed about the movements of the security forces. But they chose to ignore such reports because they had heard the like all too often in

[9] The Firefighters' Officers' Academy was occupied by the students in late November, who demanded that they be "demilitarized" and allowed to join free unions. The strike was broken by ZOMO units on December 2, students were sacked, and several Solidarity members were temporarily arrested. The breaking of the strike seemed, on reflection, to be a run-through for the type of action that was to happen throughout Poland on December 13 and thereafter.

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the past. Reports of the Milicja movements were not publicly announced at Gdansk. I know that such people as Bujak, Walesa, and Gwiazda knew of these reports, and they were also aware of the closing-in of Soviet military vessels around the Baltic; but this too was ignored.

The person on duty at Warsaw was Witold Kulerski,[10] and he sent a telex to Glemp and Jaruzelski, asking for clarification of what the maneuvers meant. I don't think there was a reply. Anyway, I left the building on Saturday evening about 8 P.M. and went home. I had the vague idea of going back later to catch up on some work, but there was lots of snow, and hot tea at home, so I didn't return. I only learned of the state of war at 8 A.M. the next day, when I switched on the radio. It completely stunned me, I had no idea what to do, and I just sat down in a state of shock, for what seemed like an age. In the afternoon I went back to Mokotowska, at the moment when it was being surrounded by ZOMO for the third time that day. I stood outside the cordon trying to see who was being taken away by the Milicja. It was horribly cold and I decided, as there was nothing I could do there, to go back home, still feeling stunned.

On my way back, in the town center, I saw a few leaflets on walls. These leaflets had been printed at Ursus, at 3 A.M. on December 13. They were very short and told simply that ZOMO had attacked Mokotowska. There were some incredible scenes where the leaflets were stuck up on the walls, with crowds stopping to read them, people pushing each other to get a better look at them. None of these people seemed to have the imagination to realize that you just didn't do things like that anymore.

I recall a similar innocence at the building in Mokotowska Street, where people were trying to talk to the ZOMO, while water cannon loomed over them, ready for action. It was so cold, and from time to time squads of ZOMO moved amongst the crowd, menacing them and telling them to go home.

[10] Kulerski remained free and working in the underground as one of Solidarity's central spokesmen, until the end of the August 1982 riots, when he was captured and charged.

It was late in the evening when I got back home. I discovered that there had in fact been Milicja at my home during the Saturday night and early Sunday morning, but that they hadn't come in because a crowd of workers had been outside and scared them off. I live close to a senior Solidarity adviser, and he had been visited by the Milicja Saturday night. He refused to open his door and instead stood on his balcony, shouting out with a loudspeaker that all the neighbors, workers, should leave and go into the factories and let people know that Solidarity members were being arrested. They broke his door down, came in and beat him up, but nevertheless quite a few people escaped through his shouting out, and one result was the presence of workers outside my building, though I didn't know about it at the time.

On Sunday evening a friend came round and said that she had heard that they had arrested my husband, it had been announced over the radio. So we talked with my son and we thought it would be a long time before my husband would be released.[11] I thought my flat was probably being watched, and of course there was a very early curfew, but I decided to remove from my flat two documents that were personally precious to me. One was an interview my husband had given. Nothing special during the evening; friends came round to discuss what had happened, and we tried to find out who had been arrested and who was still free. The second leaflet to appear was already circulating at that time, and it said that Bujak had not been taken and that he had returned from Gdansk to Warsaw. That was heartwarming news.

There was only one strange incident that night, as I was traveling from my flat to see another friend. There were very few buses around, and so after waiting for ages you were very crammed on board. I found myself, at one point, jammed tightly next to an SB man whom

[11] Hannah's husband is still in prison. Like Hannah herself, he has been arrested on many occasions by the SB. According to reports, when he was arrested he showed remarkable nerve by curling up on the bench while awaiting his interrogation, and falling asleep. The whole process of interrogating and interning new prisoners was so time-consuming that it would often be hours before an internee was transferred from his captors' quarters to the cells.

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I recognized, since he had often searched my home in the past. But he didn't notice me.

At that time I thought that the regime was going to arrest only the leadership of Solidarity. The rest of us, I imagined, were going to be subjected to threats, searches, curfews, harassments. I thought my child would act as some kind of shield for me, since in the past they had only arrested one member of a family. I didn't go underground. What choice did I have? To leave home and go away? With a child? Besides, that kind of life is extremely difficult to sustain.

On Monday, December 14, at 8 P.M., the SB came. With me at the time were a couple of friends. The SB didn't ransack the flat, just looked in all the rooms and cupboards, to see if anyone was hiding. They asked to see my friends' documents, and then asked me if anyone could look after my child or if I wanted him to be left in an orphanage. In that way I learned that they were about to arrest me. There was no shouting but their attitude was very hostile, decisive, and I saw there was no sense in trying to bargain with them.

In the meantime another woman friend of mine had arrived, who had worked at Mokotowska with me. Immediately the SB heard her mention the building where we worked they took her identity card and wanted to take her too. But she told them that she had left her child with some neighbors, and that she wanted to go home and get the child. After a while, a bit of chat and arranging, they gave her card back and let her go. It was an indication of the slackness of the SB—they had no firm orders to arrest this woman, it would have meant another 3 hours' fuss and bother, and they just didn't want all that.

I was told to write a letter stating whom I was leaving in charge of my child. I asked what I could take with me but they said they had no orders as to what I could take with me, only instructions as to what I *couldn't* take, no sharp objects for example. I put on some warm boots, took a fur coat, picked up a toothbrush, and marched away.

My son was just ending a bout of flu, and he quickly took his temperature, which was over 38°C. He said, "Mummy, you can't leave me, look, I've got a temperature." He didn't say anything to the SB. On the way out he put a tiny toy into my hand, for good luck, a little soft toy that he had just been given a few days ago.

The gentlemen with me were obviously very satisfied with themselves, there was something in them that showed they were enjoying their revenge, as if to say, "Well, you wanted to cut our throats but now we have you instead."

As we left, there was a little scene with a neighbor of mine. He was walking down the street and made as if to approach me but I ostentatiously turned my back on him, because he looks a typical student type, and they would have loved to take him along too. Later I learned that this neighbor had been in the country for the weekend, and knew nothing of what had happened until he came back to Warsaw.

We drove to Mostowski's palace, the main HQ of the SB in Warsaw, where I was left standing for ages on a huge staircase. From there I was taken in a freezing police van to Olszynka Grochowska. Nobody made any official statement that I had been interned, nothing at all. On that journey I was accompanied by two SB guards, one who tried to be nice and entertained me with conversation, and another much nicer since he just kept his mouth shut. On that drive I could see the city through the windows. It was a dead, dark, empty city, with only the Milicja and Army patrols going round. Mainly I was thinking about the snow, and I was shivering with the cold, even though I was wrapped in the fur. At the start I had a lump in my throat all the time, but after a while I felt relief—it had all become clear, I could tell where I was going by looking out the window. Suddenly I saw a man in the middle of the street, waving his arms frantically, signaling to us for the van to stop. He had a small baby bundled up in his arms, which turned out in fact to be a three-year-old child. The telephones weren't working, the child had a very high temperature and was bleeding from the nose. So they talked to him for a bit and then agreed to take him and the child to a hospital. From the hospital we went straight to the prison.

About 1 A.M. we found ourselves at Ols-

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zynka, and the first moments involved a detailed search of me and they took away everything that identified me. They didn't look through the papers I had, just removed them. I was sitting down and getting drowsy, because it took ages to go through all this routine. Then an SB man showed me the internment decision and went away. A female warder then made a quick frisk, didn't even look in my pockets, and took me away to get some prison things. I was given a metal mug, spoon, and bowl, and three old, gray, heavy, stiff blankets.

Inside the prison the female warders behaved correctly but coolly. When I arrived they were very sleepy, and were grumbling that this wasn't their business. Otherwise they had about them a professional, expressionless air. We were also given thick stockings—but, of course, nothing to hold them up, so they just kept falling down—and a cotton nightgown too.

Although I was in prison for the first time it didn't feel strange. Olszynka is a prison for people awaiting trial and sentencing and the whole building is on one story with very odd acoustics, a loud echo following you as you walk down the corridors. The bars shutting across the corridors behind me made an unpleasant loud clang. The main thing on my mind was that I was trying desperately to hold onto this huge pile of things I had been given because I knew it would make an awful noise if it fell on the floor, enough to wake the whole prison. All our fears were predominantly that we would be put with the criminals. When I was put in a cell it was completely dark. The guard switched on the light for a moment and when I turned round I saw the face of a very close friend and I was immensely cheered that I was with our people. They all got up and welcomed me.

Every cell had seven metal bunks with two levels to each bunk, so that each could hold 14 people. In the center stood a large wooden table and benches, and in one corner a curtain concealing a toilet, sink, and cold-water faucet. Everything was in classical prison color—gray. There were no bars in the window but a very thick glass plate with wire netting set into it, and very little light. It was dark half the time, and only one of the two ceiling light bulbs worked. The floor was dirty-gray linoleum. The central heating didn't work, there was wind gusting through the window, and it was bitterly cold. You could sleep, but only dressed in everything you had, with the blankets wrapped round you. The cell itself was quite narrow, and at any one time there was room only for two people to move around. The door was extremely heavy metal, with four locks. There were two spy-holes, one set in the door itself and the other virtually a small window in the wall.

When I arrived there were five other women in my cell, all of them taken on Monday. There was a translator from the Congress of Culture, arrested for other reasons.[12] Another was an activist in the peasants' opposition movement who also had a husband who was active in KOR. One was a student detained for her activity on the Committee for the Defense of Prisoners of Political Conscience, a committee the authorities really detest. Another was a 50-year-old woman, a Solidarity activist who used to write pieces for a publication and signed them with her own name. We were joined the next evening by two more, one from Skierniewice where she had been on duty in the local Solidarity branch. When the ZOMO arrived, they just arrested her. The other was a worker from Zyrardow and was probably arrested in revenge for the massive strikes organized there. She headed a one-parent family, bringing up an eight-year-old child. When she was arrested, a huge group of armed ZOMO came for her and told her that she would be back

[12] The Congress of Culture was perhaps one of the saddest casualties of the new regime. It was to take place during the December 13 events, and when participants arrived on that Sunday they found a small notice pinned to the doors saying the Congress was cancelled. The fear the regime had of intellectuals who were to attend it speaks out of a story I heard about this cancellation. As tanks were rolling in Gdansk and Silesia, the Congress participants milled round the doors unable to decide what action to take. A small Fiat arrived and two Milicja got out and told them politely that they should disperse as martial law had arrived. They did so. Of course, after that many intellectuals took highly critical stances against the regime, but all too many again are disguising their real feelings.

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home the next day, in time to make breakfast for the child. The child was left completely alone in the flat, a tiny one with a gas oven dangerously easy to light. The woman herself had heart trouble and in general is a very nervous person. The child realized that something strange was going on and after a few hours took himself off to his grandparents.

One of my cell mates, whom I will call K, had a particularly dramatic story. On December 12 a team of ZOMO came to arrest her husband. The very second they left with him, another team arrived to take her too. She had a 4½-month-old baby. They took her and the baby to the Milicja station, where a female police officer assured her that everything would be fine, and that the baby would be looked after. K left the names and addresses of friends and parents who would look after her baby and begged the Milicja to tell the parents what had happened, and give the child to them. The Milicja did neither but instead put the baby in a state orphanage. K made a row the first few days she was in our cell to learn what had happened to the baby, but no one would tell her anything.

At the start we demanded that we be treated as internees and not ordinary criminals, and specifically that the cells be opened and we be given free access to one another. We kicked up a fuss and eventually the female head warden of the prison came along and said that it was not her responsibility as we were not under the supervision of the prison but of the Milicja, and they had instructed her as to how we should be treated. She also said that there were mothers and daughters in the same prison, and we should in some ways be grateful not to have free access. After two days we learned, as we still tried to calm down K, that two cells away from our own K's mother was staying.

We spent much of the first few days each retelling our stories of capture and arguing with the warders for the early release of K, who was let out after a week. In our section of the jail there were 70 women, and obviously the section hadn't been in use for some time. It was unprepared and unheated. When the first women arrived, even the blankets weren't ready so they had to sleep in the cold with nothing but what they stood up in. There wasn't even water at the start, and the first washing was done with melted snow. When I arrived, things had reached a state of relative luxury, although the water was still icy. After two more days the central heating had reached the temperature of a tepid hand.

The prison personnel didn't know what the limits of their authority were. They took away our heavy outdoor clothes and gave us prison jackets. I demanded that we be given our warm clothing back, and eventually we were. Roughly speaking, the warders weren't interested in what we did inside the cells. At the start our mood was one of shock, and we nervously listened to the radio all the time, since we thought we might learn something of what was going on outside by what *wasn't* said on the radio. We were waiting to hear an answer to the question, "Would Poland rise up or not?" And other questions, "Would there be a general strike? Were the factories rising up or not?" This was so terribly tiring, because we had to listen to all the news, and commentaries after the news, which was especially boring. At the time the news was in such a form—it would be suddenly announced that in such and such a town work was progressing normally, and from this it was possible to deduce that probably work had *not* been normal before. The worst part of it was that you had to fish out the news items from all those rotten commentaries you had no patience for because they were so shitty. But you had to listen to all, because there was the occasional scrap of interesting information.

The first few days were also spent analyzing if this was a setback for Solidarity, if everything was lost, or if it was the first step in a long struggle. There was a KPN girl in the cell who knew for certain that if not today, then tomorrow, and if not tomorrow, then at a time three years or ten years from now we would see barricades and fighting—and then an independent Poland again.[13] This was sloganizing, of course. I thought that they would crush opposi-

[13] KPN or the Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Niepodlegej Polski) is perhaps the regime's most hated opposition group, though its highly nationalist and occasionally anti-Semitic tendencies have aroused little interest in it outside Poland. Its unswerving adherence to anti-Soviet attitudes has

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tion in three months, and then we should have to start all over again.

About 6 A.M. they would switch on the lights and count us, sometimes losing count as we kept on sleeping underneath the mass of blankets and coats. Breakfast at 8 A.M., which was usually ersatz coffee. The night before we had been given bread and margarine for use the next morning. From time to time there was some jam too. Lunch was about 1 P.M., soup and potatoes with a sauce. Supper was at about 6 P.M., milk soup with either noodles or oats. Two or three times we had an egg for supper. There was so much dust and dirt around that we didn't like storing the bread overnight.

Twice a day they brought round buckets of hot water, but since the whole process was so slow it quickly cooled. We referred to it as "previously boiling water." At a fixed time each day there was exercise, in a yard about 5 meters wide by 12 meters long, with a three-meter-high wall around it, topped with barbed wire. We were guarded by a man with a gun and short-wave radio. We played with the snow in the yard, making Jaruzelski snowmen to throw snowballs at, writing slogans on the walls with the snow.[14] We would sometimes sing during exercise but that depended on who the guard was. Some stopped us from singing, but some were pleased that we were cheerful. We could communicate with people from other cells since there were four of these exercise boxes side by side. But we couldn't communicate between the cells because none of us knew how to tap out messages. Theoretically we were supposed to get newspapers, but practically almost none were available. When there was a chance to get a newspaper we always pleaded to have a copy of *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, since it was important for us to know the hard-line attitude of the top level of the regime.[15]

The atmosphere in the cells differed greatly. In Olszynka I don't recall anyone having a breakdown, and my cell was probably exceptionally calm. Our neighboring cell had Kuron's wife in it and had a different atmosphere—ours was very loose and informal, the cell was cleaned by anyone who cared to but next door there was almost a scout rhythm, with constant duties arranged for everyone and everything organized as a means of defeating boredom. They even organized self-education lectures among themselves. In the cell on the other side was a teacher of Polish history, and so they had their own seminars.

From time to time the idea of a hunger strike was raised but there was never a situation in which it became possible. Some of the older women were very ill and could not have sustained it, and besides there was no way of passing on word that we were on hunger strike.

The first people to come and see us were from the Polish Red Cross, in the first week at Olszynka. Gradually we all were becoming ill staying in that jail. I had backache and rheumatism and my left hand was swollen and stiff after a month. My eyes began to ache and drip, and after a month there was at least one seriously ill woman in each cell.

The Red Cross brought us Swedish shampoo and other sanitary things, all stamped with the Red Cross symbol. These women who came from the Red Cross were all terribly afraid and didn't want to talk to us at all. We literally had to force them to promise that they would try and learn what was happening to our children and families. There were no questions from them about our conditions, our needs or welfare. Next day they came back with some extra warm clothing. These Red Cross women were all extremely elegant, wearing elaborate makeup and fine clothes, and they were all *terrified*. We distrusted them and treated them with reserve but they never once tried to break through this attitude of ours.

Quite early on we began to get parcels from the Church. At the start the source of these parcels was concealed from us, all that would happen would be that our names would be called out and we would have to go and collect

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gained it considerable support inside Poland, and its leading figure, Leszek Moczulski, is still on trial for advocating such policies.

[14] In the Polish language, the word "snowman" has strong connotations of dumb stupidity.

[15] *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Soldier of Freedom)—though not formally the party's organ but that of the armed forces—represents the ultraconservative tendencies in the PZPR, which frequently transports it over the brink of absurdity. It is edited by a department of the PZPR's Central Committee.

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a parcel. We guessed it must be from the Church, since none of the articles inside were our own. The first parcels must have come from the store they keep for the poor but that didn't matter because we put everything on—it was like a refrigerator there. There were never any visits permitted for the Primate's Committee for the Interned—they were never accorded the status given to the Red Cross. Very early on we had demanded that a mass be said inside the jail, no matter whether we were believers or not. They switched on the radio at midnight on Christmas Eve so we could listen to the broadcast mass. Christmas Day was the first time priests arrived. Later they would come on any *official* (that is *state*) holiday, as they weren't permitted to come on any Church festival. They said the first mass in the prison on Boxing Day (the first weekday after Christmas). We were all released from the cells, as the mass took place in the corridor. But two cells remained shut, one of them with Kuron's wife inside.

The Boxing Day mass was the first group meeting we had, and it was very emotional, almost crying, holding hands and being together. The priests were also obviously moved, and the section chief warder seemed very nervous. The first meeting with people from outside other than priests was on December 29. The waiting room was full of people and there were a few I recognized who were trying to see me. Our short conversation was taken up with who was taken and who in hiding—there wasn't time for more. I managed to tell them that after a few days the local train drivers (the railway line passed very close to the prison) would give a long blast on the train whistle when they went past, a greeting to us inside.

During our first week the MSW colonel in charge of us, one Romanowski, began calling people from the cells to speak to him.[16] The first to be taken from our cell was told by him that various ministries had started martial law but now it was totally under the control of WRON.[17] He also said that some people would be released, some would be taken elsewhere, and that possibly some married couples would be allowed to live together in jail. A very few were released before Christmas. Two pairs of men came to see us, one pair introducing themselves as SB people, the other as prosecutors. They asked us to sign loyalty declarations, but as time went by they showed less and less interest in having us sign anything. It was as if they were simply doing their duty. They would say to us, "Do you want to sign anything? It doesn't mean that you will be released because some people sign the document and don't mean it, but it will at least speed up the process of your release or eventual placement elsewhere."

On January 3, Archbishop Glemp came and visited each cell. He spoke very quietly and calmly, asked how things were, listened to us, said, "Take care," and gave a mass. He gave us the papal blessing. The priests with him brought packets of cigarettes (at the same time saying that we smoked too much), and even put in each cell three tampons. Seven women, three tampons. It illustrated for us, rather amusingly, the priestly understanding of female needs, perhaps knowing that we needed these things but not quite sure for what, how often, or how many. Later the Archbishop's Committee for the Interned sent whole boxloads of tampons.

The interrogations were of a classical type—we were told that Solidarity was evil and illegal. Sometimes they asked questions about our friends and tried to split cells against each other. I myself wasn't asked to go and see anyone so I can't really comment but I counseled others not to go. I didn't offer this advice too strongly since it was up to individuals, I just said there was no sense in meeting such people. But you know, if people are in prison for the first time and they are new to this game, they have an urgent need to tell their captors what bastards they are. Many people went just to do this. The interrogators asked the women from my cell all about me, and told them that I was a teacher. So when the girls came back they demanded that I teach them!

Basically that is how it was until the transports to Gołdap.[18] It was now the end of De-

[16] The MSW is the Ministry of the Interior.

[17] WRON — Military Council for National Salvation — the name of the Jaruzelski governing agency.

[18] Gołdap was the site of the main women's internment camp, and is situated in the far north-eastern part of

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cember. There was some fear when we heard that we were to be moved, since we had no idea where we were going. Early in the morning of our move the convoy chief came round and said very politely that we were going to Goldap, that there would be some stops on the way. The Milicja people in charge were very correct and were happy to hear us singing our songs, and some of them even learned a few. One of the Milicja said, "I've a brother getting married soon, and I'll sing some of the songs at the wedding." We traveled in three large trucks, and about 70 of us were moved from Olszynka. (Those left behind were released three days later because they were all so ill.) There were two short stops on the eight-hour journey to use the toilet. Of course, we had to use the Milicja lavatories on the way, stopping at Milicja bases. We went to the lavatory six at a time, in the building, along corridors, then downstairs to the lavatories, and all along the route there was a line of Milicja, right up to the door, to make sure none of us escaped.

On the journey we were given hard-boiled eggs and bread and some ersatz coffee. We had been allowed food parcels from our families after a while, and while we were pleased with this, since we could be independent of the prison's margarine, on the other hand we often felt very awkward upon opening the parcel and finding butter (or something else rationed), since we knew someone had sacrificed a month's rations for us.

We arrived at Gołdap in the evening and it was a total shock. As we left the trucks the sense of emptiness was overwhelming. As we entered the building, the hall seemed quite luxurious, with fantastically large palms in the foyer. These plants and the size of it all, after Olszynka, gave us the impression of great luxury. We were all very tired and so just wanted to sleep, but the next morning we all felt that we wanted to go back to Olszynka rather than be locked up in this luxuriant cage—Olszynka had more "reality" to it.

Poland, close to the Soviet Union. A very isolated spot, it was probably chosen to prevent easy access by visiting relatives. Nevertheless, underground Solidarity bulletins soon began regularly to appear, even there.

There were many armed guards. The man in charge of the place seemed rather like a hotel porter, showing us around, dressed in a very sporty tartan shirt. He showed us the room, four people to a room, with comfortable beds and clean, light space. Each room had a bathroom and at the start we even had our own keys to the rooms. This was astonishing. The place itself was formerly a holiday camp for high-level employees of a state publishing company that owns all the street kiosks and distributes newspapers, etc. The place was built about five years ago and is supposedly set in very pleasant surroundings, but we naturally saw little of those. There are two levels in the building, with the ground level having a coffee bar and canteen as well as rooms. There were already many women there, from Fordon and Jaworze. Upstairs there were women watching color TV, and I rushed in to greet Anna Kowalska, Alina Pienkowska and Joanna Gwiazda.[19] I was pleased to see so many old friends in one place, and they quickly filled in the details about their capture and what this place was like. When they first arrived the commandant had tried to establish some sort of regime, and held a general meeting, during which all the handles were surreptitiously removed from the balcony doors in each room, and the windows were nailed shut. The women were warned to keep away from the windows as the soldiers below had orders to shoot. They were told that lights out and silence was at 10 P.M. and roll calls would be at 6 A.M. The women spent a long time trying to get him to see that there were also eight hours between 11 P.M. and 7 A.M., and maybe he could shift things around a little. There were no exercise walks, and we spent the whole time indoors. But the people in charge didn't really know how to handle this mass of women and right from the start there was a constant flow between rooms and floors. Several subgroups emerged during my time there.

We arrived on January 15, and after a short

[19] Anna Kowalska — leading member of KSS–KOR. Alina Pienkowska — health worker in Gdansk and founding member of Solidarity there. Joanna Gwiazda — radical activist member of Solidarity and wife of Andrzej Gwiazda, who contested the leadership of Solidarity against Walesa at the first national Congress of the Union, in the fall of 1981.

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time the whole place had been organized very thoroughly, with singing and self-education classes. Language classes were formed in English, French, and German, and there were lectures on history, social psychology, and a few amateur evenings of poetry and drama readings and recitals. There were some commissioned talks on the history of the opposition movement, and if various rooms wanted these talks they could book speakers to come round to talk and answer questions.

There was almost no discussion on the future of the opposition movement since, I think, the majority didn't feel they were able to initiate this type of discussion inside jail. People also wanted to get through this ordeal with dignity, and they consequently avoided talk about recent events leading up to martial law—we all felt it was important to avoid quarreling in the camps. For example, there were no conflicts between KOR and KPN people, no accusing each other of tactical errors or the like. On the contrary, I met several very good KPN women who were easy to get on with.

The guards kept to themselves, dealing with administrative affairs and supervising family visits. There were a great many soldiers outside guarding the compound, and there were the SB who interrogated us too. Eventually everyone refused to talk to these people. There was no love lost between the soldiers and the SB. The troops were changed once very three months at least, with different units being brought in to watch us. The prison warders and the SB had contact, though, and almost every night they had enormous drinking sessions together, looking exactly like those of the old Russian songs about the Czar's officers stationed far from home, songs tnat speak of nothing to do, boredom and vodka. When you needed the dentist you had to travel into the local town under escort—the guard was watching you and an SB man was there too, watching the guard.

At Gołdap there were a number of serious nervous breakdowns among the women, with some of them ending up in psychiatric hospitals, and some are still there, I believe. In the middle of April there were still over 100 women there.

There seems to be no general guide as to why people were released, just as there was no general code under which people were arrested. Many were jailed through obvious absurd error, such as one girl who a month before martial law had taken a job in local government after having been a Solidarity typist. There was no reason for her to be taken but they kept her and kept her, just to show that the SB don't make mistakes. Then cases like hers became useful since they could release such people and show the world: "Look, people are being released all the time."

Now that I have been released I don't know what to expect. I just see the hopelessness of the situation. I see that they don't know what to do and actually we don't either. When I was freed, of course, the first thing I did was to go and see my husband in jail. You prepare in advance what you are going to say, get very tense, dress up specially, and try to put on a show of being normal and under control. You talk and talk, but afterward you recall all the things you wanted to say and didn't. All your hopes were raised and none fulfilled. You get home with a rotten headache, feel miserable all next day. And so it goes on. □

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Murray Hausknecht

Crime and the Culture of Incivility

From field notes on city life: A woman is seriously injured by a mugger who follows her to an apartment door and snatches her purse. A couple out for an evening returns to find the apartment burglarized. A 13-year-old car, bearing all the scars of its advanced age and already stolen and recovered four times, is stolen once again. All three incidents occur in a predominantly stable working-class and lower-middle-class neighborhood of apartment buildings and two- and three-family houses.

The conventional distinction between crimes against the person—the mugger's physical assault, for example—and crimes against property can be misleading. To steal a person's car is not simply to appropriate property. For many people a car is psychologically salient, and to steal their car is to strike at a sense of self. The burglar who invades the home is also invading a person's self.

These commonplace observations help explain the current concern with "street crime." Some complain that too much attention is paid to this kind of crime and too little to white-collar crime, which is of greater social consequence. The complaint misses an essential point; white-collar crime does not have the psychological thrust of the mugging, the burglary, or the car theft. Street crime, because of its immediacy, determines the meaning of crime as a social issue.

Crime as a social issue easily lends itself to exaggeration and emotional response. A good example is found in the opening sentence of Lionel Abel's recent comment on the Norman Mailer–Jack Abbott affair. "Not a few of us in New York have been witnesses to killings—killings, mind you, of the innocent; many of us live with the expectation of seeing such things." ("Murder and the Intellectuals," *Commentary*, November 1981.)

"Not a few" and "many"—vague terms—create the illusion that witnessing a killing has become an ordinary experience of daily life, and that expecting to see someone killed is rather like expecting to encounter a traffic jam. But if we recall that now, as in the past, most cases of homicide involve people who are at least acquaintances interacting in private rather than public places, then very few of us can be witnesses to homicides and not very "many of us" live with such expectations.

Still, if we must guard against this sort of exaggeration, we must also recognize that there *is* a high crime rate; crime as a social issue has its base in reality. And the sheer number of crimes is not the only reason for our anxiety. Victims are not the only persons affected by a crime. The victims of the crimes I reported are members of many, and some overlapping, social circles; that is, victims and nonvictims are not segregated or socially distinguishable from each other. Consequently it is easy to empathize with the victims, and this increases our sense of the prevalence of crime.

Crime evokes rage and outrage. Rage is rooted in the assault on the person, and outrage is the response to a morally offensive act. Since morality is social, the outrage and anger establish a kinship between victim and nonvictim. They also share the fears and distrust that are consequences of living with high crime rates. These fears, while sometimes exaggerated, are more often solidly based in reality. Fear, because it is an unpleasant emotion and an affront to self-esteem, feeds anger.

To say that the rise in the crime rate represents a decline in civility is in one sense a

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tautology; crime by definition is uncivil behavior. But civility is also eroded by the response to crime. The angry, fearful, distrustful person is not prepared to extend, perhaps not even capable of, the minimal courtesies and the tolerance of others that make up day-to-day civility. Civility cannot be maintained or nurtured by people whose state of mind predisposes them to volatile and aggressive behavior. The loss of civility is a social and cultural phenomenon.

One of the most visible aspects of contemporary urban life is the technology of security—the proliferation of locks, keys, bars, gates, and guards. If one can imagine the reaction to all this of a recent arrival in the city who is not yet aware of "crime in the streets," it will be easy to see how the mere existence of the paraphernalia of security might itself engender fear and distrust.

A newcomer is also introduced to the norms and folklore of security. It is important, he will be told, never to make eye contact with strangers. In New York City he will be cautioned to seek out a car with other passengers when riding the subway, especially at night.

Now it will not do to exaggerate the degree to which urban life has been changed by the loss of civility. The city has always been a place of strangers where a sharp eye is kept on possessions and doors are locked. Distrust of the stranger is nothing new, but there was always another side of the coin. The privacy of others was respected even in public places; a major function of reading the daily newspaper, for instance, was to help people maintain a civil inattention to others.

Today, though, no one can afford too much inattention. Ignoring the stranger can be one's undoing since he may be the neighborhood mugger; yet eye contact may provoke the very assault to be avoided. One must continuously scan the environment, therefore, paying attention to others while appearing not to do so. To stand on a subway platform engrossed in a magazine or book can open one to attack. A walk in the park becomes a combat patrol: the stroller must be alert to the approaching stranger and the possibilities of the clump of bushes ahead. The loss of civility changes our expectations of others, and it changes the way we live and experience our lives.

To talk of a *culture* of incivility implies underlying values and specific perspectives on the world; that is, an ideological dimension. Some aspects of this ideology are revealed in the polemics set off by the Mailer–Abbott affair. Mailer was almost universally condemned for having urged Abbott's parole. In a fairly typical comment, Naomi Munson wrote that Mailer "decidedly does not regard the propensity to harm others as a measure of unfitness to live in the free world. . . . '" ("The Literary Life of Crime," *New Republic*, September 9, 1981.)

Munson's major premise is the opposite of Mailer's. Mailer assumed that Abbott's literary talent and—given Mailer's eccentric views on violence and social injustice—even his history of violent behavior indicated a possibility that Abbott could become something other than what he was. The contrary assumption, that Abbott has a "propensity to harm others"—that is, an innate tendency—means that he can *never* behave differently. Mailer's is a generous perspective, seeing the possibilities of change in human behavior, while Munson's, given the lack of evidence for inborn tendencies to harm others, suggests a willed meanness of spirit.

Mailer's assessment of Abbott as a parole risk was a result of sloppy thinking and illusions spawned by his peculiar theories. But it is quite another thing to condemn Mailer because of an assumption that Abbott's "propensity" puts him completely beyond the possibility of change. We ought to remember that Mailer's assumption is the formal rationale for the prison system; that is, prisons are justified as places where criminals can be punished and "rehabilitated." It is not ungenerous to believe that prisons as they are now constituted cannot "rehabilitate" criminals; but to renounce the notion of "rehabilitation," because of the criminals' presumed "propensities," represents a souring of the spirit of generosity.

Some of the implications for public policy of this mean-spiritedness can be seen in Lionel Abel's comments. While many New Yorkers, he says, expect to see a killing, few, on the other hand, expect to see foul murderers "being taken to the gas chamber or to the chair.

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No, that we are not supposed to see in newspaper photos and not on live television. The sight may be too uncivilizing." This seeming vote for capital punishment is consonant with his belief that it is necessary to be "implacable" in the treatment of criminals, even those who, like Abbott, do "not strike one as having a criminal mind." (The 19th-century ring to the last phrase seems particularly appropriate to a *Commentary* essay.) He finds his justification for implacability in Hegel who believed, Abel instructs us, that punishment has nothing to do with deterrence or rehabilitation. Rather, the real function of punishment is:

> to restore the state, injured by the criminal act, to health. Every crime which goes unpunished weakens the state; the punishment of a criminal for his crimes makes the state stronger. When the criminal, in taking a human life, treats the state as nothing, the state becomes indeed *nothing* until it retaliates and treats the criminal as nothing by taking his life. In this way his crime is annulled.

This conception of punishment is congruent with "the spirit of vengeance" that quite properly "has ruled our laws." Mailer and others who have not heeded Hegel are "indulgent of crime and criminals" because they "foresee the end of our own society."

It takes a certain achieved callousness to believe that watching people die in gas chambers and electric chairs on prime-time television would be a salutary experience. ("For Mature Audiences Only"?) The coarsening of sensibility on display here is latent in the culture of incivility, and it is a necessary prerequisite for invoking "the spirit of vengeance."

An immediate response of the criminal's victim is an impulse to strike back, a desire for revenge. This is so normal a reaction that it is reasonable to be suspicious of the victim who denies having felt it; the wish to punish those who have hurt us is part of being human. But, as Emile Durkheim argued, the criminal injures the community as well as the individual, because the crime violates and subverts the moral code that transforms individuals into a community. By reacting to the crime with punishment the community repairs, so to speak, the damage done to its common morality and reinforces its commitment to that morality. Durkheim, on the social functions of punishment, sounds very much like what Abel tells us are Hegel's views. There is, however, a critical difference. Abel's central concern is not the community's morality but "the health" of the state; the criminal damages its *power*, and punishment restores that power. Abel's rhetoric—the state is "*nothing* until it retaliates and treats the criminal as nothing by taking his life"—suggests a conception of the state as a sacred object and crime as an act of sacrilege: "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord."

Abel does not distinguish the premeditated murder from those committed, say, in the course of a drunken dispute or as a panic-stricken response of a frightened armed robber—*all* who kill must be reduced to "nothing." A similar perspective frequently animates proposals for mandatory jail terms, long prison sentences, and abolishing parole. These measures, we are told, will reduce crime, but more often than not they are embraced without any questioning of whether, or under what circumstances, they would lower the overall crime rate or deter given criminal acts. When questions of this order are ignored, it is fair to say that anger and the unqualified desire for vengeance are the dominant impulses.

When this happens, we begin to sense that the culture of incivility also entails an authoritarian vision of the world. That vision encompasses more than just the criminal. Those opposed to capital punishment, Abel says, are victims of "hubris" induced by a utopian belief in "the nearness of an end" to the present order of society. But to talk of hubris is to talk only of a character flaw that in Greek tragedy was punished by the gods. What appears to Abel as a defect of character may be something more complex and subtle. Again Durkheim provides the counterpoint: punishment that is the result of "collective anger" tends to be mitigated over time by the "sympathy" we feel for anyone

> who suffers the horror which all destructive violence produces in us . . . this is the sympathy and the same horror which incites that very anger. . . . The same mental state drives us to punish and to moderate punishment . . . there is

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a real and irremediable contradiction in avenging the human dignity offended in the person of the victim by violating it in the person of the offender. [Quoted in Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 261.]

This contradiction cannot be resolved; it can only be alleviated by mitigating the punishment as much as possible. If anger and the desire to lash back at the criminal are elements of being human, then we must reconcile ourselves to living with the paradox that being human also implies a spirit of generosity toward even the meanest of criminals. Any attempt to suppress the inevitable tension in favor of "implacability" is another manifestation of an authoritarian outlook.

Durkheim's is, of course, the long view. At any given moment it is not at all certain that a debate over crime and punishment will be resolved in favor of further mitigation. A recent example of "the spirit of vengeance" overriding an impulse toward generosity is the success of California's Proposition Eight, which, among other provisions, permits the use of bail for preventive detention. In this and similar instances, at least two other reservoirs of anger and outrage reinforce the culture of incivility and allow "the spirit of vengeance" to guide policy.

One such reservoir is hard times, and with that the experience of economic deprivation that follows from high rates of unemployment, inflation, and structural changes in the economy. In modern societies, people tend not to accept hard times as an inevitable part of the human lot. Hard times now represent a defeat of legitimate expectations of a "good" or "decent" life. Hard times generate their own anger, and some of those "free-floating" emotions can be channeled and focused on crime and criminals. Politicians, for example, find it easier to talk of crime and "solutions" to the problem than to concentrate on a malfunctioning economy and economic policies.

The other reservoir of anger is endemic racism; people are surprised when they learn, from the victims' stories or dull official statistics, that not all car thieves, muggers, and rapists in New York City are black and Puerto Rican. The anger aroused by the mugger becomes fused with the hostility of the ever-present racial and ethnic prejudices, and these amplify the emotions surrounding the issue of crime. By focusing on muggers and "safe streets," it is possible to appeal to traditional prejudices and to avoid the boomerang effects of overt racism. Here an ideological perspective like Abel's can become a vehicle for venting the hostilities of prejudice in the guise of dealing with the moral issues of crime. (It hardly needs saying that the argument itself is not therefore racist.) So it serves a traditional function: the ideology of vengeance diverts attention from pressing problems of deprivation and so screens institutional structures from criticism.

None of this means that crime is not a "real" issue; it is part of the fabric and consciousness of everyday life and is far more "real" than, say, the periodic red scares that blow through the landscape of American politics. But its very reality is what makes it so easy to use as a distraction from other issues. And because crime is a real problem of the here and now, the response in the form of the culture of incivility is particularly subversive. Anger, fear, meanspiritedness, the loss of tolerance, the ideology of vengeance—all can be as destructive to the social fabric as crime itself. The pains and injuries we suffer from crime and criminals are added to and made more intense by the culture of incivility. □

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Patricia Cayo Sexton

The Life of the Homeless

Outcast groups vary historically in their composition and in the political meanings and symbols attached to them. What we observe about one group of outcasts, the homeless in New York City, finds its reflections on a historical screen of alternating concern and contempt for the poor.

This group invites political interest because its symbolic associations have been unexpectedly positive for several reasons, among them: (1) the special characteristics of the group and its growing numbers and visibility in front of opulent highrisers and on the steps of elegant Manhattan brownstones and everywhere else in the city; (2) the sharply critical response of many New Yorkers to current national welfare and economic policies; (3) the creative use of the courts and legal tactics in addition to traditional social work and activist approaches; (4) the presence of religiously motivated individuals and groups who have assumed a special mission to the homeless; (5) a good and sympathetic press and, finally, the special qualities of the city and its inhabitants—that Big Apple with its fairly big heart and (relatively speaking) fairly big pocketbook.

Unfortunately, the extensive literature on social stratification tells us little about the political and social functions of outcast groups. (The word "outcast" is applied to them because it suggests what is inevitably true: their condition results from being cast off, degraded, uprooted, excluded from rewarding work—by other classes, by economic policies, and by a value system that cherishes individual achievement, despises individual failure, and is profoundly suspicious of "misfits.")

In the Marxist view, this class has little political significance because it lacks true revolutionary potential. In the *Manifesto* it is a "lumpenproletariat," a dangerous class:

> [This] passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution: its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In fact, the outcast class has always had political meaning, usually of a passive sort, in that it may move other groups to political acts (often of a punitive sort). And at times it has played an active political role.

After the Protestants closed all Catholic monasteries in Elizabethan England, for example, the realization that the swelling ranks of beggars and vagabonds were joining in religious rebellion finally led to the enactment of the first English poor laws. These laws over time virtually forced the able-bodied poor into workhouse confinement, while providing some meager public assistance to the disabled.

Politically active or not, this outcast class is almost always a political symbol. In the best of medieval times, it was likely to be a cherished symbol—the hapless children of God whose misery was a test of the faith, hope, and charity for the more fortunate. The duty of hospitality to needy strangers was taught by the early Church. An ordinance of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the seventh century, as reported by C. J. Ribton-Turner in *A History of Vagrants and Vagrancy,* published in 1887 (London: Chapman & Hall, p. 9), reads:

> Whosoever doth not receive a sojourner into his house, as his Lord ordaineth and promiseth of the Kingdom of Heaven therefore . . . and hath not washed the feet of the poor, nor done alms, so long let him do penance on bread and water, if he amend not.

In the 13th century, the wife of the King of Scotland was distinguished for almsgiving:

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> During her whole life, wherever she might be, she had twenty-four persons whom she supplied with meat and clothing. Departing from the Church she used to feed the poor: first three, then nine, then twenty-four; at last three hundred; herself standing by the King and pouring water on their hands. [Ribton-Turner, p. 33.]

In the best of medieval times, of course, people were ordinarily attached to family groupings or communities from which they were seldom totally outcast. The economic and ideological reformations that severed these ties created new groups of outcasts and attached new meanings to them, as can be seen with some clarity in a small volume edited and introduced by Martin Luther in 1528 entitled *Liber Vagatorum,* "Book of Vagabonds and Beggars." This book was published seven years after Luther's formal excommunication from the Catholic Church and four years after his violent denunciation of the Peasant Wars and his break with Erasmus and the Humanists. The book has three parts: the first shows the methods by which mendicants and tramps get their living; the second gives some "notabilia" about these livelihoods; the third presents a "vocabulary of their language or gibberish, commonly called . . . Beggar Lingo."

Luther writes that such a work "should become known everywhere, in order that men can see and understand how mightily the devil rules in this world. . . . " About the vagabond vocabulary he writes, "Truly, such Beggars' Cant has come from the Jews, for many Hebrew words occur in the Vocabulary, as any one who understands that language can perceive." The book's message is essentially that most beggars are frauds and that charity should be given only to those who are known by the givers as honest beggars, even when others appear needy and possess official licenses to beg.

The English translator of *Liber Vagatorum* attributes the increase of vagabonds during the 16th century to the begging system of the Catholic friars, religious mendicants who gave to beggars "sundry lessons in hypocrisy, and taught them, in their tales of fictitious distress,

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how to blend the troubles of the soul with the infirmities of the body." He then contends that poetry became estranged from the nobility, the citizen, and the scholar (who forsook verse and rhyme for more prosaic and mercenary pursuits), and allied itself with beggars and vagrants. Mendicity, he says, became a distinct institution, divided into various branches and provided with a language of its own. Luther sought, he adds, to sweep away two classes of "locusts": the papacy and its members, and "the beggars and vagabonds who imitated the Mendicant Friars in wandering up and down the country, with lying tales of distress, either of mind or body."

RETURNING to Marx's *Manifesto* for traces of the profounder sources of the shifting historic conditions and meanings attached to the outcasts, we find that early in the industrial revolution the rising bourgeoisie, allied to the religious reformers,

> . . . put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other bond between man and man than naked self-interest and callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value. . . . In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

Rather than sweeping out the "locusts" of beggars, the effect of this "pitiless" upheaval has been to multiply the number of disassociated outcasts and to diminish the compassionate regard in which they once were held.

Since the Reformation and the rise of capitalism, there has been the strong conservative tendency to label outcast groups as unworthy, undeserving, antisocial, indigent out of inertia rather than because of public apathy or private exploitation. These outcasts then came to symbolize, and in turn stigmatize, the larger groups who resembled them in their poverty, ethnic identity, or other demographic characteristics.

Conservatism, of course, predates industrialism. The Roman playwright Plautus, for example, gives these words to one of his characters: "He deserves ill of a beggar who gives him to eat or to drink, For he both loses that which he gives and prolongs for the other a life of misery." Alas, Plautus lived out his later life in poverty.

The historical dialectic of love and hate, compassion and contempt for the outcast has also played itself out in our own time, first in "the war on poverty," in which the poor themselves played an active and sometimes even violent political role, and on into the darkening period of reaction to welfare, street crime, "big government," and high taxes. Accordingly, those who traded on rising welfare costs and street crime delivered this message at the polls: the poor are not only undeserving and expensive to support, they are made even more miserable and antisocial by public assistance. Plautus revisited.

In New York City and elsewhere, a new group has appeared to join the poor and outcast, relieving to some degree the stigmatizing pressures on older outcast groups. The public response is far more charitable than its response to the old outcast groups, perhaps because its composition is quite different; that is, it contains many women, whites, elderly, and large numbers of those who are indisputably and conspicuously disabled.

This new impoverished group has come to be known as "the homeless." It includes some older inhabitants of the central city and skid row: males without families, jobs, homes, often disabled by alcoholism or other infirmities. The ranks of these "old-timers" have been joined by at least two other groups. The first resemble the "hobos" of the 1930s in that they are mainly able-bodied young males who have been displaced by hard times from their jobs, families, shelters.

The second group, which is of special concern here, is almost unique in our times, made up as it is of people who were, in other days, locked up in mental hospitals but now are "deinstitutionalized" or denied voluntary admission to these hospitals. In the two decades following 1960, more than half a million people

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throughout the country were deinstitutionalized, and an unknown, but perhaps similar, number have been refused voluntary hospitalization.

Estimates derived chiefly from the Department of Health of the State of New York indicate that more than 36,000 people in New York City are homeless. The city challenges the figure but the fact that every public shelter newly opened by the city is soon filled suggests that demand far exceeds supply.

While growing numbers of these homeless are apparently young jobless males who are relatively sound of mind and body, there is evidence that one-third or more of the city's homeless (estimates range up to two-thirds) suffer from some disabling psychological disorder, including chronic alcoholism.

The designation for these new and old street people—"the homeless"—reflects the response of a new group of their advocates and the causes and "cures" they perceive for homelessness. The term is neutral rather than pejorative, unlike such designations as underclass, lower class, lower depths—or such popular words as bums, tramps, or drunks. The term "homeless" does not attach blame or a degraded "lower" status to people. It merely says that they are "without homes" and that their primary need is for shelter.

An impressive group (or movement) has been formed, first in New York City and now nationally, the Coalition for the Homeless. The group's leanings are toward advocacy and the law as means, and toward establishing small-scale residential communities for the homeless. The group does not seem to count much on extensive research, conferences, or actions by the homeless as means—or on the remedial efficacy of psychiatric or other professional services for them.

The successes of the Coalition for the Homeless, at least in New York City, have been notable. City shelters and soup kitchens have been opened, the conversion of single-room occupancy hotels to more profitable purposes and the consequent eviction of their residents has been impeded, and new money for the homeless and for small residences has been obtained. The Coalition's major limitation has been (as some observers see it) that, while its goals involve political advocacy, it does not yet have either the political skill or the drive to mobilize available public support. The Coalition may indeed be the only potentially large-scale movement concerned with the poor to survive the current war against poverty programs.

HOMELESSNESS, then, is symbolic not only as a designation but as a new direction in the public response to the poor. Many citizens, of course, are repelled or terrified by the sight of so many disturbed and homeless people on their doorsteps, but an astonishing number of them respond to the homeless, especially to the "deinstitutionalized," with perplexed compassion and charity. In that sense, it may be a tragic but somewhat fortunate political circumstance that the institutionalized were so abruptly released from their confinement, even though they have not yet found the care and welcoming communities that were supposed to follow their release, along with an extension of their basic civil rights.

Appalling as their condition is, it may serve some social purpose. The deinstitutionalized are far more visible than most of the poor and, more important, they are obviously "deserving" poor. Many are especially sympathetic figures because, for the first time in memory, they are women, "shopping-bag ladies," who have known better times and are now far down on their luck, just as our own kin could some day be.

The stigma attached to the outcast, as previously noted, tends to spill over onto adjacent groups with similar characteristics, but the deinstitutionalized have no related groups. They are isolates, and their visible presence tends to distract people from other stigmatized groups—the "undeserving and dangerous poor." *

In New York City, the most effective advocacy has been carried out in the courts, and by

* Oddly enough, during the great depression of the 1930s, the mentally ill apparently played a very different role. Appearing to the public as a "dangerous class" that resembled the unemployed in their homelessness, age, race, etc., they tended to stigmatize the sturdy unemployed and the legions of hobos with whom they were associated in the public mind.

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one lone ranger, a young lawyer, Robert Hayes, who successfully sued the city on behalf of homeless men—using the language of the state constitution concerning public responsibility for shelter. Hayes now has left his Wall Street law firm to work full-time for the Coalition. More recently, he has filed suits against the city on behalf of homeless women, and against the state for its failure to provide suitable voluntary hospital care for those suffering from chronic mental illness.

As for the response of religious groups, Catholics have been notably more active than others (though working far from full capacity), and to some extent the medieval poetry of the poor, the sense of the hapless and deranged being closer to God, has reappeared with the Catholic Worker group providing an active, enduring model for others. Of course, the Salvation Army is there but is not much involved in the new advocacy movement. Other religious groups, such as the Moravian Church (which predated the Lutheran Church), have also been active. And the major religious groups of the city—Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—collectively decided to work on behalf of the homeless. The Community Service Society, a civic group, has taken some major organizational initiatives, and the city of New York has also been there, with a human service record at least equal to that of other American cities.

The importance of the city's relative receptivity, plus the religious connection, can be seen in a Coalition news report on an "extermination program" underway in Phoenix, Arizona. In July 1981, a Phoenix ordinance made it a misdemeanor to lie down or sleep on public property, and that November a new zoning ordinance excluded soup kitchens and missions from the renewed downtown area. On January 1, 1982, the Lighthouse Rescue Mission was condemned by the city after 28 years of operation, along with the Helping Hand Mission, which had functioned 34 years. A major park was closed to discourage sleeping, and all existing public shelters and a Salvation Army program are being shut down, along with existing soup kitchens. In May the editor of the *Arizona Republic* hailed such actions: "We didn't tolerate prostitutes—why tolerate bums?" The sole remaining refuge will be the St. Vincent de Paul Society, which, the Coalition reports, "has decided to fight."

Based on the wholly unsupported view that big is beautiful, or cost-effective (or better for managers), even the best public officials are likely to favor huge public institutions (schools, asylums, medical complexes, shelters) over more intimate and self-managing ones. Private tax-paying citizens, on the other hand, may be persuaded to prefer, for their communities, the more modestly proportioned establishments, all else but size being equal.

The Coalition claims that smaller residences, run by nonprofit groups, can do a better job for less money than big public institutions; but it also urges New York City to adopt a large, planned crash program to meet urgent need. The program should include: the identification of thousands of emergency beds to be used on an as-needed basis for the winter; employment of shelter clients on the staff of all new shelters; initiation of a pilot public-works program of jobs and stipends for willing shelter residents; reimbursement of nonprofit groups and the substantial assistance of religious groups that set up shelters; the conversion into longer-term residences of city-owned properties in all five boroughs.

In New York, the charitable mettle of residents is being tested as perhaps never before. It's not the usual test; no collection plates are being passed, and there is no demand for impersonal credit-card giving. The test is one-to-one, hands-on giving, and it involves more than money or mere symbolic currency.

A case in point is a student who told me of a young man who lives in front of one of the city's super-luxury hotels by day and in steam tunnels near the hotel by night. The hotel's doormen provide showers for him, and others on the hotel staff, as well as passers-by, regularly give him food. My student spent many hours of many days trying to befriend this desperately troubled man and in the end broke through his silence, and told him of other food and shelter options available to him. She learned that he had been in mental institutions but much preferred his present quarters to hospitalization. She also learned that he knew his condition was

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deteriorating and that he would probably accept an offer of decent public shelter, were it forthcoming.

Obviously, the hands-on charity of passers-by is no substitute for proper housing and public welfare. But as a supplement to the latter, this hands-on exercise can benefit the giver as well as the recipient; and its absence can allow citizens a certain detachment and moral distance from the harsh, punitive decisions now being made about public welfare.

THE MEDIEVAL SYSTEM of hands-on charity was an imperfect model. It led to the institutionalization of begging, and it failed to provide the poor with the welfare entitlements that we now cherish. But these entitlements are slipping away fast and leaving no charitable tradition of *moral* rights and obligations in their place.

The organizational division of labor that established poor laws, workhouses, and public welfare allowed individuals, in a sense, to turn over their charitable impulses and obligations to those specialists who were supposed to "care for" the poor—and who often "cared very little" for them. Thus the private citizen was let off the hook while the welfare system was institutionalized, bureaucratized, and, in the worst of times, corrupted by those who dispensed welfare in an exceedingly uncharitable way.

To keep that system open, honest, vigorous—and charitable—there may be no substitute for the application of hands-on charity, to all varieties of outcast and impoverished people, by as many citizens as can be reached.

The deinstitutionalized homeless are only the most conspicuous and most compelling group of outcasts. Their presence has helped to open the doors of public shelters to other homeless people, so it may also help extend more adequate public welfare and hands-on charity to others.

Quite obviously, the mini-movement for the homeless, generated by concerned citizens, as well as by those who simply want the poor off the streets, cannot by itself turn around the nation's voters or the welfare system; but it may be one part of the overall political strategy of those who favor decent welfare policies.

The young leaders of the Coalition for the Homeless are perhaps right to be so suspicious of academic studies and statistics, so often offered as substitutes for action. We already know a great deal about who the homeless are and what they need, but we know much less about how to win the votes and resources needed to deal with their problems. This is basically a political issue and one of crucial importance to the homeless and to other impoverished people. □

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Martin Kilson

The Black Bourgeoisie Revisited

From E. Franklin Frazier to the Present

Since the publication of E. Franklin Frazier's brilliant book *Black Bourgeoisie* in 1957, this class of blacks has acquired a new prominence in both American and Afro-American life. The size of the black bourgeoisie surpasses anything Frazier could have imagined; it now is several times what it was 30 years ago. Its dual status, within the American and Afro-American settings, is infinitely more complex and less dysfunctional than that described by Frazier a generation ago.

Frazier was virtually alone in his critical characterization of upper-strata blacks (middle-class and elite):

> The exclusion of middle-class Negroes from [equal] participation in the general life of the American community has affected their entire outlook on life. It has meant that whites did not take Negroes seriously; that whites did not regard the activities of Negroes as of any real consequence in American life. It has tended to encourage a spirit of irresponsibility or an attitude of "play" or make-believe among them. Consequently, Negroes have "played" at conducting their schools, at running their businesses, and at practicing their professions. The spirit of play or make-believe has tended to distort or vitiate the ends of their most serious activities. . . . Since [the members of] the black bourgeoisie live largely in a world of make-believe, the masks which they wear to play their sorry roles conceal the feelings of inferiority . . . that haunt their inner lives. . . . Their escape into a world of make-believe with its sham "society" [conspicuous status-seeking] leaves them with a feeling of emptiness and futility.[1]

More than anything else, the enormous growth of the black bourgeoisie in the 1960s and 1970s stimulated its behavioral and structural metamorphosis. The first five years of the 1960s saw some 380,000 nonwhites (mainly blacks) acquire white-collar employment, placing about one in five nonwhites into the middle class—some 4 million persons.[2] By 1980 about two out of every five employed blacks were working in white-collar jobs. This compares with 52 percent of whites in white-collar jobs and 32.4 percent of Hispanic Americans. Educational advancement was, of course, basic to this occupational advancement of Afro-Americans. The number of blacks completing high school increased from 42 percent to 75 percent between 1960 and 1980, and today nearly one out of every ten college students is black, up from 6.1 percent two decades ago.

Both qualitative and quantitative aspects of blacks' expansion into middle and upper occupational ranks during the 1970s are significant, as shown in Table 1. While the number of employed blacks increased by 1.3 million (17.3 percent) between 1972 and 1980, the largest employment gain for blacks was in white-collar occupations (nearly 1.2 million or 55 percent) and the sharpest increases were in professional/technical jobs (354,000 or 55.4 percent) and managerial/administrative jobs (168,000 or 69.1 percent). The well-paid ranks of blue-collar workers (craft and kindred workers) also increased—by 217,000 or 32.3 percent.

An equally crucial qualitative feature of the expansion of middle-class and middle-income Afro-Americans is that both males and females shared in this development, as shown in Table 2. Both at the lower and top ranks of white-collar jobs, black women strengthened their position

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relative to their white counterparts, more so in fact than did black men. For example, by 1980 some 14 percent of black women held professional/technical jobs compared to 17 percent of white women, whereas 8 percent of black males held such jobs compared to 16 percent of white males,[3]

Table 1 Employment change by occupation and race, 1972 and 1980, annual averages [Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Black employment change, 1972-1980		White employment change, 1972-1980	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total employment	1,344	17.3	13,306	18.2
White-collar workers	1,185	55.3	10,022	27.4
Professional and technical	354	55.4	3,592	33.8
Managers and administrators	168	69.1	2,639	34.2
Sales	88	51.9	698	13.5
Clerical	580	52.7	3,094	23.8
Blue-collar workers	215	6.8	1,760	7.0
Craft and kindred workers	217	32.3	1,427	14.2
Operatives, except transport	73	5.8	-209	-2.3
Transport equipment operatives	41	9.0	204	7.5
Nonfarm laborers	-116	-14.7	337	10.0
Service workers	21	1.0	1,826	21.2
Private household workers	-238	-41.8	-159	-18.6
Other service workers	259	15.9	1,985	25.6
Farmworkers	-74	-31.9	-302	-10.8
Farm managers	-23	-51.1	187	-11.4
Farm laborers	-51	-27.3	116	-9.9

Source: *Monthly Labor Review*, June 1982, p. 30.

A Mainstream Black Bourgeoisie

THE GROWTH of white-collar occupations in the 1960s and 1970s alters the long-standing isolation of the black bourgeoisie from the mainstream American society and economy.[4] A new occupational differentiation also appears, away from the traditional black professions of teaching and preaching toward engineering, business management, science, and technology. College-educated black males in teaching declined by 94 percent between 1960 and the early '70s, while black males in engineering increased by 194 percent, in the natural sciences by 200 percent, and in business management by 262 percent. By the 1970s, some 10.1 percent of black college-educated males were entering managerial jobs compared to 14.8 percent of white college-educated males; 0.5 percent of black college-trained males were entering design careers compared to 0.5 percent of white college-trained males; and 0.7 percent of black college-trained males were entering architecture compared to 0.5 percent of white college-trained males.[5]

This occupational shift reflects a fundamental fact: upper-strata blacks are employed increasingly not in ghetto but in national job markets—in national (white) banks, insurance companies, retail firms, industries, universities,

Table 2 Percent distribution of employed persons by occupation, race, and sex, 1972 and 1980 [Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Black men		White men		Black women		White women	
	1972	1980	1972	1980	1972	1980	1972	1980
Total employed	4,347	4,704	45,769	55,033	3,406	4,394	27,305	36,043
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional and technical	6.4	8.2	14.3	16.1	10.6	13.8	14.9	17.0
Managers and administrators	4.0	5.6	14.0	15.3	2.1	3.4	4.8	7.4
Sales	1.7	2.5	6.6	6.4	2.5	2.8	7.8	7.3
Clerical	7.6	8.4	6.8	6.2	22.7	29.3	36.2	36.0
Craft and kindred workers	14.8	17.6	21.2	21.5	9	1.4	1.3	1.9
Operatives, except transport	17.4	15.5	12.1	10.7	14.8	13.8	12.5	9.4
Transport equipment operatives	10.3	9.9	5.7	5.4	.4	.7	.4	.7
Nonfarm laborers	17.4	13.0	6.8	6.5	.9	1.4	.9	1.2
Farm and farm managers	1.0	.4	3.4	2.6	—	—	.4	.4
Farm laborers and foremen	3.5	2.4	1.7	1.5	1.1	.5	1.5	1.3
Private household workers	.3	.1	—	—	16.4	7.4	3.0	1.9
Other service workers	15.8	16.4	7.3	7.9	27.6	25.4	16.2	16.0

Source: *Monthly Labor Review*, June 1982, p. 30.

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and government agencies. The last employ the heads of 30 percent of white-collar black families, compared to 16 percent for whites. Such occupational dispersion of white-collar blacks affects their class identity; it alters the historical mode of racial or ethnic interaction. It allows, above all, new milieus to shape class awareness and identity—milieus within which middle-class blacks derive not merely professional but also social and political orientations. When reinforced, in turn, by the increasing shift to suburban living among upper-strata black families—now 33 percent and increasing at a rate twice that of middle-class whites—we have the essential ingredients of a mainstream black bourgeoisie.

WE HAVE NO BETTER SOURCE for documenting the occupational and social dispersion of upper-strata blacks than the journal *Black Enterprise*, the first black multimillion-dollar entrepreneurial magazine (circulation 250,000), owned by Earl Graves. For example, in September 1975 *Black Enterprise* reported the black penetration of the executive ranks of American foundations.[6] Equally noteworthy is the black penetration of the middle-level technical and managerial ranks of big and middle-sized corporations.[7]

The importance of this occupational dispersion with regard to black middle-class identity cannot be overemphasized. It influences bourgeois blacks in several ways. It frees the black bourgeoisie from the traditionally segregated job market, to which customary racism had doomed the pre-1960s black bourgeoisie. It distributes upper-strata blacks more randomly among jobs, technologies, organizations, and networks that define the American economy. The black bourgeoisie today increasingly derives its awareness and orientation from nationwide milieus, and it is indeed no longer consigned to segregated "slots."

The shift from the ghetto to nationwide milieus is hardly instantaneous. It takes time and is mediated through a new type of middle-class infrastructure. Since the early 1970s, the black bourgeoisie has been forging a new nationwide network of organizations.[8] And the new black political "cadre," nearly 6,000 elected officials (compared to 125 in 1960), is also fashioning a network of organizations.[9]

Though all-black in composition, like the pre-1960s associations, the new ones have a different relationship to America's power elite. Where the pre-1960s associations, such as the National Negro Business League (founded in 1900), function protectively, shielding upper-strata blacks from the pressures of white supremacy and shoring up ghetto markets, the new associations function integratively—opening broad opportunities for upper-strata blacks throughout American economic and institutional life.

This process nationalizes the black bourgeoisie's networks, increasingly intersecting black and white power structures. At some point the new associations of upper-strata blacks will, like a molting skin, give way to yet another metamorphosis, to fulfill these integrative tasks in wholly new ways. Meanwhile the new associations help to merge black and white bourgeois identity and awareness. Over time we will see a growing proportion of upper-strata blacks acquiring social, professional, and political attitudes that are more class-linked than race-linked, resembling what may be found among upper-strata whites.

This is no idle projection. The integrative function of the new Afro-American professional class and their associations rests upon a fundamentally new position for blacks in the upper ranks of the American economy.[10] And this structural change is even more impressive when some of its qualitative dimensions are recognized.

No previous generation of the Afro-American technocratic and business elite has ever experienced the real world of American capitalism as thousands of blacks in "Fortune 500" firms do now, and this experience is reflected in both the composition and behavior of black professional associations. This process is revealed in miniature in the functioning of New York City's One Hundred Black Men, which was founded in the late 1960s. One Hundred Black Men now has 500 members, characterized by one observer as "the cream of the city's black achievers. . . ." Its first president was Bruce Llewellyn, former head of a giant super-

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market chain (Fedco) and now president of the Federal Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which initiates and services American investments in African states. One Hundred Black Men's current membership is a Who's Who of the city's black elites.[11]

Occasionally, issues of concern to working-class and lower-class blacks engage the attention of One Hundred Black Men—such issues as the lack of professionalism among city police, or police brutality, unemployment among black youth, and the availability of adequate health facilities for New York City's blacks. The association's primary concerns, however, include expanding credit from white banks for black businesses, advancing professionalism among blacks in white and black firms and professions, advancing blacks in the city's political establishment, and expanding a variety of exchanges between black and white elites. In achieving these goals, the association insists upon being exclusive in regard to the high level of talent and success required of its members. As one leading member put it:

> I know that when some folks call us elitist they intend it as a putdown. But that doesn't bother me. When I sit down with a corporate head or a city official, they know I represent a group that is made up exclusively of the most powerful and influential and successful black men in the city. And they listen. It's because we're exclusive that we can be effective.[12]

To one degree or another One Hundred Black Men is replicated in numerous local and national black elite associations. These associations are now the dominant agencies shaping a new black/white leadership symbiosis and a new bourgeois identity among Afro-Americans. Unlike the pre-1960s associations, the new ones have greater professionalism and more viable mainstream linkages. They no longer have to respond to the frustrations associated with racism as did their predecessors—by channeling frustrations into what E. Franklin Frazier considered pseudoelite behavior, a "world of make-believe" where scarce resources were frittered away on aping white "high society." The energies and resources that generate black upward mobility now can be harnessed in behalf of bona fide influence and power in the American mainstream—though racist constraints, while weakening, have by no means disappeared and must be dealt with.

Power-Seeking vs. High-Society Life Style

EVIDENCE of the life styles of today's upper-strata blacks can be found in a number of new black journals. The most prominent of them appear monthly and have a nationwide circulation: *Black Enterprise* (250,000), *Essence* (600,000), *Black Collegian: The National Magazine of Black College Students* (250,000), and *Dollars and Sense* (110,000). There is also an influential annual, *Opportunities for the Minority College Graduate* (now in its 15th edition). And the oldest black monthly, *Ebony* (6 million!), is now partly recast as a journal concerned with black achievement of positions of power, so modifying its former obsession with high-society life styles.[13]

The national black journals are now the prominent purveyors of what might be called power-seeking life styles, devoted to black entrepreneurial innovation and growth, professional advancement, and strategic positioning throughout American society. This purpose is heralded in the subtitle of *Dollars and Sense*—"the compendium of information for black business and professional men and women"—which is Chicago's contribution to this new black journalism. *Black Enterprise,* published in New York, carries several monthly columns (in addition to "Making It"), titled "On the Move" and "Names in the News," which offer brief career biographies celebrating a preference for a power-oriented life style. It also carries fuller portraits of major black business innovators (such as Henry F. Parks, founder and owner of the largest black meat processing firm, Parks Sausage Co.) and in-depth reports on black firms that have penetrated major spheres in the economy. *The Black Collegian,* patterned after *Black Enterprise,* covers the whole gamut of career options available in American institutional life. No previous generation of middle-class blacks has been exposed to this type of black media, inundating blacks with a message on the need to penetrate American power networks.

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While the few pre-1960s black proponents of power-seeking life styles never obtained more than a marginal foothold, today's situation is quite different. Power-seeking life styles now vie with the older "high-society" outlook, whose attenuation might be attributed to E. Franklin Frazier's *Black Bourgeoisie* (1957), which launched a devastating critique of *Ebony*'s gaudy marketing of high-society values. Yet these values, though now widely questioned, are far from dead; and for good reason. After all, even among white ethnic and WASP elites, who have had far more opportunities than Afro-Americans, a vibrant appetite for conspicuous leisure and garish consumption persists. Thorstein Veblen considered this a congenital condition of the American reality, sparked by the status tension and insecurity that bedevil the struggle for social mobility in America.

It is no surprise, then, that "high-society" life styles still appeal to the Afro-American upper strata. This is apparent in the persistence of upper-strata black fraternities and social clubs, now again captivating students at some black colleges (especially at Howard University in Washington, D.C.) and stimulating the return of extravagant debutante balls among affluent blacks. This trend is also reflected in the rise of national black magazines dedicated to marketing expensive use of leisure time. The monthly *Black Odyssey: A Magazine on Travel and Leisure* is the most prominent. While clearly skewed to persons of affluent tastes, *Black Odyssey* also appeals to the more Spartan, noting in an editorial, on p. 1 of its Summer 1979 issue, that

> . . . some of us want to know where the nearest picnic area is located. Where can we learn to swim and snorkle? What and where are the museums in the cities in which we live and visit? Where are the respectable singles clubs? Where are the not so respectable singles clubs? Where are the jazz concerts and discos? . . .

The numerous local black-elite magazines mix high-society and power-centered presentations, sometimes skewed to high-society preferences and often in a rather tacky fashion.

Thus the context of middle-class and elite identity for Afro-Americans today is quite variegated. Preferences for "high-society" life styles are challenged today from many quarters, and they must coexist with strident power-seeking appetites. And these advocates of power-seeking have an important goal—the convergence of the black and the white bourgeoisie.

The Insider/Outsider Syndrome

THIS CONVERGENCE of the black and the white bourgeoisie cuts two ways: it helps to reduce the older virulent forms of racism experienced by middle-class blacks; and it stimulates a new kind of bourgeois consciousness, which reaches beyond black confines to the national arena. Though this transformation is protracted and, so far, imperfectly realized, the growth of a national-minded black bourgeoisie produces crucial changes in the Afro-American social structure. Sometimes it sharpens the differentiation between upper- and lower-strata blacks. At other times it forges new kinds of functional divisions within the black upper strata. For instance, in the sizable population of black lawyers in Washington, D.C., there now is a division between the majority of ordinary black civil servants and a minority elite cadre that enters top white law firms and the policy-making ranks of key government agencies.[14]

The cumulative impact of these developments is transforming the customary character of American race relations. There is emerging what might be called, for want of a better term, status-deracialization. Reinforced by every advance of upper-strata blacks into mainstream American power structures, status-deracialization is evolving into the cutting edge of class awareness and differentiation in the black community. But, like the growth of a national-minded black bourgeoisie, status-deracialization is a protracted process. At any given time, the mainstream integration of upper-strata blacks is erratic, characterized by breakthroughs on one front and setbacks on another. The setbacks, because of residual racist practices, slow down the replacement of race-linked with class-linked attitudes among the black bourgeoisie, thereby restricting the ideological

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range of class differentiation among Afro-Americans.

To speak of status-deracialization is another way of identifying those alterations in the historical dynamics of racism in American life that William Wilson characterizes as the "declining significance of race" (see Note 3). Like Wilson's term, status-deracialization does not imply that racism has ceased to exist. Far from it. It means that racism now has less capacity to dictate the structure and behavior of an expanding segment of Afro-Americans. Though one can debate the actual size of this segment, it might well comprise about 60 percent of black families—those in the elite and middle class (35 percent) and in the upper blue-collar class (25 percent), but not the marginal blue-collar and lower class (about 40 percent). While persistent racist practices by police, business firms, unions, and by hoodlums like the Ku Klux Klan continue to threaten all blacks, these practices now are a weaker constraint upon Afro-Americans than they were ever before.

Yet until all racist threats to full equality for Afro-Americans are wiped out, status-deracialization will remain a relative and not an absolute phenomenon. Full equality is far from being a viable reality for all blacks. And this, in turn, affects the character of class perceptions among Afro-Americans. The growth of class awareness is likely to proceed, as it were, by fits and starts. Above all, class perceptions among blacks display numerous inconsistencies. On some issues, upper-strata blacks will converge with upper-strata whites. On others, upper-strata blacks will converge with lower-strata blacks, which means that some combinations of class and racial or ethnic concerns are operative and yet that sometimes racial concerns alone predominate. Why these inconsistencies?

The erratic manner by which upper-strata blacks are co-opted into the American mainstream leaves them, as it were, both "insiders" and "outsiders." While possessing upper-strata capabilities, and therefore being increasingly acceptable to national power structures, the black bourgeoisie is still vulnerable to residual racism. This insider/outsider condition is also shaped by the newness of this upward mobility, for the vast majority is first-generation elite and middle class, coming from blue-collar families whose experience with customary racism influences its class perceptions. Only a small segment of upper-strata blacks is second-generation, but some came from elite and middle-class families who often cultivate strong black ethnocentrism in their children—a facet of the pre-1960s black bourgeoisie that E. Franklin Frazier neglected.

These family experiences function as countervailing forces, pulling class perceptions among upper-strata blacks into a race-linked direction while their expanding inclusion in mainstream power structures propels them in another direction. Ambivalence and ambiguity must characterize the "split personality" of the black bourgeoisie at a time of emergent status-deracialization.

Bourgeois Blacks vs. Lower-Class Blacks

THE INSIDER/OUTSIDER SPLIT manifests itself in various ways. For example, a study of the political ideology of black and white doctors in New York City in the 1960s, testing Frazier's assertion that black doctors "have generally acquired a conservative middle-class outlook on life," found that in fact only a minority of black doctors define themselves as conservatives. The study found 73 percent of black doctors identifying themselves as "liberal," compared to 47 percent of white doctors. Thus Frazier's assertion, at least for this study, has proved erroneous. Why?

Frazier's view of the black bourgeoisie was too one-dimensional, attributing too much significance to social class as such. He minimized the complex influence of persistent racism upon the self-image of upper-strata blacks. And now, in an era of rising expectations, reinforced by black ethnic militancy, bourgeois blacks paradoxically resent racism even more than they did in the past.

Today the interplay between conservative and liberal feelings among the black bourgeoisie revolves around whether social and political issues are viewed as class-linked or race-linked. If viewed as class-linked, upper-strata blacks

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are likely to respond as conservatives. If seen as race-linked, they respond as liberals.

Yet certain issues that are both class- and race-linked can also evoke a liberal response from bourgeois blacks—for example, Affirmative Action, or federal aid to black businesses. More complicated still are such issues as a national health plan—issues that entail some federal constraints on certain upper-strata blacks (in this case on doctors, dentists, pharmacists, health-field entrepreneurs) but produce benefits for lower-strata blacks.

Taxation issues also can be baffling. In general, upper-strata blacks share with upper-strata whites a conservative view on taxation, while at the same time recognizing the importance of federal taxation powers to a wide range of national policies beneficial to lower-strata blacks—for instance, the Job Corps, CETA, Food Stamps, and Aid for Dependent Children. Such complex policy issues place the typical upper-strata black in a bind—a bind more difficult in an era of status-deracialization, when the black bourgeoisie experiences increasing relations with upper-strata whites. Class-identity formation among the black bourgeoisie cannot be grasped by using, as Frazier did, one-dimensional assumptions.

IN 1974 WILLIAM SAMPSON AND VERA MILAM of Northwestern University undertook a study of bourgeois values and ethnic solidarity in two black middle-class communities in Chicago and adjacent Evanston. The study revealed much about the complexity of class-identity formation among the black bourgeoisie.[15] Some 49 affluent black families in Chicago's Pill Hill section (formerly a community of white doctors) and 145 average middle-class black families in Evanston participated in the Sampson-Milam study. The Pill Hill families had a $39,270 mean income and were 53 percent college-educated; the Evanston families had a $19,236 mean income and were 21 percent college-educated.

The differentials in affluence and college education that separate the communities govern a great deal of the interplay between ethnic patterns and bourgeois values. Thus when queried about their acceptance of middle-class status, the affluent Pill Hill families were much more likely to react favorably: 51 percent of the Pill Hill families were "positive" or "very positive" about being bourgeois, 31 percent "ambivalent," and 14 percent "negative." The average middle-class families in Evanston, on the other hand, were only 35 percent "positive" or "very positive," 37 percent "ambivalent," and 18 percent "negative." The issue of "individualism" further distinguished the two communities, for some 35 percent of the Pill Hill families considered themselves "individualistic," compared to 23 percent of the Evanston families.

However, the greater commitment to "individualism" by the Pill Hill families did not preclude a self-defined ethnic solidarity. When asked, "Do you feel a special obligation to try and help poor blacks," some 80 percent of the Pill Hill families said they "agree" or "strongly agree" (16 percent agree, 64 percent strongly); and 82 percent of the Evanston families said they "agree" or "strongly agree" (16 percent agree, 66 percent strongly agree). These results, of course, contrast markedly with the long-standing Frazier hypothesis that the more middle-class or bourgeois blacks are, the weaker their ethnic or race commitment.

Yet the Frazier hypothesis continues to have weight. For example, the Sampson-Milam study put another ethnic-commitment question to their subjects from a more class-linked perspective, querying their attitude toward lower-class blacks. When asked to respond to the statement, "I find the way of life of poor blacks repugnant," 63 percent of the average middle-class Evanston families replied "agree" or "ambivalent" (48 percent agree, 15 percent ambivalent), compared to 49 percent of the affluent Pill Hill families offering the same response (35 percent agree, 14 percent ambivalent).

It would appear that the average middle-class families in Evanston were reacting out of their less well-off and more tenuous status, perhaps reflecting a fear of slipping in class position. On the other hand, the affluent Pill Hill families' greater tolerance of lower-class blacks might be a function of *noblesse oblige*—not uncommon among some affluent Ameri-

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cans toward the poor. The affluent families' greater tendency for tolerance reappeared in response to a second query about lower-class blacks—"I am not embarrassed by the behavior of lower-class blacks." Some 30 percent of the Pill Hill families said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the statement, while 37 percent of the average middle-class Evanston families offered this response.

The second query—"I am not embarrassed by the behavior of lower-class blacks"—warrants a closer look. If we combine the "disagree," "strongly disagree," and "ambivalent" responses, then both the affluent and average middle-class black families in the Sampson-Milam study are actually not very favorably disposed toward the behavior of lower-class blacks. Some 61 percent of the affluent families gave a combined response of "disagree/ambivalent" to the statement "I am not embarrassed by the behavior of lower-class blacks," as did 58 percent of the average middle-class families.

These findings suggest that we cannot dismiss the Frazier hypothesis out-of-hand. Social class undoubtedly has an influence on the relationship of upper- and lower-strata blacks; and upper-strata blacks today surely differentiate themselves from the life styles of lower-class blacks. Yet the forces of race or ethnicity persistently intersect with the class-based realities of the lower class and the black bourgeoisie, far more so than in lower-class and middle-class relations among other American ethnic groups. And as racial realities in America are often beyond the control of any segment of the black community, the relations between upper-strata and lower-class blacks will never be easy to delineate.

Whither the New Black Bourgeoisie?

INSOFAR AS RACE-LINKED REALITIES continue to compete with class-linked forces in shaping the behavior of the black bourgeoisie, today's black bourgeoisie is similar to its predecessor as dissected in *Black Bourgeoisie*. For both the old and the new black bourgeoisie, racism hinders the quest for parity with the white bourgeoisie. This hindrance generates much frustration, and this frustration, for both the old and new black bourgeoisie, distorts the character of bourgeois existence, especially the quality of its leadership role. This role, for both the old and new black bourgeoisie, must seem problematic when compared to the leadership of the white bourgeoisie. But here the similarities between old and new black bourgeoisie end, for there are some fundamental differences.

The old black bourgeoisie's political economy was essentially ghetto-bound—while the new black bourgeoisie's political economy is essentially national. Now both the training milieu and job markets are mainly free of ghettoization—a feature in the elite formation of white ethnics (Irish, Italians, Slavic Americans, Jews, and so on) that took two generations to achieve, compared to three or four generations for Afro-Americans (from the late 1880s to the 1960s). Though long in coming, this deghettoization of the black bourgeoisie's education and job markets spawns a behavioral and structural metamorphosis that symbiotically disentangles the new black bourgeoisie from the old.

Above all, the occupational and professional milieus of the new black bourgeoisie intersect (though not necessarily directly) those of the white bourgeoisie. Like the old black bourgeoisie, the new black bourgeoisie sustains a race-bound organizational infrastructure. But here the similarity ends. Whereas the old black bourgeoisie's associations defended ghetto markets, the new black bourgeoisie's race-bound associations function integratively—as ramrods against residual racism in the national economy (job markets, skill markets, credit markets, and more) and in general institutions. The difference is fundamental: the old black bourgeoisie faced a fierce ceiling on its professional and social mobility; the new black bourgeoisie, while still confronting residual racism, takes over much of the professionalization and mobility dynamics of the white bourgeoisie.

Thus the new black bourgeoisie enjoys an option that the old black bourgeoisie, in Frazier's gloomy perspective, could only "play" at: it is becoming a bona fide elite or upper class. Prior to the 1960s, lower-strata and upper-

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strata blacks alike were apprehensive about this option. Lower-strata blacks feared the loss of their ethnic leaders or worse—that elite blacks would join in perpetuating racist rule; upper-strata blacks feared they would fail as a bona fide elite and would be manipulated for purposes beyond their control.

Today there is still fear and apprehension of elite blacks among lower-strata blacks, because there has risen within the black bourgeoisie a viable, mainstream black political force—nearly 6,000 elected officials and perhaps 20,000 administrative and policy technicians at city, county, state, and federal levels. While "success anxiety" of upper-strata blacks has not disappeared, it is now aggressively countered by the power-seeking sector of the black bourgeoisie, a process reinforced by further interlocking of the black bourgeoisie with national power networks.

What about the problem of "humanizing" the new black bourgeoisie, moving it away from self-serving goals toward other-serving perspectives—a problem that exercised Frazier 30 years ago? This will, no doubt, prove nearly as difficult as for the white bourgeoisie. Although representatives of American ethnic elites often think otherwise, racial or ethnic affinity between lower and upper classes is seldom much of a constraint upon irresponsible leadership and governance. As with the rise to leadership by the white bourgeoisie (WASP, Irish, Italian, Jewish, German, and so on) between the middle nineteenth century and World War II, the bid of today's black bourgeoisie for greater clout is surrounded by rhetoric that plays upon the moral and progressive idioms of American history.

Reality, however, belies the rhetoric. Through corruption, stealth, norm-breaking, law-breaking, and coercion (both institutional and extralegal) American elites, regardless of ethnicity, have historically exhibited a leadership posture in which they try to undercut the force of America's democratic tradition, hoping to tilt the rewards of private markets and the political process disproportionately in their favor.

It might be argued that the new black bourgeoisie's more difficult evolution immunizes it against this tradition. Curiously enough, this self-serving argument has surfaced recently from intellectual proponents of the black bourgeoisie, appearing in such prominent national organs as the *New York Times, Washington Post,* and *Harper's*. Nell Painter, a black historian at the University of North Carolina, offers a variant of this argument in the *New York Times* (December 17, 1981), suggesting that new black elites in both America and Africa might prevail more benignly than is usual for modern elites, because of the pathological racist constrictions they have shared with the black masses. Yet the past 25 years of independent African states offer little evidence of enlightened rulership, while any judgment of the new bona fide elite status of the Afro-American bourgeoisie requires more time.

Roger Wilkins, a prominent Afro-American lawyer and journalist, offers another variant of recent efforts to dress up black rulership. Writing in *Harper's* (March 1982), Wilkins suggests that, owing to a special identity angst experienced by "blue-chip" blacks like himself (that is, blacks now within national power networks), the black bourgeoisie will revitalize its relationship to lower-class blacks. But Wilkins offers no specifics of such revitalization (for example, living in lower-class neighborhoods, expanding elite voluntary activity among lower-class blacks, or shoring up the lower-class blacks' fledgling political structure). Indeed, it might be said that Painter and Wilkins seek to alter national perception of lower-class blacks as the only truly depressed (and truly needy) segment of Afro-American life, claiming that the identity angst of bourgeois blacks is a comparable burden. Yet their claim, in fact, is thoroughly dubious; their cry has a ring less pathetic than phony.

WHITHER THE BLACK BOURGEOISIE? In the short run, it seems that its more self-serving and exploitative proclivities vis-à-vis lower-strata blacks are likely to be checked by the bourgeoisie's need to play a leading part in ridding American society of all vestiges of racism. While greater access to the middle and upper power ranks propels bourgeois blacks—as it does bourgeois whites—toward an establish-

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mentarian outlook, residual racism functions as a powerful countervailing force, pulling bourgeois blacks toward liberal/left orientations. Today as in the past, the liberal/left sectors of American life remain the black bourgeoisie's natural allies in the struggle against racism.

For the elites of the Irish, Italians, Germans, Orientals, Jews, and other ethnics, their caste burden (whether religious or national) diminishes or dissolves after two generations of class mobility. But the black bourgeoisie has such a heavy caste burden (the essence of white racism) that few social scientists feel safe in predicting precisely when that caste burden of race will give way to class achievement as the defining axis for the Afro-American middle class and elites.

This peculiar structure of caste and class gives Afro-Americans a tilt toward the liberal/left in American life—a sort of necessitarian liberalism. Only among American Jews, who experienced a more rigid caste burden than other white ethnics, is there any comparable experience.

As all the various attitude and voting data show, this tilt applies to between 60 and 70 percent of Jews in general and Jewish elites in particular, despite the strong pull of conservative Zionism and the new ethnocentrism that evolved among Jews in the 1960s and '70s. Necessitarian liberalism causes middle-class and elite blacks to back public policies that are often rejected by bourgeois white ethnics and that sometimes even oppose their own self-interest if viewed in class terms.

Thus while 30 years ago E. Franklin Frazier was rightly wary of the conservative potential in the black bourgeoisie's self-serving values—then a black elite still without a populist-oriented civil rights movement—it is possible today to be somewhat less pessimistic. The black bourgeoisie today would have to be daft to misconstrue the Reaganite-conservative stance as being in their interest (not to speak of the interests of lower-strata blacks to whom many bourgeois blacks are tied by kinship).

Of course, Reaganite Republicanism—so naked in its deference to the powerful and greedy and so bent on scuttling any federal role in sparking social mobility—also threatens the interest of a significant segment of the white bourgeoisie, much of which (the white-ethnic especially and the redneck-WASP) emerged in the post-World War II era and can claim no more than one generation of viable bourgeois status.

This recently advanced segment of the white bourgeoisie is in crucial ways marginal. It has the comfort of some security, but also shows numerous signs of fragility—for instance, the boredom of its youth and its heavy drinking, sex, vandalism, and general disarray. Reporting on a premeditated railway derailment (that killed the engineer and injured many) as an example of this disarray among new bourgeois white youth in the suburban town of Fair Lawn, New Jersey, Samuel Freedman observed in the *New York Times* (July 10, 1982) that

> [this] was not what parents had in mind when they moved to this suburb of 32,229. The residents, largely Jewish and Italian people bound for the middle and upper-middle classes, left Newark, Paterson, New York City after World War II. Fair Lawn offered excellent public schools and modest homes with tidy lawns. Most families . . . stay at least until their children go to college, as nearly 80% do.

Attracted to the Reaganite conservatives' skillful appeal to old American ideals (thrift, work ethic, the family, sexism, religion, nationalism), the new white-ethnic and the redneck-WASP bourgeoisie nurses its own variant of "false consciousness." It is therefore not as cognizant as the new black bourgeoisie of how Reaganite policies threaten its status, though in recent months poll data suggest a new awareness of that danger. If this development persists, it could produce for the black bourgeoisie a kind of alliance with its heretofore unavailable white counterparts.

Such an alliance would offer the black bourgeoisie unique political opportunities. It could open what might be called transethnic or transracial leadership leverage at many levels of American politics, with blacks emerging as sustained spokespersons for whites' interests and vice versa. Though it remains to be seen whether whites are tolerant enough to allow this to happen and whether the black bourgeoi-

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sie is resourceful enough to seize the opportunity—utilizing the liberal/moderate wing of both the Democratic and Republican parties—there are certainly enough new realities differentiating today's black bourgeoisie from that described by E. Franklin Frazier 30 years ago to warrant some optimism about the prospect.

Notes

[1] E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Free Press, 1957), pp. 205–206, 213.

[2] Dan Cortz, "The Negro Middle Class," *Fortune*, November 1966.

[3] Current occupational data on blacks are elaborated in Diane Westcott, "Blacks in the 1970s," *Monthly Labor Review*, June 1982. Also in William Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 126–134. See also Richard Freeman, *Black Elite: The New Market for Highly Educated Black Americans* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 6, 60.

In specific white-collar jobs, by 1980, black females were — 7.4 percent of women accountants (black males 3.6 percent of male accountants); 9.4 percent of women computer specialists (black males 4.1 percent); 10.8 percent of women personnel and labor specialists (black males 7.9 percent); 0.5 percent of women medical and dental practitioners (black males 2.1 percent); 9.2 percent of women health technicians (black males 8.4 percent); 5.3 percent of women college teachers (black males 3.3 percent); 10.2 percent of women school teachers (black males 5.5 percent); 12.2 percent of women school administrators (black males 6 percent); 4.6 percent of women banking and financial officials (black males 2.6 percent); 6.7 percent of women engineers and science technicians (black males 5.6 percent); and 7.1 percent of women lawyers and judges (black males 3.1 percent). Finally, in aggregate terms, some 13,000 black family heads are doctors and dentists, 22,000 accountants, 25,000 engineers, and 191,000 managers and administrators.

[4] Reynolds Farley, "The Long Road: Blacks and Whites in America," *American Demographics*, February 1980, pp. 14–18.

[5] Freeman, *Black Elite*, p. 60 passim.

[6] Among the major foundations with black executives are: Charles Kettering Foundation, Borden Foundation, Avon Foundation, Lilly Endowment, John Hay Whitney Foundation, TRW Foundation, Clement & Jessie Stone Foundation, Cummins Engine Foundation, Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, the Twentieth Century Fund, Borg-Warner Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Phelps-Stokes Fund, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation.

[7] For over a decade each monthly issue of *Black Enterprise* has carried a column entitled "Making It," comprising a job profile of persons exemplifying the occupational dispersion of the black bourgeoisie. In the September and October 1979 issues, this column listed the following instances of occupational dispersion: Hallie Anderson, promoted to supervisor of the Group Claims Division at the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. (Hartford); Bill Baker, appointed manager of Communications for Blue Cross and Blue Shield (Colorado); Jack Bell, elected president of the Texas Restaurant Association and the first black to head this 5,500-member group; Columbus Coleman, promoted to executive vice-president and general manager of Wells Fargo Securities Clearance Corp. (New York); Tom Finch, formerly director of Matrix Operations for Meadowlands and Giants Stadium (New Jersey), was appointed director of Promotions at Arlington Park Race Track Corp. (Arlington Heights, Ill.); Jay Francis, elected vice-president of Westinghouse Broadcast Co.; Edward T. Gilliam II, appointed manager of Finance and Administration for Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority; F. Michael Kyle, appointed Internal Audit manager at Toro Co. (Minneapolis); Cressworth Lander, appointed managing director for the Civil Aeronautics Board; James Lockhart, formerly vice-president for Legal Affairs at Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., was appointed vice-president for Public Affairs at Transamerica Corp.; George Brown, promoted to executive vice-president at Grumman Energy Systems, Inc. (Bethpage, N.Y.); Stephen Daniels, appointed manager for Reservations at Trans World Airlines (New York Region); and Aldred Fornay, appointed creative director at Revlon Corp.

[8] Among these organizations are the National Association of Black Manufacturers (1971), National Association of Black Accountants (1970), National Association of Black Contractors (1972), National Black Media Coalition (1973), National Black Network (1973), Council of Concerned Black Executives (circa 1975), and the Organization of Black Airline Pilots (1976).

[9] These include the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, the National Association of Minority County Officials, and the National Caucus of Black Schoolboard Members. Moreover, the nationwide associations are reinforced at the local level (city) by a plethora of similar associations, ranging from the Dallas Alliance for Minority Enterprise, the Durham (Black) Business and Professional Chain, to New York City's powerful One Hundred Black Men.

[10] See Westcott, "Blacks in the 1970s," pp. 32–33. Noteworthy too is the doubling of the proportion of black managers and technicians in the following list of eight top-level Fortune 500 firms: *AT&T* — 4.5 percent minority (mainly black) managers in 1972 and 12 percent in 1981; *Exxon Corp.* — 3.4 percent minority managers in 1977 and 14.9 percent in 1980, as well as 8.9 percent minority professionals in 1977 and 14.9 percent in 1980; *Gannett Publications* — 7 percent minority managers and 8.5 percent professionals in 1980; *Sea-Land Industries* — 13 percent minority managers, 17 percent professionals, and 21.4 percent salespersons in 1981; *Xerox Corp.* — 3.5 percent man-

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agers in 1972 and 14.6 percent in 1981, as well as 6.4 percent professionals in 1972 and 16.3 percent in 1981; *Equitable Life Assurance Society* — 6.2 percent minority managers, 10.2 percent professionals, 16.3 percent technicians, and 20.9 percent clerical workers in 1981; *Hewlett-Packard* — 9.7 percent managers in 1981, 11.2 percent professionals, and 15.8 percent technicians; *IBM Corp.* — some 15,600 blacks among total employees of 197,000, nearly 8 percent, and comparable proportions of black managers and professionals.

[11] The membership of One Hundred Black Men includes: several political figures—Charles Rangel (congressman), Basil Patterson (New York secretary of state), David Dinkins (city clerk), Vernon Jordan (former head of the National Urban League); a leading banker—Hughlyn Pierce; three publishers—Ed Lewis, Earl Graves, John Procope; a sports promoter—Don King; leading lawyers—Judge Samuel Pierce and Judge Herbert Evans; two foundation heads—Franklin Williams (president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund), Franklin Thomas (president of the Ford Foundation); the architect who heads the School of Architecture at Columbia University—J. Max Bond, nephew of the late scholar and educator Horace Mann Bond.

[12] Mike Kennington, "The One Hundred Black Men," *Opportunities for the Minority College Graduate, 1980* (15th Annual Edition, 1980), pp. 34–36.

[13] These national journals are supplemented at the local level (city and state) by an array of other new black journals: *New City* (Washington, D.C.), *Washington Living* (Washington, D.C.), *Black Family* (Chicago), *Pride* (St. Louis), *About Time* (Rochester, N.Y.), *New England Black Weekly* (Boston), and *Sun Belt*, a state magazine in Mississippi that is funded by white banks and dedicated to black economic entrepreneurship.

[14] In recent years, exemplifying the vanguard black policy-makers at the state and federal level are William T. Coleman (trained at Harvard Law School), secretary of the Department of Transportation under President Ford; Wilson Riles, third-term superintendent of the Department of Education in California; Willie Brown, leader of the Democratic legislators in California and the first black to hold majority-party reins anywhere; Clifford Alexander (Yale Law School), secretary of the Army under President Carter; Drew Days (Yale Law School), director of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice under President Carter; and Leonard Coleman (Harvard Kennedy School of Government), secretary of the Department of Energy under New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean.

[15] William A. Sampson and Vera Milam, "The Intra-Racial Attitudes of the Black Middle Class: Have They Changed," *Social Problems*, December 1975. □

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David Bensman

Concession Bargaining in Steel

A Weakened Union Faces Corporate Blackmail

Things are grim in South Chicago. Two years ago, Wisconsin Steel went bankrupt, leaving 4,000 steelworkers without jobs, pension plans, and their last paycheck. Then Pullman Standard closed, after United Steelworkers of America District Director Jack Parton's frantic efforts to save the plant failed. U.S. Steel's South Works plant itself is down to a crew of 950, one-seventh its size of two years ago. And the Republic Steel mill, scene of the Memorial Day Massacre of 1937, is down from 5,300 to 4,000 employes.

As the mills slump, many of the little "bucket shops" that service the mills have closed. The loading docks on the banks of the Calumet River are quiet as a graveyard.

You can see the pain of America's industrial contraction on the streets. Torrence Avenue, alongside the rusting hulk that was Wisconsin Steel, is full of boarded-up groceries and saloons. And in Irondale, wooden frame houses that withstood a hundred Chicago winters and the Great Depression are crumbling.

In spring 1982, U.S. Steel delivered an ultimatum: South Works would not get a new rail mill that would employ 450 workers and make it possible to keep 3,000 hands working—unless Local 65 agreed to a change of work rules.

Just in case the devastation of South Chicago was not sufficient to force Local 65's acceptance, U.S. Steel heaped on other pressures. The company halted repair work at the big #8 blast furnace and announced plans to give greater importance to the Gary Works at the expense of South Works. Next, it shut down its mill in Alabama, where a new tube mill had been planned. Finally, boats began picking up ore in South Chicago for delivery to Gary. The message seemed clear: South Works was in jeopardy.

Local 65, it seemed, had to make concessions. With unemployment rampant, where else could members find work? Even if they followed Reagan's advice to leave for Houston, how could they sell their homes?

Roy Hollis, a crane operator unemployed for 14 months, expressed the steelworkers' desperation: "How can we say we ain't going to accept it when we don't have anything? They're in the driver's seat, so you just have to ride." Roy Hollis's resignation, though understandable, was not typical. Instead, Local 65 members united in rejection of U.S. Steel's demands.

Although many demands were painful, the hardest to swallow would have abolished craft lines. One would have created "supercrafts," combining the tasks of millwrights, electricians, and welders. The other would have destroyed the traditional prohibition against skilled workers doing production. These proposals were aimed at a problem about which the company has long complained: maintenance workers don't work continuously. They fix a machine, then rest until needed. By combining three crafts and merging production and maintenance jobs, the company hoped to eliminate "nonproductive" time.

Monte Meauhead, a millwright, believes this is unjust: "We have to work through lunch, through our breaks, and a lot of times it's

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voluntary, because we want to see the mill run too. But I don't believe that you have to be a slave to your job."

Local 65 could not accept the destruction of craft traditions. Bitter conflicts that had divided the union for a decade were laid aside on July 16, when the officers agreed to face down the company's ultimatum. Even recently elected President Donald Stazak, a self-described "company man," went along.

Had the union accepted company demands, workers at the rail mill would have had to work harder, in less safe conditions, for lower rates of pay. But their decision to defy U.S. Steel was more than a refusal to make material sacrifices. Their fundamental motivation was anger at their bosses, and a sense of honor.

Anger at the boss is rooted in the experience of working in the mill. Steelworkers put up with an authority that pervades their life on the job and at home. They work rotating shifts, first 7 A.M. to 3 P.M., then 3 P.M. to 11 P.M., then 11 P.M. to 7 A.M. Assignments are made from week to week, leaving workers and their families unable to plan their lives more than a week in advance. And management still orders people to work mandatory overtime with just an hour's notice—even when thousands are on lay-off. The authoritarian environment breeds conflict over foremen's favoritism, disputed piece rates, excessive absenteeism, and so on. This conflict is part of the mill, a familiar, chronic, controlled tension. But when U.S. Steel purchased Marathon Oil, then threatened to shut down South Works, tension turned to anger.

In Roy Hollis's words, "A big company like that, they just take the money and do what they want." And in Monte Meauhead, U.S. Steel's betrayal has produced a radical response: "How come the company can't be fair to the workers after all the years we put in and built that company up? And now they want to get into oil. . . ."

Steelworkers have also developed a pride in resisting management that enables them to survive an authoritarian environment. Job classifications, craft identities, and work rules all mark the limits of the bosses' power. Steve Alexander, a black production worker, explains: "No one wants to back down against the company. It's that macho toughness of workers who have a fairly strong union: you don't give in. . . . To black workers, it's more. It's this feeling that it's like working in a plantation atmosphere."

The deepest source of resistance is the workers' sense of obligation to uphold the union. The union rests upon principles to which members adhere regardless of their individual interest. For example, steelworkers insist that the company pay the lowest rated workers not much less than the highest rated. And they maintain a seniority system that subordinates the interests of the strongest worker to the needs of the group.

Spencer Redd, who's been out of work for a year, explained the seniority principle: "I think an older man should be able to work. I just have to sacrifice. It might hurt me now, but eventually it will benefit me."

U.S. Steel's demands threatened union principles. The company's most radical proposals—the creation of "operating technicians" to do both production and maintenance work, for example—would have directly affected only a few dozen men in the rail mill. But Local 65 members felt it would be dishonorable to jeopardize the interests of thousands of their contemporaries and descendants to get a few hundred jobs in South Chicago.

Ike Mezo, one of the local's ten elected grievers, explained: "The guy who's been around any length of time doesn't want to go against tradition. He cares about the next generation."

When I asked Steve Alexander why steelworkers were concerned with principles in the face of economic calamity, he answered that "even the conservative people like to think of themselves as good trade unionists."

But the story at South Works was not to end here, for neither Donald Stazak nor United Steelworkers President Lloyd McBride was willing to risk losing the rail mill. After national concession bargaining broke down on July 30, Local 65 President Stazak asked McBride to send his assistant, Sam Camens, to South Chicago.

As soon as Camens entered the picture, U.S.

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Steel changed its tune. The company dropped many demands, including the proposal to create "supercraftsmen." But the company insisted on four points. (1) "Operating technicians" were essential. (2) The union would have to waive its right to grieve the job classifications spelled out in the manning agreement. (3) The company would consider "ability" as well as seniority in filling production jobs in the rail mill. (Since production workers would help out with repairs, this provision could mean that management will select mostly skilled workers for the new facility.) And (4), management insisted on eliminating welders.

Local 65 negotiators resisted these proposals, but the tide turned when Camens—who has considerable prestige in the union—said the company was not bluffing. And so, even though Local 65's concessions could be used as precedents to force other plants to weaken their work rules and even though the new rail mill in South Chicago would displace workers at the other rail mills, the International gave Local 65 permission to bargain. Camens's approval gave President Stazak what he wanted, support for reaching agreement with U.S. Steel. And so Local 65 bargainers dropped their resistance to a manning agreement for the rail mill. In return, management agreed to strengthen seniority rights.

On August 27, 1,100 steelworkers packed the union hall to discuss the manning proposal. Stazak and Mike Ally, the grievance committee chair, read the proposal and asked for questions. When Stazak surrendered the floor to Joe Kransdorf, a leading plant radical, he set the stage for a wild evening. Kransdorf charged that it would be unsafe to have workers bent on meeting their production quotas doing maintenance work as well; they'd be under pressure to patch things up hurriedly. Furthermore, the new job classifications would produce a speed-up so bad some men couldn't keep up. Kransdorf sat down to an ovation. Alice Peruala, Local 65's militant president until Stazak defeated her last fall, now took the floor. Peruala's denunciation of the manning proposal gave legitimacy to the opposition.

It fell to Carl Alessi, from the District office, to defend the agreement. Alessi argued that operating technicians would do only minor repairs. "Alessi was saying that you will only be used on small maintenance jobs," Ike Mezo commented. "But everyone that's been in the mill knows how the boss operates. You start with one little thing, and then they've got you doing everything." If Alessi's defense of the operating technician idea failed to impress, neither did his forecast for South Works' future. He had to agree that the company might still cancel the rail mill. And he had to admit that most members of Local 65 would remain jobless even if the mill were built. You could see steelworkers calculating that, with only 3,000 people in the mill, they'd still be on the street. They booed Alessi off the stage.

Then it was Ed Sadlowski's turn. Sadlowski, like the union he's been associated with for almost 30 years, was in a difficult position. As a signer of the manning agreement he couldn't very well speak against it. He explained to a hushed audience that the bargaining committee had been trying to preserve union principles in the negotiations and had won expanded seniority rights, but he conceded that "this agreement ain't nothing to write home about." Turning to the key question, he argued that U.S. Steel would build the mill if there was a demand for rails. In other words, "They don't make investment decisions at the bargaining table."

The workers had heard enough. Concessions would not guarantee them jobs and would worsen working conditions. They struck up a chant, "vote now." Everyone in the union hall could see that the agreement would be defeated overwhelmingly.

To insure the pact's ratification, President Stazak organized a strange election. He announced that the vote would be "advisory," and the campaign would be unusual. There would be no debate in the union newspaper, and only Stazak would have access to the mailing list. Since few people are working in the mill, that arena for campaigning was out too.

The mail ballot included a letter urging members to vote "yes." And the actual ballot read, "Advisory Ballot. Should Local 65 Rail Mill Negotiating Committee sign the Rail Mill

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Manning Agreement in a joint effort to re-establish South Works as a viable competitive facility?"

In desperation, the opposition turned to the press. They even called a press conference, where President Frank Guzzo of Local 1033 at nearby Republic Steel expressed concern that concessions at South Works could hurt his local. And Steve Alexander charged the agreement might make it hard for minorities to get hired on the rail mill.

But against President Stazak's power to orchestrate the election, the opposition was of no avail. 1,795 members approved concessions, only 305 opposed.

Why did Local 65 approve concessions? Clearly, the South Works story was part of President McBride's quest to establish cooperative relations in the steel industry in the face of concerted corporate attacks. Joe Kransdorf comments: "How could the International expect a local with 6,000 of its members on layoff to make a rational decision? The International should make sure that locals are not picked off one by one."

Still, when all is said and done, 1,795 steelworkers voted to approve concessions. Their decision needs no explanation; they saw no alternative.

But Local 65's decision might have been different had the vote been conducted at a meeting where Kransdorf, Peruala, and Mezo could explain their opposition. Then the members' anger at U.S. Steel and their sense of honor might have prevailed, as it had at the August 27 meeting.

But when members at home face the choice alone, cut off from the feelings of solidarity that prevail at a union meeting, they consider mostly their own interest. Those who are still working vote "yes" to keep the mill open; workers whose preferential status is abolished by the manning agreement vote "no." Laid-off men with 10 to 20 years seniority vote "yes;" here they were the bulk of the voters. Low-seniority men, who cannot hope for reemployment, have been laid off so long they can't vote. In short, here the leadership of the International and of Local 65 combined their effort to enable the calculations of self-interest to overwhelm sentiments of solidarity.

The decision by South Chicago unionists to make concessions to save their mill is but the opening scene of a long drama. More difficult choices will follow, because the underlying problem steelworkers face has not yet been resolved. Fundamentally, the unions' dilemma is that the world economy has changed.

For a hundred years, the American steel industry produced for domestic consumers without worrying about foreign competition. The internal steel market grew so rapidly that employers and workers could share "the growth dividend," even if unequally.

Things have changed. Foreign manufacturers have penetrated the domestic market. Our steel industry lost one major cost advantage when the Mesabi iron range became depleted; now Japanese steelmakers can buy Venezuelan and Brazilian ore as cheaply as can U.S. companies. Changes in transportation costs are also significant; today Japanese manufacturers can ship steel coils to South Chicago cheaper than American firms can transport coal from Pennsylvania mines to Calumet harbor.

Our steel industry faces a competition it has not known since U.S. Steel was organized in 1901. The conservative habits of U.S. manufacturers, their high-price strategy, their slowness to introduce new technology, their short-term profit orientation, and their managerial inefficiency are all no longer viable.

When international competitors gained the ability to produce steel for sale in U.S. markets, American firms responded slowly. They upgraded their mills piecemeal, kept prices high, delayed introducing new technology. At the same time, they began moving capital to more profitable sectors. As a result, Japanese and other steel producers steadily increased their share of domestic sales, first selling low-grade steel, then switching to high-grade alloys that were the big money-makers. Today imports account for more than 30 percent of the value of all steel sold in this country.

The steel industry's internationalization poses a challenge to the union. For the past 40 years, American steelworkers have gained decent living standards by sharing in the profits of employers sheltered from foreign competitors. That shelter is gone. The chill winds of

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international trade have penetrated union halls in Pittsburgh and South Chicago.

To gain perspective on what this means, let us look back a hundred years, when trade unionists faced another wrenching change. After the Civil War, American industry outgrew local boundaries, as the railroads stretched across the continent. At the same time, iron manufacturers developed the Bessemer process and other improvements. Suddenly, iron workers were caught up in a competitive flood that washed away old institutions and work practices.

Cooperage, one of America's leading industries in 1860, producing barrels for shipping food, beer, liquor, and manufactured goods, was transformed in less than two decades. The proud cooper, who had controlled his skill as his union controlled the workplace, passed into oblivion.

But the transformation of most industries proceeded gradually. Workers used their skill and concerted power as levers to gain a voice in determining how employers would organize the new factories. Workers could not shape the industrial world solely on the basis of their local unions and work rules. To gain leverage, skilled workers had to establish national unions strong enough to ensure that the various locals followed the same policy; and national officers struggled to gain the power to prohibit locals from striking in hopeless situations.

During that struggle, unionists debated concessions with an intensity Local 65 members would find familiar. Members of the Hat Finishers' National Association, for example, debated for *five years* whether to give up the right to strike for wage advances, whether to give up the right to call shop meetings whenever grievances arose, and whether to shorten the apprenticeship term. Reluctantly, hatters made these concessions to management, but the institutions they created in the process proved successful in defending the journeymen's "culture of work" for many years.

After all the concessions hatters made in the 1880s, their national union's "label boycotts" succeeded in organizing more workers after 1895 than had ever been organized before. And they united with allied craftspeople in 1896 to form a larger, more powerful organization. As the reinforced union pursued its label boycotts with the help of other AFL unions, hatters drew ever closer to workers in other crafts, until their "craft pride" began to give way to "class consciousness." The hatters' path, of course, was just one of those taken by unionists in the late 19th century, but all activists discovered that the growth of national markets necessitated more collective strategies for labor. The internationalization of markets will transform the contemporary labor movement just as profoundly.

Recent concession bargaining in South Chicago makes clear that the United Steelworkers of America possesses a valuable resource—a membership dedicated to unionism. Workers' anger at their bosses and commitment to unionism enabled them to resist in the face of severe unemployment and corporate blackmail. Yet militancy is not enough. It will take leadership to forge a new relationship between steelworkers and their employers. Here the USW seems weak. In negotiations between eight companies and the union last summer, President McBride never took a position on whether steelworkers should reopen their contract; instead, he conveyed the employers' request to begin discussions. When the companies asked to run slide shows describing American industry's problems in international marketplaces, McBride agreed; but steelworkers never saw an analysis by their own union. And McBride made no effort to involve the union's secondary leaders in the bargaining. No wonder steelworkers grew so suspicious that anti-concession sentiments overwhelmed the bargaining process.

Compare the Steelworkers' approach to that taken by the United Automobile Workers. In the auto industry, concession bargaining was a relatively open process in which President Fraser played the role of passionate advocate, while thousands of union activists participated in shaping events. In the course of bargaining, the UAW developed a political dialogue that informed members about the issues, enabling them to make a decision they're willing to back up. By contrast, steelworkers are uninformed about what's happening to them and divided amongst themselves.

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The UAW has another advantage. It has a program for stabilizing employment. Recognizing that hundreds of thousands of jobs will be eliminated in auto plants no matter what scenario is played out, the UAW established a joint training program with Ford. To deal with foreign labor-cost advantages, the union proposed legislation requiring all auto companies selling cars in this country to buy or produce most of the parts here. The UAW has also taken steps to gain "job security" for members through experimental "lifetime employment" projects at two Ford plants and through limited bans on plant closings at General Motors. But the limits of the UAW's program have become painfully evident, as Chrysler places newspaper ads boosting its cars' "Japanese craftsmanship" and General Motors turns to Japanese manufacturers to produce subcompacts for GM to sell.

If workers are to benefit from concession bargaining, they must gain some control over decisions about capital investment and new technology. Cooperative labor relations will not help unionists if corporations install robots and computers without input from their employees, or if they flee American taxes and labor laws for low-wage havens abroad.

Can American workers gain a handle on decisions that have for so long been in the corporations' domain? Certainly, workers in South Chicago alone cannot do it; even their international union will have little success in the absence of a national political movement committed to social controls on corporate decision-making.

Nor is it only industrial workers that are suffering from the international economic upheaval. Manufacturers need cooperative relations if they're to become competitive. The corporations' needs give unions leverage. They can threaten to strike; they can also offer to help boost production. As long as steelworkers remain committed to unionism, concession bargaining can be transformed into a struggle for the future of the labor movement. □

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On Feminism, Family & Community

The following exchange between Barbara Ehrenreich and Jean Bethke Elshtain concerns the latter's article, "Feminism, Family, and Community," which appeared in our Fall 1982 issue.

Barbara Ehrenreich Comments

"I must write a piece on feminism, family and community," Jean Bethke Elshtain declaims in her opening sentence. And, alas, since she has, so must I. If only she had published her rambling, pretentious essay somewhere else, like *Commentary* or, perhaps, *The Pro-Family Reporter*, I would have been spared this unpleasant task and could be spending the day doing something Elshtain and I are probably in substantial agreement about, like the laundry. But since she presents herself as a feminist and publishes in a journal of the left, she has a claim on my—and other feminists'—attention, and I'm not so sure that this isn't what she's looking for. A "feminist" who devotes much of her considerable journalistic energy to attacking feminism is bound to be an attention-getter, and while I appreciate the novelty of her stance, I am not so sure about the ethics of it.

To summarize her argument as best I can: Capitalism has been undermining the family, and radicals (leftists and feminists) have been mindlessly cheering it along, thus losing the allegiance of "ordinary people," sometimes introduced as "ordinary decent people." Why would radicals do such a silly thing? First, because they see the family as a part of an "enemy system" and, second, because they see that family ties detract from devotion to "the Cause." These are not minor mistakes, Elshtain warns: look what happened at Jonestown, where cult members weren't even allowed to go home for Thanksgiving. But it is not too late for feminists to shape up and become "social feminists," who are to occupy themselves by indicting "an economic system that denies families a living, family wage and that forces both parents into the labor force, often against the will of the woman. . . ." Once we are back at home with the children, we can try, somehow, to rebuild "organic communities" to infuse "female-created and sustained values" into the public domain.

So far so good or, at least, not so terrible. Many will recognize Elshtain's argument as (1) the kind of "backyard" populism popularized by Harry Boyte and others, in which social change is supposed to come from (white?) ethnic communities composed of patriotic, church-going folks who have hitherto been neglected by the left; and (2) as late-19th-century conservative feminism, which upheld "home values" and believed that homebound women could change the world by the sheer force of their feminine moral superiority. This is familiar enough, and pretty tame stuff, but Elshtain goes further. It turns out that to restore a happy, pre-Enlightenment state of *Gemeinschaft*, we are going to have to roll back most of liberalism. Elshtain is a little coy about exactly how much will have to go, but I don't see much future for divorce, day care, or publicly sponsored social services of any kind if her brand of "social feminism" gets its way.

Before proceeding to the right-wing denouement of her argument, though, I have my own axe to grind about two of Elshtain's centerpiece concerns—feminism and the family.

Elshtain insists that feminism, or at least late-'60s to early '70s feminism, was relentlessly and almost monolithically "antifamily." Since this is not true, she is forced to rely on some pretty specious bits of evidence. For example, she cites a

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"widely circulated" essay by Laurel Limpus that described the family as "the central agent of oppression." "Widely circulated" it may have been, but was it ever published? And who is Ms. Limpus? Or she quotes Betty Friedan's description, in *The Feminine Mystique*, of the home as a "comfortable concentration camp." Let's not forget the context: Friedan had nothing against marriage and children. What she was decrying, in this phrase, was the futility of the housewife's daily routine, and the dreadful isolation in which it is performed.

The most astonishing piece of evidence Elshtain adduces is from her "now-yellowed copy of *Women and Revolution*," in which the family is denounced as a distraction to "the class consciousness of the workers." Well, I dug out one of my now-yellowed copies of this publication and, sure enough, as I recalled, it was an organ, not of a feminist group, but of that half-crazed Trotskyite sect, the Spartacist League. The reason I recalled this, incidentally, is that *Women and Revolution* devoted most of its space to attacking feminists (me among them) for our petty-bourgeois deviationism. Could there have been another publication called "Women and Revolution"—a feminist one (though, wherever it came from, the quote Elshtain uses sounds far more "left" than feminist)? I would hate to think that Elshtain was running out of legitimate quotes to prove her point.

The truth is, as the editors of the feminist anthology *Liberation Now!* wrote in 1971, that "there is no monolithic approach to the family among women in the movement." There were feminists fresh from the counterculture who were indeed antifamily and disposed to a utopian communalism. There were equally radical feminists—some of the members of New York's Redstockings group—who upheld marriage and monogamy. There were Marxist feminists—best represented by the Wages for Housework group—who strove to vindicate women's role in the family with the clumsy argument that housework "produces surplus value." But most of these debates about "the family" went on in the urban and campus enclaves of intellectual feminism. Out in the smaller cities and in the suburbs, the women who were drawn to feminism in the early '70s were, for the most part, already wives and mothers, and eager to get past the theory and on with the movement.

I think that one reason Elshtain persistently maligns and misrepresents feminism—why she so totally neglects sisterhood and sees only "possessive individualism," why she cannot believe that feminists are "ordinary people" too—is that she is not too sure what we have been fighting for. She detaches herself in the opening paragraph by introducing herself awkwardly in the third person as "someone who characterizes her own work as made possible in part by the intellectual ferment feminism has generated." The generous interpretation would be that she recognizes that there would not be so many women, like herself, in senior academic positions if it were not for that feminist "ferment," though one could also conclude that she is merely thankful to feminism for having given her a polemical bone to chew. Later, when she gets around to explaining why something like feminism could have happened at all, she suffers another syntactical breakdown: "Feminist protest" becomes "a response by women to conditions of their identities that had grown problematic under the pressures of modernization and capitalism." Hmmm. What about sexism? What about rape? What about unequal pay?

Elshtain would like a kind of feminism that honors the values associated with women's traditional domestic role— nurturance, caring, and so on—above the values of the marketplace. This is an unobjectionable sentiment, and one shared by many feminists. Where Elshtain parts company with feminism and, I believe, with reality is that she imagines that the "feminine values" are uniquely engendered by the traditional family, in which a male breadwinner supports his full-time homemaker wife and their children. Thus we are enjoined to go out and demand that men be paid a family wage, so that their wives can stay home, their children will not be sent out to day care, and the family will not fall apart.

I too think it would be nice if every man earned enough to support a family. Being a feminist, I think it would be even nicer if every woman also earned enough to support a family—but let's leave that aside for a moment. Supposing we accomplished the massive downward redistribution of income necessary just to give the men a family wage, would the pristine "feminine" values be restored to our families and to society? In the most fundamental sense, no, simply because the family that is based on the family wage has always been very much a capitalist, market-bound institution itself.

Jean Elshtain, Christopher Lasch, and others who romanticize the traditional family as a haven for nonmarket values consistently overlook the economics of the situation. The wife's dependence on her husband—whatever feelings may or may not be involved—is also a financial dependence. The husband, in turn, is dependent on his employer, so that the family as a whole might as well be married

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to capital. All the internal dependencies that hold it together depend on that link to capital, the male wage. Internally, this kind of family is likely to be permeated by the values of the marketplace: men, for example, come to feel they are "trapped," that their wives are "parasites" (and this tradition of male contempt and resentment predates the feminist revival by many decades).

Nor do I think that restoring the family wage to men would necessarily restore the family, even on the capitalist terms sketched above. For just because a man earns a family wage does not mean that he has to share it. Feminism did not single-handedly "destroy the family" in the 1970s. Men are marrying an average of four years later than they did in the '50s; an astonishing number are choosing to remain single and live alone; and there is a great deal of impressionistic evidence that men of all classes are less disposed than ever to marry a woman who cannot "pull her own weight" financially, or to sustain a marriage after sexual interest has waned. If corporate capital has defaulted on the pact represented by the family wage system, so too have men, and—short of some plan to conscript them into marriage and compel them to hand over their earnings to their dependents—I do not see what feminists, "social feminists," or antifeminists, for that matter, can do about it.

WHAT WE CAN HOPE to do something about without abrogating anyone's civil rights (I know, another liberal post-Enlightenment concept, but I'm fond of it) is the increase in female poverty that has resulted, in part, from the collapse of the family wage system. Whether because of divorce, desertion, or the failure to marry at all, increasing numbers of women are both raising and supporting children on their own. (The number of single mothers who are in poverty, as defined by the federal government, almost doubled in the decade of the 1970s.) It is the children of single mothers who are most at risk from poverty, inadequate child care and, in the wake of Reagan's cutbacks, malnutrition.

It seems to me that if we are to let ourselves be guided by the "female-sustained," non-market values of nurturance and compassion, we should be struggling mightily to (1) increase women's earning power so that single mothers can hope to become effective breadwinners; (2) provide high-quality day care for the children of all working mothers; (3) restore and expand the publicly sponsored social services—Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, Food Stamps—that poor families depend upon for subsistence.

Yet at the mention of social services, Elshtain suddenly drops her role as the representative of maternal virtue against hard-hearted feminism and announces her "... refusal to embrace the standard liberal agenda of more provision of social services to ameliorate the destructive effects of a socially irresponsible corporate structure." The children who are going without school lunches, the young women who cannot afford prenatal care, the people lining up at soup kitchens and churches for a handout will, I suppose be expected to join in Elshtain's great refusal. The language "socially irresponsible corporate etc." is leftist, but the intent is as bad as anything to come out of the New Right. We already knew that Elshtain was a conservative on social issues, but with this statement she joins the right on economic issues.

When I got to this point in Elshtain's reflections, I began to have a queasy feeling about the "image of a strong woman" held out to us at the beginning of the article, Elshtain's grandmother, a farm woman of German descent. "For my grandmother," she tells us,

> ... the "I" of the self was always a "we" located within a dense web of human ties. She could no more think of herself outside the tissue of "*unsere Leute*" than she could fly.

Someone who has no reference point other than family and nation, and who cannot sort out a historically responsible "I" from either, is not my idea of a role model. With all due respect to Elshtain's grandmother, this image evokes for me a cult that was vastly more evil and destructive than anything Jim Jones managed to organize. I say this only to recall the dangers of sacking the Enlightenment values of rationalism, liberalism, and democracy. If bourgeois individualism has not produced a just and stable social order, the alternative is not to submerge ourselves in the mystic body of the *Volk*.

There is a great deal more I would like to say about feminism—what it means in the lives of those of us who proudly count ourselves as feminists, what it means as a political force in the United States today (note, for example, the growing "gender gap" in voting patterns)—but, for brevity, let me end with my own paradigmatic image of a "strong woman."

A neighbor, I will call her Brenda, is without a doubt one of those "ordinary people" Jean Bethke Elshtain claims to speak for. She is a Catholic, mother of four and, until recently, a registered Conservative and the wife of a blue-collar worker. We did not, on the face of it, have much in common except for the fact that our little girls were friends.

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. . . Then Brenda's husband split (a not uncommon occurrence in this outwardly peaceful suburban neighborhood), and I heard through the girls that she had, with great difficulty, pulled herself together and gotten a clerical job. I ran into her in June at a school function where, to my amazement, she embraced me like an old friend. Then, to my greater amazement, she asked somewhat sternly whether I would be going to an upcoming antinuclear demonstration. When I admitted I would be, she said, "That's wonderful. If you want you can come along with me and my women's support group."

Brenda and I are both single mothers (which may disqualify us from Elshtain's definition of "family"); we are both feminists; and I think we are on our way to being, in a very concrete sense, "community." □

Jean Bethke Elshtain Replies

I trust that Barbara Ehrenreich has recovered from the onerous task of responding to me. It must be annoying to face a challenge to one's unreflectively held dogma, particularly when the source of that challenge is a thinker who positions herself on the left and identifies herself as a feminist. In this unlucky circumstance, ready-to-hand diatribe that shows up one's enemies and confirms simultaneously one's own status as spokeswoman for reason, justice, decency, and social progress won't quite serve. But Ehrenreich makes a valiant attempt nonetheless. She dusts off her full panoply of anticonservative rhetoric and finds that it will pretty much do the job—*if* she can convincingly portray me as a Moral Majoritarian in left-wing, feminist drag. That may help to account for the animus of her piece, a diatribe that alternates between flip sarcasm and crisp matter-of-factness, as if any fair-minded and genuinely radical person will see things her way.

The two levels of Ehrenreich's argument—personal slander and political excommunication fused with self-serving personal and political celebration—operate to a single end, to quash debate among feminists and radicals on contested and vital matters. My response is written with regret that Ehrenreich never seriously joins the issues I pose. For this reason I shall recast my argument as I respond, for I do not want the substance of my case to be lost as I defend myself against Ehrenreich's attempt to write me out of the universe of left-wing and feminist debate.

I hope to clarify certain matters for myself and for others who no longer find delusory comfort in the assurance that the crisis on the left is attributable solely to our nefarious foes and the "false consciousness" of those who enthusiastically or half-heartedly endorse them. To read Ehrenreich one would never know, for example, that the ERA fight was not a clear-cut battle between men and women but one between organized groups of women who dominated both sides of the struggle. Why are women doing this? Are they all benighted dupes in full flight from Ehrenreich's promised feminist freedom? Or does their disaffection have deeper roots?

Ehrenreich offers a tidied-up picture of the contemporary American political world in which capitalists, Reaganites, male oppressors in traditional families, racists, "romantics" who find some good in the past, and radicals of dubious pedigree, the unwitting allies of reaction—on the one hand—and enlightened reformers and revolutionaries, fighting the good fight against sexism, racism, rape, unequal pay, oppression of every kind, and right-wing reaction, promising sisterhood, liberalism, democracy, and more and better social services—on the other—square off. This image, not my argument, parts company with reality and it does so calculatingly, from strategic aims. That is, Ehrenreich's determination to limit the range of debate *within* feminism and the left requires that her response to me be a strategic, not a substantive one. She seems willing to give over to the right all serious discussion of family, community, and traditional values. Taking a leaf from one of the more unedifying episodes in our recent historic past, she engages in a reversal best called "*anti-red baiting*."

Ehrenreich's second strategic move is to caricature my argument, to set it up as an easy target for her polemical riposte. These strategic ploys play off against one another as Ehrenreich interweaves innuendo, sarcastic put-down, and sinister suggestion with her presentation of an "authentic" left-wing

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and feminist alternative. Along the way she recasts the political history of contemporary feminism in a manner most favorable to her case and most damaging to mine. Given her version of things, I become an obsessive crank, yearning for *Gemeinschaft* and generally twisting the truth of the matter.

Ehrenreich claims that, for some bizarre reason, I publish in journals of the left (and, I might add, in feminist journals, to compound my perversity). She disallows my right in good faith to engage feminism and the left as someone *within* that community. Why these journals, including *Dissent*, should misguidedly print essays that really belong in neoconservative or right-wing publications only deepens the mystery. But Ehrenreich has no doubt whatever about my true motivation: I "present" myself as a feminist in order to get the attention of real feminists like herself, thereby deflecting such real feminists from important matters by forcing them to respond to odious arguments. Ehrenreich also finds my ethics suspect, arguing that I long ago mislabeled myself with malice aforethought to get all that attention and just maybe, she hints, to ensure a cushy "senior academic position."

Now Ehrenreich's suspicions about my doctrinal purity are confirmed when she arrives at the "right-wing dénouement" of my argument. She boldly tells it like it is: "Elshtain, never 'correct' ["always a conservative"] on the social issues has now gone over to Reaganomics," and has been unmasked at last as one of "them." Should any doubt linger as to the true nature of my essay and its intent, Ehrenreich, not content to anti-red bait me, throws out the tantalizing suggestion that my grandmother, whose presence haunts my essay and whose life inspired my reflections, is a protofascist, or the prototype for one. For she, "someone" with no reference point "other than family and nation," is (or could be) party to "a cult . . . vastly more evil and destructive than anything Jim Jones managed to organize." Ehrenreich, "with all due respect," will not have my grandmother as a "role model." At this juncture there seems little left of me: my heritage is impugned, my radical and feminist credentials are in disarray, and my intentions are suspect. Clearly, I should skulk on over to the right-wing where I belong. For me to defend my track record on feminist issues would not suffice to clear me of Ehrenreich's charges for I have never, in her view, acted in good feminist faith.

All those who engage in political debate surely will be tempted by and occasionally succumb to the urge to set our opponents up the better to knock them down. But even if one allows a wide berth for polemical enthusiasm, Ehrenreich's recasting of my argument is stunning in its selective vapidity. She claims that I accuse radicals and feminists of doing a "silly thing" by "mindlessly cheering" from the sidelines as capitalism undermines the family, for in so doing these groups lost the allegiance of "ordinary people." Eliding my critique of radical attacks on the family with that "sinister alternative" (my phrase) to family breakdown embodied in the rise of cults, Ehrenreich trivializes both my concern and the horror of Jonestown.

My argument holds that when the family as a mediating institution is either nonexistent or has been purposefully destroyed, individuals become more vulnerable, whether they face a megalomaniac aiming to create one large "family" under his absolute command or a large-scale bureaucracy which sees them as "clients." Ehrenreich is unmoved. "Look what happened at Jonestown," she cracks, "where cult members weren't even allowed to go home for Thanksgiving." If one didn't know that Jonestown is a place where 900 human beings perished in a mass suicide-murder, this remark might be mildly amusing after a cynical, sophomoric fashion. But one wonders: if Jonestown is funny what sort of human tragedy would Ehrenreich find truly hilarious? Is there no room in her scheme of things for a few tears to be shed for these victims, 276 of whom were minor children, many of them poor, black wards of that welfare state in which Ehrenreich ultimately places such confidence?

The answer, apparently, is "no," for Ehrenreich's radical-feminist agenda is in fact a souped-up version of the liberal welfare state. She calls for increased female earning power, more day care, more social services. My critique of this standard liberal agenda as *radical* politics is used by Ehrenreich to "prove" that I have gone over to hard-hearted Reaganomics. That is blatantly false. The point is that Ehrenreich, with apologists for corporate capitalism, views the family primarily in economic terms, as if this were its first and foremost "function." She ignores the family as the locus of deep emotional bonds and ethical imperatives, as the source of what Jane Addams called "the family claim." Treating cavalierly the ties that bind generations one to the other, grounding us as historical beings who have a past and look to the possibility of a future, Ehrenreich is blind to the pathos of homelessness, to the alienation of deracination. To be sure, publicists of liberal capitalism acquiesce in family breakdown even as they, unlike Ehrenreich, extol a sentimental version of domesticity. But with the liberal technocrat, Ehrenreich can think of no better response to the radicalizing force of capitalism than to *redefine* the family in line with the market imperatives and

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consumerist ethos it trails in its wake. The new model family, besides being the locus for consumption, may also serve as an interpersonal association to "fulfill" the "self." If it does not, if there are too many hassles, one opts out and seeks something more fulfilling. This streamlined modern view of things is dramatically at odds with an alternative vision of the family as an intergenerational institution, the primary locus for the nurturance of vulnerable human existence, and an essential, social base for our human self-creation. *This* family serves as a barrier to the total intrusion of market imperatives and forestalls premature leaps into an abstract universalism that invites an arrogant pact with the *Weltgeist*. My vision holds that if we are to learn to care for others, we must first learn to care for those persons we find ourselves joined to by *accident* of birth. Such commitments are essential to a social order grounded in the image of a social compact or covenant rather than in contract and self-interest.

I have suggested that the most radicalizing force at work in our time is capitalism. Capitalism is a machine in incessant motion that constitutes the human subject as a sovereign consumer and forges an order in which market imperatives and a technocratic ethos fill up more and more of the available social space. The dislocations thrown up by this force are papered over, from time to time, by providing social services to its temporary or "permanent" victims. This is often done for the most humane reasons and with an eye to promoting social justice—the greater the dislocation and social distress, the louder the calls for rational planning and liberal beneficence. No decent person can support Reaganomics as an alternative to such social welfare. But it is difficult to see why extending the welfare state is a *radical* move.

At stake in our debate is nothing less than the way in which radicalism and feminism define themselves in relation to past *and* present. I call for a self-definition that is solicitous of place and concerned with popular understandings of family and community. My stance is radical in relation to the ethos of modern liberalism and to that mode of left-wing feminist protest Ehrenreich represents. For the poles that frame her vision are those of the state, on the one hand, and a wholly voluntarist "community" of like-minded persons, on the other. Statist politics, whether it calls itself liberal, radical, or feminist, is interest-group politics. In the words of Sheldon Wolin: "The individual is not first and foremost a civic creature bound by preexisting ties to those who share the same history. . . . He or she is instead a business executive, a teamster, a feminist, office worker, farmer, or homosexual whose immediate identity naturally divides him or her from others." In a self-interested group order, politics is a struggle for advantage and citizenship dissolves. For the "citizen, unlike the groupie, has to acquire a perspective of commonality. . . ."

Ehrenreich's other pole—voluntarist "community"—acquiesces in the dissolution of particular and generational ties. For the ultraliberal, all the old constraints are intolerable, so one is free to redefine "the family" any old way. (Ehrenreich's suggestion that single mothers living with their children may well be disqualified from my definition of "family" is ludicrous. I argue that the popular understanding of family locates its origin in ties of kinship and marriage—certainly true with mothers and children. This does not preclude by fiat other intimate arrangements, but it insists that in a democracy popular understanding should carry some force.)

The thinness and fragility of this scheme of things is glossed over as its enlightened modernity is celebrated. Who gets left out of this voluntarist order? One rarely encounters old or sick people. The unborn and newborn are similarly invisible as the "chosen" comings-together of age, class, and sex-specific persons are set up, not as one social form, but as *the preferred* alternative to "traditional" familiar and kin ties. For society's cast-offs, the poor, racial minorities, the long-term unemployed, Ehrenreich's radicalism offers more social services. Again, Wolin:

> They are "targeted" by specialized programs that, in effect, fragment their lives. One agency handles medical assistance, another job training, a third food stamps, and so on ad infinitum. If a person's life is first flensed by bureaucrats whose questionnaires probe every detail of it, and that life is reorganized into categories corresponding to public programs that are the means of one's existence, the person becomes totally disabled as a political being. . . . This is because he or she has been deprived of the most elemental totality of all, the self.

Reflect for a moment on what Ehrenreich's argument fails to account for. She cannot explain opposition to her radicalism on the part of the very groups in whose "behalf" her dream is presumably dreamed. She cannot account for disaffection from the welfare state as anything other than meanspiritedness or racism. I have tried to understand this disaffection from liberalism and its radical alternative (of Ehrenreich's sort) and have argued that the animating ethos of women's familial and communal identities may serve as the nucleus of an alternative to atomistic and technocratic politics.

More important, "Feminism, Family, and Community" was an act of *hommage* to a remarkable

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woman, my grandmother, while she is still among the living—caring, chastising, instructing, calling upon us to act from "the better angels of our nature." My grandmother will never read my essay. She had little formal education, for she labored in the sugar-beet fields of Northern Colorado and cleaned other people's houses when she was a little girl and a young woman. She remains most at home in the language of her German Bible and her books of prayer and devotion. But at least I will not, through my silence, have permitted her to pass away as in a dream. Memory, it seems, becomes politically suspect if memories do not confirm a particular view of the past, and the people who gave it texture and meaning, as so much detritus to be swept into the dustbin of history. Ehrenreich is made "queasy" by the image of a woman whose identity is bounded by family and her sense of "peoplehood" (*not* nationalism). She sees in such ties the origins of fascism. But she is wrong. Fascism ran roughshod over family, community, and religious ties in the name of an overarching nationalistic loyalty. The same holds for state-socialist systems and is increasingly true of our liberal-technocratic order, its statism curbed by lingering democratic imperatives and by the "refusals" of people protective of place, committed to community, family, friends, and a future for their children.

Ehrenreich's queasiness is misplaced. She would do better to think about the manipulative implications of social engineering and "rational" planning. The democratic and antihierarchical commitments of such feminists and radicals as Ehrenreich, who remain captive to an abstract vision of a "collective" order of freely choosing adults, are easily swamped, first, by the internal tensions between democratic imperatives and technocratic politics and, second, by the structural constraints and radicalizing force of that productive machine they must keep intact, but gear only to benign ends. By accepting the state and the culture of productivity as givens, by downgrading human ties that do not conform to "sovereign choice," Ehrenreich lends tacit support to a new world that will be very much like the one that preceded it, only more so.

Unlike Ehrenreich, I cannot claim to speak in the name of the future. Instead, I hope to serve certain human values and to keep alive, through political discourse, the texture of lived experience and personal memory. □

• *Another comment on Jean Bethke Elshtain's article, by Marshall Berman, with her reply will appear in our Spring issue.* — Eds. □

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A. J. Liehm

The World of Milan Kundera

THE JOKE, by Milan Kundera. Translated by Michael Henry Heim.
New York: Harper & Row. 267 pp. $14.95.

History has destroyed Central Europe. The great Central European novel has enthroned history. — Milan Kundera

Habent sua fata libelli—"books have their own fates." It will be interesting to know what the fate of Milan Kundera's first novel, *The Joke*, will be in the United States, now that it has at last been published in English in its full, nonmutilated version. When it was issued here many years ago, an American publisher reprinted the abridged and edited British version, which evoked an angry public protest from Kundera. Penguin then published a partly restored version in England. This, however, never reached the United States, where, in the meantime, Kundera has deservedly been recognized as one of the finest writers of our time. All these years, however, an excellent film version of *The Joke* was available, shot in Czechoslovakia during the Czech Spring of 1968. But the existence of that film (released here by Grove Press) remained a secret to the public at large.

Finished 15 years ago, *The Joke*—still considered by many Kundera's masterpiece—is the uncontested forerunner of other great Central European novels—works by the Pole Konwicki, the Hungarian Konrád, the Czechs Hrabal, Škvorecký, Vaculík, and others, whom Americans have since learned to read and admire. For much of this we owe thanks to Philip Roth and the series he edits for Penguin, "Writers of the Other Europe." *The Joke* contains not only all of Kundera's themes and paradoxes; it reveals a wide perspective through which the best of Central European literature has contributed to a new understanding of contemporary history—or, we might say, of history itself.

In his short essay on Hermann Broch and his *Sleepwalkers*, published in the Paris weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur* (April 9, 1982), Kundera—a superb essayist and critic—affirms his indebtedness to a distinct Central European tradition:

> It seems to me [he writes] that four great novels, two of them written in Prague and two in Vienna, have anticipated and determined the orientation of the novel after Proust: Kafka's *The Castle*, Hašek's *The Good Soldier Schweik*, Broch's trilogy *The Sleepwalkers*, and Musil's *Man Without Qualities*. World War I started a process (by no means finished) that was fatal to Europe, to its culture, and its survival. The extremely vulnerable little nations of Central Europe felt it before others. History emerged for them as a monster, inexplicable and without mercy, impervious to human will. The great novelists of Central Europe ask: What are the possibilities of man in a world that has become a trap? Or, as Kafka put it in a more concrete way: What are the possibilities of man in a bureaucratized world, in which private life does no longer exist and the land surveyor is watched even when making love? Or Broch: What are the possibilities of man caught in the course of history, descending inexorably, step by step, on a staircase of decline?

Applying this experience—discoveries made in

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the realm of the novel—to the world of Stalinism and its consequences is in itself not a political act but a literary one. Kundera always protested (and does so again in his foreword to the new American edition of *The Joke*) against simplistic political interpretations of his writings. But here he loses control of his intentions, as do the antiheroes of his novels. The official philosophy of the system that is the playground of Kundera's philosophical-literary game is one of historical optimism in which history has a meaning and man is the conscious creator of his own history (or, at least, has the potential to be that).

Dismantling that optimistic vision and contradicting it through a vibrant poetic demonstration is, in its consequences, inevitably a political act, an act of subversion. However, and this is probably what is really important, Kundera does not subvert the Communist world and its politics. Using the often unique material and experience that communism (specifically in Eastern Europe) contributed to the 20th century, he manages to subvert all sorts of false certainties, philosophical and moral clichés, and self-serving lies that seem to appeal to people all over the world.

MILAN KUNDERA was born 54 years ago in the Moravian capital Brno, the city of Mendel, Musil, and Janáček. His father was one of the leading Czech pianists, famous for his interpretation of Janáček; his older cousin Ludvik, a poet and translator of Brecht, was one of the leading members of the Brno surrealist group.

As a student at the University of Prague, Kundera and his friend Jan Trefulka (another important writer from Brno, today silenced in his homeland), were ardent followers of the socialist dream and members of the Communist party. They inadvertently became the antiheroes of a "joke" that cost them their party membership and suspension from the university. Thus the highly praised, promising young poet learned his lesson early in life. His next volume of poetry was sharply attacked for its "pessimism and existentialism." The dangers of lyrical attitudes and their paradoxes became one of the *leitmotifs* of Kundera's work. He settled accounts with his own "lyrical past" in a rather devastating manner in *Life Is Elsewhere* (Knopf).

Later he taught literature and writing courses at the Czechoslovak Film Academy, then one of the world's best film schools. During this period he produced a pioneering book of literary criticism devoted to the great prewar Czech avant-garde prose stylist Vladislav Vančura. This was followed soon after by Kundera's breakthrough in prose, the short stories *Laughable Loves* (Knopf, Penguin) and, in 1966, *The Joke*, his first novel.

These were good as well as uneasy times. Prague became a hectic center of intellectual activity, resuming the role it had played in the 1930s as a meeting place of art and artists from all over the world. The Czech cultural world became the center of a struggle for a change in the nation's overall way of existence, and Kundera was one of its main spokesmen. At the same time the uneasy regime of Antonin Novotny, haunted by the collapse of the economy and the unexorcised ghosts of Stalinism (and those of its victims), continuously fixed on artists and intellectuals as scapegoats. On a trip to France, in the spring of 1966, I carried the manuscript of Kundera's as-yet-unpublished (and, many thought, unpublishable) novel, *The Joke*. The French poet Aragon took me to the head of one of the biggest publishing houses, Claude Gallimard, who believed what I told him and had the novel translated. Thus, a couple of months after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the book was already in the hands of its French readers and on its way to world fame.

In the meantime, Kundera and I, together with the writers Pavel Kohout, Ivan Klíma, and Ludvík Vaculík, were involved in another, this time less pleasant incident: we all spoke openly at the Congress of Czech Writers in June of 1967; as punishment, we were fired from our jobs and expelled from the party. The journal on which most of us had worked was closed down, and its publishing house was taken away from the Czechoslovak Writers' Union. This was intended to "normalize" intellectual life in Czechoslovakia. A couple of months later the Prague Spring started—postponing this "normalization" by another year or two.

In 1969 Kundera and I met again in Paris, spent long hours together, discussing the future. He was going back to his native Brno, I was staying abroad. We both knew that these were just two wrong answers to an impossible question. For once, however, the skeptical, pessimistic Kundera was more optimistic, more a victim of his own "cheating" than I who was known to my friends for my incurable optimism and faith in the meaning of action. Yet this anomaly was soon put right. Kundera, who had since been awarded the Medici Award for the best foreign book of the year (*Life Is Elsewhere*), came to France with his wife Vera, for a time still believing that he would go back to Czechoslovakia, perhaps in two or three years, while teaching at the University of Rennes. He had brought with him his third novel, entirely written in Czechoslovakia, *The Farewell Party* (Knopf, Pen-

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guin), which was soon to earn him renewed international acclaim.

The "normalized" Czech regime, persecuting every original artist, every nonconformist art, would not publish Kundera's books. It would even attack him occasionally, but it was also eager not to make him a permanent exile. Together with his friend Milos Forman (whose American films are also not shown in Czechoslovakia, although he is a welcome visitor there), Kundera was singled out as an example of the regime's tolerant policies toward famous artists who decided to work and live abroad. Three years ago, after having his archives smuggled out of Czechoslovakia, Kundera published his *Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (Knopf, Penguin) and also an account of the cultural genocide pursued in Czechoslovakia after 1968. Immediately, he was deprived of his Czechoslovak citizenship. A year later the new French president, Mitterrand, made him a citizen of France. The Paris daily *Libération* commented: "Receiving Milan Kundera, France has acquired one of the greatest living writers."

THUS KUNDERA AND HISTORY (or politics, if you wish) are close acquaintances. But for whatever it has done to him, Kundera does not hold history in high regard. In the already mentioned foreword to the new American edition of *The Joke*, he says:

> The plot of *The Joke* is itself a joke. And not only its plot. Its "philosophy" as well: man, caught in the trap of a joke, suffers a personal catastrophe which, seen from without, is ludicrous. His tragedy lies in the fact that the joke has deprived him of the right to tragedy. He is condemned to triviality. The mourning with which the Helena story ends is of a different weave from the mourning that becomes Electra.
>
> But if a character is condemned to triviality in his private life, can he escape to the stage of history? No. I have always been convinced that the paradoxes of history and private life have the same basic properties: Helena ends up in the hoax of the trap Ludvik has set for her; Ludvik and all the others end up in the trap of the joke history has played on them: lured on by the voice of utopia, they have squeezed their way through the gates of paradise only to find, when the doors slam shut behind them, that they are in hell. Those are the times that give me the feeling history enjoys a good laugh.

This is how Kundera, in his seminal novel, sees the story of an important part of his generation, not only in Czechoslovakia but the world over, thus dealing with one of the important paradoxes of our century. (It is no coincidence that his tale of the corruption of a lyrical creature in the Stalinist world of Czechoslovakia borrows its title, *Life Is Elsewhere*, from the graffiti that appeared in Paris in May 1968 on the walls of the Sorbonne. He might have found another appropriate title a couple of months later in Chicago.) Writing philosophically and as a poet about his country's and his generation's experience, Kundera creates one of the century's true philosophical works in prose, recognized as such by readers whose historical experience in this century has been quite different.

A true poet, however, can make these experiences, this strange mixture of history, privacy, and ritual, eventually meet.

This probably accounts for Kundera's high opinion of the novel as a genre, which he has defended for years against all those prophesying its decay. Referring to one of his masters, Hermann Broch, and Broch's concept of an epistemological or "polyhistorical" novel, he fully subscribes to the idea that the novel is above all an act of knowing, as well as the acknowledgment that "man can boast about his reason, his pragmatism, his cynicism, but he is trapped in the mechanism of the irrational. . . ." This is undoubtedly Kundera's credo:

> Broch did not understand polyhistoricism as a directive to embrace the social totality, as did Zola or Balzac. Joyce's undertaking was definitely closer to him: to mobilize in a novel the totality of proceedings and styles. But his wager was still a different one and could probably be expressed as follows: neither poetry, nor philosophy, nor human sciences. The novel is an opportunity for a *supreme intellectual synthesis*. [*Le Nouvel Observateur*, April 9, 1982.]

KUNDERA'S STORIES are tales of paradoxes, sometimes trivial (triviality, even a certain vulgarity, being so often the dimension of paradox in daily life), always unexpected, abruptly revealing not only a hidden truth but also the emptiness of rituals, hiding the void of human or historical manipulation. (Take, for example, in the *Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, Vlado Clementis, on the cold day of the Communist victory, covering with his own hat the head of the Communist leader Klement Gottwald, who would later have him hanged. Clementis disappeared from the pictures in history books, but the hat stayed.)

Kundera's most recent success was his adaptation (he called it variations) of Diderot's *Jacques le Fataliste*, running for a year to critical acclaim and full houses at the Paris Théâtre des Mathurins. In an essay accompanying the adaptation in book form, Kundera explained how—already blacklisted in Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion—

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he was asked to adapt, under an assumed name, Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot*. He failed desperately, feeling almost sick, and had to rush for cure to Diderot, as to a source of healing waters. And indeed, if we look beyond his immediate Central European masters, we can see that Kundera is a true descendant of a literary tradition of *divertissement romanesque*—that of Boccaccio, Rabelais, Cervantes, and others, in which *divertissement* expresses important reflections about human life. There is not one serious sentence in *Jacques le Fataliste*, Kundera observes, but he immediately explains the difference between Diderot's time and ours:

> There are things that never come back. The period of time when gaiety and the comical were just one lasted only a short moment in European history, the moment of Rabelais, now lost forever. Sterne and Diderot turn to Rabelais already with a kind of nostalgia; their gaiety is, so to speak, a reflection of a bygone gaiety. Gogol and Chekhov were great humorists, but how melancholy! And our own century's humor is not even melancholic any more: it touches on despair. Gogol once said, if you look with attention and long enough at a funny story, it will turn sadder and sadder. The West has been staring at the comical for so long that the gay comedy of a Rabelais transformed itself into the comedy of despair of a Ionesco. The European adventure of the comical is nearing its end, like the European adventure itself. And it ends in a final paradox: at the bottom of the comical it has discovered despair. The tragedy of Antigone fills us with feelings of human greatness. The comedy of a Bald Soprano unveils life without any hope and greatness. . . . History was always reserved for drama and tragedy. But in *The Joke* I attempted to ask the following provocative question: And what if history was just a joke in which we have been imprisoned? If its bloody vaudeville was as meaningless as the vaudeville of our private lives? What if man, as small as he is in his private affairs, were no greater while he makes revolutions and wars? Isn't the pretended greatness of history just a mirage? [Libération, Paris, December 6, 1981.]

There is yet another source of Kundera's sad humor, another playground on which he practices his playful games, courageously mixing great poetry with utter triviality. Kundera believes that—as much as history—sexuality used to be no laughing matter, a sphere to which the comical had no access. In the same interview he says:

> Today, in a period of utter permissiveness, erotic literature has become a bore. Lawrence is ridiculous. And I cannot read even Henry Miller any more. In spite of this, I still find the sexual act fantastic and extremely revealing. In my novels love-making is the condensation of all the internal conflicts of a character and his story.

KUNDERA EMERGES TODAY—from his short stories, plays, and four novels—at the peak of his creativity, as the most pertinent ironist of the human fate in the latter part of our century. The filter of East Central European experience provided his irony with an original dimension, which he sometimes describes as the result of the unheard-of condensation of history compressed into the lifetime of one generation in one single place. The kind of man Kundera deals with is no different from those living elsewhere; he has only experienced—like Kundera himself—something that elsewhere was spread over several generations. This concentrated interaction between the private and the historical is, in my view, responsible for the enormous explosive power released by Kundera's merciless paradoxes.

As a philosopher Kundera was never tempted by satire or science fiction. In this respect he is different from Orwell, Zinoviev, and Koestler. The experience, the social climate and model they all refer to is for him mainly a source of poetic imagination. As much as Sartre, but not exactly in the same way, he thinks highly of literature and, as we have seen, of the novel as a most important key to the world. But, unlike Sartre, Kundera's immediate masters, Broch, Hašek, Kafka, and Musil, all were poets. He describes the main characteristics of his aesthetics as follows:

> All that remained unaccomplished in Broch's work made me understand how necessary it is to achieve: (1) a new art of "novelistic counterpoint" (capable of integrating music, philosophy, narrative and dream); (2) a new art of radical austerity (making it possible to embrace the vertiginous complexity of the modern world without the loss of architectural clarity); (3) an art of the specifically novelistic essay (one that does not pretend to deliver an apodictic message, remaining hypothetical, playful, or ironic).

AN EMIGRÉ WRITER is not an anomaly in our century (and since Ovid and Dante he probably never was). Yet only those survive emigration who left with baggage that is large enough to accommodate the whole world, and who do not attempt to throw everything away (including childhood and style) in the vain hope that they will be able to grasp the world anew. Kundera, like Thomas Mann, seems to be one of these. He will probably never return to his own country to live; he will continue to write in Czech, "for the translators." But whatever he

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brought from there—experience, poetic vision, style, philosophical perspective, ironic tradition, and all his innumerable stories—is large enough to allow the whole world into it. Add the talent, the genius if you wish—and you are probably close to an understanding of one of the most fascinating and most paradoxical phenomena of contemporary literature. You will read *The Joke*, across all the semantic barriers, as a novel of your own fate, and look with impatience and curiosity toward the new book, to be published in Paris next year. □

Mark J. Osiel

Church Politics in Latin America

THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN CHILE: CHALLENGES TO MODERN CATHOLICISM, by Brian Smith. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 393 pp. Cloth, $30. Paper, $9.95.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA, by Daniel Levine. Princeton University Press. 342 pp. Cloth, $27.50. Paper, $8.95.

That the Catholic Church in Latin America has undergone a political reorientation in recent years is widely known. But until now there have been almost no detailed studies of how and why this happened. The first conclusion that emerges from these two works is the inaccuracy of the impression, often conveyed by the popular press, that there has been a sudden and thoroughgoing reversal in the political perspective of the Church. This picture of the Church—until recently allied with the oligarchy against the poor, now converted to violent revolution—could scarcely be further from the truth. What change there has been, appreciable by all accounts, has not occurred overnight. This is especially apparent if we consider the differing reactions of bishops in various national churches to the challenge from the left.

The success with which the Church in different countries dealt with liberalism in the 19th century teaches us a great deal about its effort to come to terms with socialism in the 20th. The separation of Church from state was achieved earlier and with much less acrimony in Chile than in Venezuela or, particularly, in Colombia. The Chilean Church thus extricated itself from alliances with antiliberal landowners, enabling it to sponsor serious efforts at socioeconomic reform through its influence on the Christian Democratic party. This liberalization of the Church made it much more likely, in turn, for the Chilean left to avoid the virulent anticlericalism that plagued the histories of Colombia and Mexico. But if the Chilean Church most easily handled the encounter with liberalism, the Chileans also have faced the most painful experience with socialism.

The Chilean bishops, fearful of Marxism, had no desire to see Salvador Allende come to power. But when faced with this *fait accompli*, they adjusted with surprising and admirable ease. They successfully avoided confrontation with the regime until the last few months, when Allende briefly proposed an increase in state control over the educational system. As the process of polarization in Chile began, the bishops consistently acted as a force for moderation and restraint. They criticized in equal measure the violence of the extreme right and the unauthorized factory seizures of the far left. When the coup occurred, the episcopate offered neither support nor condemnation. Perhaps naively, they believed—with many others—that military intervention, presumably of short duration, would be the only way to restore order and prevent civil war on a Spanish scale.

But rather than preventing such a conflagration, the junta proceeded to initiate one. For almost two years of military rule, the bishops did not recognize that the violation of civil rights had become an integral feature of the new political order. They continued to praise the junta for its professed commitment to Christian values. Preferring to intercede on behalf of particular individuals, they used their close relations with government officials to benefit their immediate constituents as best they could. Only when the leadership of the Christian Democratic party and, finally, the bishops themselves became subject to attack by the regime did they begin to speak out publicly against the flagrant injustices and to assume a "prophetic" stance of open opposition. Even so, it was not until three and a half years after the coup that the bishops first publicly suggested that the junta was not the legitimate representative of the people.

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The experience of the Colombian Church was quite different. The bishops did not so agreeably resign themselves to the modern world; they had to be dragged into it kicking and screaming. They sided with the conservative oligarchy that emerged victorious from the civil wars of the 19th century and continued to profit from their close ties to this unified social elite. Colombia remained more rural and agricultural than Chile or Venezuela. The intimate and insidious bond between the local priest and the seigneurial patron was not disrupted by the growth of any substantial urban economy. The Church consequently retained a degree of hegemony over cultural life, which to this day is nearly without peer in Latin America. The Church encountered little organized pressure to compromise with the forces of liberalism, to say nothing of socialism. Secure in its power, the episcopate has remained very reluctant to consider any form of cooperation with Marxists, according to Daniel Levine's interviews.

Yet the Colombian bishops, because of their material success, have attained higher levels of education than their Venezuelan counterparts. This education has exposed them to a wider range of intellectual currents, including those of "liberation theology." They consequently display some intellectual affinity with the left, at least in the categories with which they discuss their nation's problems. They oversee an organization that has grown very large and highly bureaucratic, again because of its successful alliances with conservative elites. This rather petrified administrative apparatus has proved unresponsive to efforts at creating new grass-roots programs of collective self-help among the poor, although for decades such programs elsewhere have become the most promising development in Latin American society, in the judgment of some observers.

The Venezuelan Church presents yet another pattern, distinct from the preceding two. Here the civil wars of the 19th century were won by the liberals, who stripped the Church of the privileges it retained in Colombia. The oil boom induced an economic expansion that spawned a large urban working class, which became the basis of support for mass political parties. These developments made for a more secular society in which the Church retreated to a less significant role than it occupied in either Chile or Colombia. Its institutional frailty made it less inclined to set foot on any new theological limbs, and its lesser educated bishops have been more conventional on questions of economic inequality. But because the Church in Venezuela has not been successful in building a solid organization in the local parishes, it has been compelled to be more flexible in responding to its poorer constituents. It has engaged in a wider range of local programs than the Colombians, despite its scarcer resources and intellectual lethargy. The Venezuelan Church has also shown greater willingness to consider cooperation with Marxists, if only because of its greater need for allies in a society whose secular leaders abandoned it long ago. These innovative inclinations in parish practice find no stimulus in theory, for the bishops are less informed about or sympathetic to liberation theology than their Colombian neighbors.

THE MOST INTRIGUING and difficult questions arise when we begin to ask of each historical account, Why did it happen? Why did the Latin American Church, as a whole, undergo such a profound and perplexing transformation in its conception of its mission in the world? How are we to account in general terms for the differing degrees of radicalization that the various national Churches have experienced? Two sorts of explanation are being proposed in these studies. One stresses the independent power of new ideas. The other focuses on the Church's need to defend its interests against governmental encroachment or eroding public support.

Donald Levine's useful account of the Venezuelan and Colombian stories, summarized above, indicates that the tendency of bishops to assist their benighted flock does not spring in any obvious way from a taste for radical theology. It is precisely those bishops farthest from the intellectual centers, occupying dioceses in the most isolated and economically marginal areas, who have felt impelled by the force of circumstances to experiment with new forms of helping the poor. This finding, however, does not sit very easily with Levine's own preferred explanation. He wants to show the centrality of new interpretations of Christian faith—interpretations that deny the distinction between sacred and profane—as the true source of the Church's recent political engagement with the world.

Let us try a second account. It would seem plausible, at first glance, to expect that those Churches which have been subjected to growing repression would tend, increasingly, to speak out against the injustices done to them and to others. The Church, after all, will rise to the defense of its interests much like any other large-scale organization.

This is precisely the inference we are encouraged to draw from Brian Smith's helpful history of the

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Chilean Church. But a problem arises as soon as we begin to compare his case with the others. There is no close, positive relation between the degree of repression to which a national Church is subject and its propensity to assume an aggressive stance in fostering sociopolitical change. It should be obvious, at least, that if repression is severe and intense enough, it will intimidate (if not eradicate) even the most aggrieved of clerical critics. Nor is it clear at what point in an increasing tide of government repression the "interests of the Church" begin to be significantly affected. In some countries the bishops have seized the initiative as soon as their priests or nuns have ben arrested. In others they appear to have tolerated numerous deportations of their clergy. In Chile they have chosen to act publicly only when they themselves or their political allies have been attacked. The concept of the Church's interests is therefore a rather vague one and cannot offer much aid in explaining why and when the bishops decide that they have had enough.

One can scarcely resist the irony that it is Brian Smith, the former Jesuit priest, who slights doctrinal innovation in favor of the nuts and bolts of bureaucratic self-interest, while it is Levine, the Jewish social scientist, who revels in the mental universe of the new Catholic theology. The disagreement between these authors is an important one, and not entirely explained by variations in their respective national cases. Yet it is probably mistaken to imagine a stark conflict between ideas and interests. It is clearly some *idea* of what the Chuch is, and of what its worldly objectives should be, that informs the bishops' notions of what its earthly interests are. And only the most gnostic or mystical conception of humanity's relation to God is prepared to ignore the common interests of the faithful as an organized community. So the dichotomy is a false one.

PERHAPS THE MOST ominous problem, to which both authors point with trepidation, is the possible tension between the Church's effort to democratize itself and its desire to democratize society. Up to a point, the two projects run naturally together. The newly democratized Church, encouraging participation at the base and collegiality among the ranks, presents to the citizens of a repressive society the compelling image of their prospective future. But this laudable concern with ecclesiastical decentralization is full of unresolved ambiguities. The peril is that in its attempt to transform itself, the Church will simultaneously invite its own balkanization into an array of divergent factions, all the more easily conquered by an authoritarian state.

In fact, the contours of political reorientation within the Latin American Church are by no means uniformly toward the left. The bishops' commitment to decentralization has inadvertently set off several groups on the ultra right as well, such as the notorious Tradition, Family, and Property associations now common in several countries. These new groups, no less than those of the Catholic left, have arrogated to themselves the right to speak in the name of the Church. The risks of the Church's radical gambit in Latin America are thus as spectacular as its promise. □

Mitchell Cohen

The Life and Thought of Hannah Arendt

HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD, by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl. New Haven: Yale University Press. 563 pp. $25.

Hannah Arendt was once approached by her student Elisabeth Young-Bruehl with a translation Young-Bruehl had done of a phrase by Aristotle. After due consideration of its Latin and German renderings, Arendt remarked, "Ja, well, my dear, it's not exactly right, but maybe Aristotle would think it more interesting than wrong." In many ways, these words capture Arendt herself. She was a thinker who translated the German philosophical traditions in which she was tutored—by none less than Heidegger, Husserl, and Jaspers—into a series of political studies and arguments that generate endless controversy. Her work and life, now the subject of a lengthy biographical study by Young-Bruehl, defy easy characterization.

Arendt was aware of this and perhaps even thrived on it. Asked to define herself politically in 1972, she denied the validity of such an attempt and noted, somewhat bemused, that the left thought her to the right, the right thought her to

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the left or some sort of maverick, and that she herself "couldn't care less." More telling, however, was what followed: "So you ask me where I am. I am nowhere. I am really not in the mainstream of present or any other political thought. But not because I want to be so original—it so happens that I somehow don't fit."

Not fitting, in fact, fitted her. She was a Jewish woman who was compelled to flee her native Germany and then France, a temporary haven, for the United States. Having escaped the Nazi sweep, she fell in love with the foundations of the American Republic, all the while (as Young-Bruehl notes) retaining the German language as her homeland. Perhaps as an outgrowth of all this, tensions and contradictions abound in her mature political writings; she combined a radical democrat's belief in spontaneity and political participation (particularly as embodied in the post-World War I Workers' Councils) with a conservative's insistence that the political realm was—or at least ought to be—something separate from the social. She argued in *On Revolution* that the American Revolution succeeded, while the Russian and French failed, because only the Founding Fathers of the United States made sure that the political realm retained its autonomy.

Arendt believed her own thought to be a thinking against the entire tradition of Western political philosophy, a tradition that, in her view, ended with Karl Marx. The author of *Capital* committed the ultimate sin of placing the social question (that is, class) at center stage. For Arendt, on the contrary, freedom had a strictly political connotation; it was not a question of freedom from want but freedom to enter the public realm, to engage in great deeds, and to speak great words among one's peers. She was at home with Pericles' Funeral Oration: "[T]his is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business at all."

Thucydides' Pericles also asserted that future ages would wonder at his Athens, and Hannah Arendt never stopped doing so. In the pre-Socratic world of the polis she found the embodiment of the public realm. Her obsession with antiquity betrayed the influence of German romanticism and of Heidegger who, we learn from Young-Bruehl, was briefly Arendt's lover and for whom she was inspiration while he was writing *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger's impact on Arendt's mode of thinking is also evident in her Aristotelian construction and differentiation of meanings in *The Human Condition*, a book that avowed to "think what we are doing." Her style of thought has occasionally been characterized as "poetic" and this too bears the mark of Heidegger who, in "The Thinker as Poet," tells us in verse that "Singing and thinking are the stems/ neighbor to poetry."

Linking thinking and poetry has, of course, its own problems. Arendt embraced a "passionate thinking" and was strongly biased against exaggerated claims on behalf of a "science" of politics. In a 1953 *Partisan Review* article on "Understanding and Politics," she referred to the Biblical story of King Solomon's prayer for an "understanding heart"—something she, in turn, defined as imagination, quoting Wordsworth to the effect that it is "but another name for . . . clearest insight, amplitude of mind,/ And Reason in her most exalted mood." Imagination lets us "see" things in perspective, although, as she insisted elsewhere, this was not to be equated with "fictional ability."

THERE IS NOT ALWAYS a clear line between recognizing that factors are only comprehended within theoretical frameworks, and becoming lost in imagination when attempting to grasp realities. In a meditation on Hölderlin's line that "poetically man dwells . . ." Heidegger ruefully remarks that "Our dwelling is harassed by the housing shortage." In reading Arendt, we frequently find ourselves hovering between brilliant flashes and lyrical but unsatisfactory uses of history, particularly ancient history. (After all, the great political freedom Arendt found in the polis was predicated on slavery.) Of course, other theorists have employed history in questionable ways even while making lasting contributions; Machiavelli's uncritical use of Livy in *The Discourses* comes to mind and is, perhaps, a particularly appropriate parallel given Arendt's republicanism.

The relations between imagination, history, and political analysis, between understanding and explanation, can hardly be pursued within the context of this review, but we ought to recall that poetry

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lends itself easily to mythology. Still, to the extent that we are challenged and angered in reading Arendt's work, we are forced to reconsider and reassert the centrality of qualitative questions in all political research.

Young-Bruehl tells us that Arendt came to call her own method *Perlenfischerei* (pearl fishing), a characterization that must be judged only partly accurate and highly problematic. Fishing is a hit-and-miss endeavor; to the extent that Arendt's pen yielded flashes of insights, pearls were indeed harvested. However, her misses were great as well. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism* she virtually ignored Russian development from czarism through Leninism and argued that among the causes of the emergence of totalitarianism was the *breakdown* of the nation-state in the late 19th century, a thesis hardly sustainable, and least of all as regards Germany.

Furthermore, if we are to take the German philosophical influences on her seriously—and we must—then it is necessary to conclude that she was doing more than casting a line into the turbulent waters of her times. The ultimate framework of her thought remained the crises of German thought in the half-century before the rise of the Third Reich. In her sense of the homelessness and atomization of modern men and women, we can hear not only the reverberations of the Nazi triumph, but also the echoes of those German intellectuals, especially in academe, who saw their world undermined by advancing capitalist civilization and hence counterposed qualitative *Gemeinschaft* with its *Kultur* to *Gesellschaft*, with its quantification and fragmentation of life. Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher (her second husband and intellectual comrade) saw *The Origins of Totalitarianism* as what Young-Bruehl calls a "frontal assault" on Europe's 19th century (its "bourgeois" century), which spawned what was later crystallized into German totalitarianism.

ARENDT'S ANTIPATHY to bourgeois mores also informed her view of the United States. "The fundamental contradiction of the country," she wrote not long after her arrival, "is political freedom coupled with social slavery." In this striking statement we find what is central to and most troublesome about her thinking, specifically her vision of the political realm as a *Ding an sich* counterposed to the realities of "society" and hence class. She seems to have been almost constitutionally incapable of seeing the necessary interweaving of the social and the political. The logic in Anatole France's (somewhat belabored) quip that in (capitalist) democracy a millionaire and a beggar have equal rights to sleep under bridges appears to have held little force for her.

Arendt's 1959 "Reflections on Little Rock" exemplifies the critical flaw in her thinking and also shows what she had in common with elements of classical liberal thought. Briefly, she argued against the political enforcement of social equality—"... equality not only has its origin in the body politic; its validity is clearly restricted to the political realm. Only there are we all equals"—while simultaneously asserting that government ought to guarantee that segregation was not legally enforced. The fight against antimiscegenation laws, in her view, should have been the locus of the civil rights struggle, not the integration of educational facilities.

In short, equality *before the law* was what, for her, was at stake. The problem with this is evident: racism becomes, for Arendt, a *formal* political question, whereas its reality was conditioned by its interpenetration with the political *and* the social realms, each playing off the other. The abolition of discriminatory laws was, of course, prerequisite to a successful struggle against racism. Legally guaranteed civil rights, however, do not abolish racism. Equality before the law, as essential as it is to democracy, no more eliminates discrimination than it creates equal opportunities for all in a class society.

Arendt was fixated on a mere part of the whole and lost sight of the dependence of that part on the larger historical whole. This nearsightedness manifested itself periodically in her practical political judgments as well as throughout her theoretical

dissent

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writings. For example, she admired Nelson Rockefeller's political program in 1960 because she deemed it "without ideological nonsense such as capitalism versus socialism and vice versa," not recognizing that Rockefeller's program lacked such "nonsense" because it took capitalism for granted.

ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL'S BIOGRAPHY of Hannah Arendt is a valuable and illuminating intellectual and personal portrait. It contains a wealth of information about Arendt, recreates the various milieus of her life, introduces her ideas, and dwells at length on her "tribe" of remarkable friends and acquaintances. The book gives us a particularly vivid picture of the intellectual and emotional engagement between Arendt and Blucher. The book's major flaw, however, lies in its author's apparent inability to establish much critical distance from her subject; it is not just a loving biography, it is an adoring one.

In any given dispute involving Arendt, we know in advance what Young-Bruehl's evaluation will be. For instance, referring to the storms provoked by *Eichmann in Jerusalem* and "Reflections on Little Rock," Young-Bruehl states,

> In both cases Arendt sailed upwind of strong currents, deep emotions, and unmastered pasts. She was thought unsympathetic, even callous, in the two works which burst most impatiently out of her personal sympathy for innocent victims caught up in a whirl of events they were powerless to resist.

While some of the attacks on Arendt bordered on the hysterical, particularly in regard to *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Young-Bruehl's generalization is simply outrageous. Are we to assume that Gershom Scholem, perhaps the most important Jewish historian of the century and a severe critic of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, did not "master" his past while Arendt did? It was Scholem who characterized the tone of Arendt's book as "heartless, frequently almost sneering and malicious. . . ."

On the other hand, Arendt was not a "self-hating Jew" or "anti-Israel," as some of her critics will have it. She in fact came to politics (from philosophy) because she was a Jew in Germany, and her *Rahel Varnhagen*, written in the 1930s, contains much self-reckoning. Young-Bruehl firmly demonstrates the depth of Arendt's ongoing commitment to her Jewishness and to Israel, despite her many criticisms of Israeli policy and the Jewish "establishment." But Young-Bruehl is far from home ground when she deals with these questions, especially the Middle East. One can overlook factual errors (such as dating Israel's birth on the 18th rather than on the 14th of May 1948); the bias of other comments cannot be ignored. For instance, she states in passing that in 1952 and 1953 "hundreds of so-called infiltrees, displaced people trying to return to their homeland, had been killed or captured by the Israelis," conveniently ignoring the rising—and mostly civilian—Israeli death toll that was the result of such "infiltrations" (to be exact: 137 casualties in 1951, 142 in 1952, and 180 in 1953).

These drawbacks should not, however, overshadow the value of Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's book. It is indeed an impressive study of a most engaging, if problematic, political mind. □

Zuzana Kováková

An Uncommon Prayer

THE QUESTIONNAIRE, OR PRAYER FOR A TOWN AND A FRIEND, by Jiří Gruša. Translated by Peter Kussi. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 257 pp. $15.95.

Protest against oppressive regimes *can* take a dramatic form: demonstrations, work stoppages, hunger strikes, even self-immolation. But a softly-spoken, "No, I will not," can also constitute an act of dissent. In Jiří Gruša's case, such a refusal provides the foundation for an eloquent and morally profound statement about freedom and political oppression.

The Questionnaire, newly published in English translation, was originally circulated in samizdat manuscript, earning Gruša eight months in prison and subsequent banishment to the West. Publication of the Czech text, by an emigré publishing house in 1978, earned him wide acclaim as a brilliant and serious writer. In 1979, Gruša's novel won the Egon Hostovský prize for the best piece of Czech fiction published abroad.

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The novel is a dream that condenses many themes—the possibility of preserving moral integrity under oppression, the nature of truth and its necessary connection with history, the relationship of man to his God—all these and others are intricately woven together by the dreamwork. Like a dream, this novel is promising, puzzling, seductive and, like a dream, it contains an ineffable component, an aspect that resists all analysis and interpretation, a mood that will haunt the reader and bring him back to the work more than once.

In the novel, Gruša takes an ordinary job application (ordinary, that is, in Soviet-bloc countries) as the impetus for one man's extraordinary journey of self-discovery. The novel itself consists of the protagonist's somewhat idiosyncratic responses to a series of routine questions. The plight of the protagonist, Jan Chrysostom, is not unusual among Czech dissidents—he is unemployable. (Although interrogation and imprisonment have not been abandoned by the regime, in a country where the state is the sole employer it is often more convenient simply to starve the offender into submission.) Jan Chrysostom has applied for a job 15 times. Each time he has been asked to fill out a questionnaire about his class origins, education, political activities, and so on. Each time his application has been rejected without explanation.

Jan's attempt to make sense out of those mysterious rejections is aided by a happy accident. The message, "DO NOT CROSS OUT," has been penciled in on the 16th questionnaire. Jan takes this admonition as both a personal directive and a clue to his past failures; his applications have been rejected because he has taken the liberty of crossing out irrelevant questions. Henceforth, Jan decides, he will cross out nothing, not even those questions that inquire about events of which he could have no personal knowledge. The result is a journey into his own past and the past of his nation, a journey in which we participate via his responses, witty, whimsical and ironic, to questionnaire No. 16. For us, however, the result is also a profound insight into the possibility of preserving moral integrity under oppression.

For the fulcrum on which Gruša's entire endeavor pivots is Jan's initial decision to *cross out nothing*. This bit of stubborn absurdity in dealing with an absurd situation is far more than a literary device to justify the recounting of Jan's personal history. It is fundamentally an act of courage, a profoundly moral act.

In Jan's decision, Gruša offers an answer to a perennial human problem that has haunted Czechs since the battle of the White Mountain: how can an oppressed people preserve moral integrity while still ensuring biological survival? Gruša's solution can be captured, if clumsily, in the notion of "bearing witness." To bear witness is to observe or witness events, but also to speak out and, more, to speak the truth, to recount what one has witnessed. Jan Chrysostom does both. Chrononaut and seer, he is the memory-bearer for whole generations. What they have lived and survived, he sees and remembers. Though they have had to maintain silence in order to preserve their lives, their story is not lost. One day Jan Chrysostom will speak out—he will tell the whole truth.

Though Jan's act is not a dramatic one (he does not shout out a denunciation of the regime), still it is daring. For, in simply telling his story *as it happened*, Jan defies the regime's unspoken demand to render history consistent with present policy. The ability of the client regimes to legitimate their power rests on a convoluted scaffolding of half-truths and historical lacunae; as the signatories of Charta 77 have discovered, the harshest punishments are reserved for those who would disrupt the rickety support. Jan, like the Chartists, confounds the regime's attempt to have it both ways, to rewrite history behind closed doors and then hold up the product in public as the "objective" basis for their power.

IN THIS NOVEL, Gruša establishes himself as an expert intuitive psychologist, gifted in his understanding of both character and dreamwork. Within the larger dream that is the novel itself, dreams, visions, and portents abound. Gruša demonstrates extraordinary skill in articulating the strange and beautiful language of the hidden. It is the hidden, the ineffable, that imparts to this novel its haunting mood; and it is often in the hidden that truth is to be found.

At the very outset of his journey, Jan suspects that his dreams define him more faithfully than his curriculum vitae. Thus, in reviewing past job-hunting efforts, he muses:

> I should have mentioned the dream with the circle, about the way it turns and about the faceless women and the women whose faces are made of layers of pink petals which I keep peeling off to get at the likeness underneath but the layers are without end and the petals circle as they spiral to the ground.

Jan's suspicions are confirmed later when he relates one of his dreams to Olin, his uncle and dream interpreter. The dream is of a corpse, surrounded by mourners who

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> . . . pretend not to notice that in place of a sexual organ a tree is growing out of the deceased, a blooming apple tree full of bees. The dead man is surprised at their blindness and determines to remain dead until they take notice.

Olin sees in this dream Jan's vocation as an artist and the danger that attends it:

> Keep painting my boy. If you ever acted the way you paint, you'd turn into quite a bastard.
> That was what I dreamed?
> Yes.

Olin, as a Czech soldier in the French Foreign Legion in 1939, is warned in a vision of the approaching war and assured of his own survival. He sees a smiling, naked woman walking through a wheat field, her hair ignited by the sun's heat, the stalks around her blazing, about to consume him. But he is delivered from the fire by the cat-woman:

> . . . a snoutful of fangs . . . grasped Olin by the neck, lifting him high in the air and carried him over the burning field. Olin hung on like a kitten in its mother's mouth, those teeth could have killed him but they did not bite, they were safe. Olin shook his legs, one of his boots came loose and fell into the fire. . . . But he was deposited barefoot on a well-scrubbed floor and the sulfurous yellow which had burnt all around him now gleamed from the fur of a rusty-yellow cat.

Jan, too, has the power of vision. At war's end, still a child, he foresees quite clearly the nature of the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia. The fighting is over, his mother has sewn a Czech flag and baked a cherry cake for the first time since the war began. But the day is marred by violence. Collaborators are rounded up by the townsfolk, tortured, hung from the tree of the Republic, doused with gasoline and set alight. A wasp hovers over Jan's cherry cake, but is distracted by the smell of fresh blood dripping from the wire-bound hands of a collaborator:

> The wasp, even though already gorged on our cherry cake, clamped her fuzzy mandibles . . . into the wound, right up to the opening of its mouth and all its hairs and feelers were helping to work the proboscis deeper and deeper. Its hairy legs, too, were braced in flesh. The tiny veins on the folded wings pulsed and throbbed joyously rather than watchfully. The ease with which the juices flowed promised that the hands would continue to be quiet and harmless.

The wasp feeding on the blood of the nation, on the blood spilled by the nation itself, is sensed rather than seen by the young Jan Chrysostom, at home with his cherry cake, out of sight of the violence.

Gruša is no less skillful at drawing character than at articulating dreams. Jan Chrysostom is many things, chrononaut, seer, artist, dissident, but also itchy adolescent engaged in a sleazy double affair with a village girl and her widowed mother. Jan's coming-of-age is documented complete with casual cruelty, irreverent hubris and sweaty armpits. It is to Gruša's credit, however, that his naturalism is never gratuitous. The sexual scenes, too, pull their weight in this novel.

Gruša is not interested in legend-making, but in a larger kind of truth. He too recognizes, like his countryman Škvorecký, that ". . . inside, people are dirty dogs. Everybody. The only difference is some people try to hide it and others don't bother" (*The Cowards*, 1970). The Czechs have not always been equal, in heroism or in seriousness, to the destiny that has been relentlessly thrust upon them (for that matter, who has?) and Gruša acknowledges this. However, he eschews shrill accusations and remonstrances, if not a certain quantum of guilt. Gruša, like Plutarch, understands that to love is to forgive, and to forgive, in any but a trivial sense, is not to blind oneself to the failings of men but to accept them for what they are—ignoble, perhaps, but also a part of our human endowment. So when Jan Chrysostom's father, in the midst of conceiving him, takes the name of the Lord in vain, Gruša has Jan comment: ". . . the Lord probably pardoned him, for after all what was He to do with Edvin, after He had endowed him most generously with the gifts of beauty, tenderness and an appetite for this very thing?"

GRUŠA'S NOVEL is not without problems. The vernacular of the astrologist, ever present, creates metaphors that have been corrupted for the American reader by the recent trendy revival of that art. The device of locating the beginnings of Jan's consciousness in the foetal stage will, no doubt, be familiar to readers of contemporary European literature. But these are small flaws. The reader, in falling victim to Gruša's art, must forgive him anything.

This is at once the most phenomenological and intellectual of novels. Gruša, like Eliot before him, has constructed a rich and tightly woven tapestry of allusions to historical events and documents, to cultural and religious conventions, to myth and even to graffiti. (The rhomboid symbol for female genitals is as immediately recognizable and meaningful to Czechs as Killroy to a generation of Americans.) This means extra work and some puzzles for the American reader. For example, "Ma Fille," the name of the cat that delivers Olin

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from the burning field, is a play on the Czech word "Mafie," the designation given to the resistance movement in World War I. ("Mafia," not in the sense of a covert criminal organization, but of a self-help or patriotic one.) Allusions as recondite as this, however, are rare. Though the dream landscape may initially look more familiar to a Czech reader, the novel is certainly accessible to Americans who have a basic knowledge of European history and culture.

Gruša closes his tale by quoting St. Augustine's pledge to speak, not in sophisticated confabulations but simply, in accordance with God's Law. Let us hope that Gruša's prayer for his country and for the nations will be answered. □

Mark Levinson

Paths for the Democrats

THE ONCE AND FUTURE DEMOCRATS, by Paul Simon. New York: Continuum. 182 pp. $12.95.

THE ROAD FROM HERE, by Paul Tsongas. New York: Vintage Books. 280 pp. $5.95.

WINNING BACK AMERICA, by Mark Green. New York: Bantam Books. 354 pp. $3.95.

Stung by its defeat in 1980, disgraced by its attempt to out-budget-cut the Republicans in 1981, the Democratic party is united in 1982 mainly in its opposition to Reagan. But beneath this tenuous unity there is ideological unease and organizational disarray. The debate (or lack of it) in the Democratic party is interesting for many reasons, not least for the light it throws on the need for a long overdue discussion on the nature of liberalism.

The principles of liberalism after World War II were those of the New Deal. Government would play an increasingly important role in the economy; the business cycle, if not abolished, would be tamed, and the new economics would provide for growth and prosperity. The structure of the economy was to be left intact, but it would be fine-tuned by Keynesian demand management. In one sense, this worked. For roughly 25 years after World War II the U.S. economy was characterized by high rates of growth with relatively (by today's standards) low unemployment.

Yet even then, liberalism was only partly successful. While the achievements of the welfare state did ease the lives of millions, poverty was still widespread. Compared to most industrial economies, the U.S. welfare state was one of the stingiest in the world (even before Reagan). By the late 1960s, traditional liberalism, the political force behind the welfare state, had lost its cohesion. The liberal-labor coalition was splitting over the war in Vietnam at the same time that Richard Nixon, acting according to liberal economic theory, was fighting the war-induced inflation by provoking a recession. As planned, unemployment increased, but prices did not come down. This was the first encounter with the dominant fact of economic life in the 1970s and '80s: stagflation—simultaneous high rates of unemployment and high prices, violating the liberal theory of fine tuning.

The current malaise of the Democratic party can be traced back to that period, over 10 years ago. The 1970s witnessed a reaction against the welfare state. Liberalism was put on the defensive—incapable of controlling the economy and unable to respond effectively to charges of inefficient government bureaucracy.

The inevitable reevaluation is now under way in the Democratic party, and these books are part of that discussion. They represent the range of opinion in the party—Simon the traditional liberal, Tsongas the neoliberal, and Green the left. Each book covers a wide range of issues, and all three agree on one point: a Democratic party resurgence will require a program that can result in renewed growth and productivity in the economy. But the crucial question—and this is where differences arise—is, how?

PAUL SIMON'S *The Once and Future Democrats* is the least helpful. It reads as if it were put together in a hurry—resembling an anthology of positions rather than an analysis of issues—but this is perhaps inevitable when a politician (Simon is a congressman from Illinois) writes a book. In 16 chapters Simon states his views on such issues as health, education, jobs, agriculture, cities, presidential selection. In almost every case he supports positions far superior to those of Ronald Reagan or even the center of the Democratic party. He proposes, for instance, a national public jobs program for those

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who cannot find work in the private sector, and he is an articulate critic of the Pentagon, arguing that increased military spending does not necessarily make the U.S. more secure.

Simon's economic program includes the creation of an agency similar to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which, through its loan-making powers,

> could help to make decisions on which industries need special encouragement and could help plan for a transition for industries that will be eliminated by some new domestic or foreign development. . . . The agency and its chief executive office should be so constructed as to minimize political pressure. . . . such a board should be probing where the U.S. ought to be 20 years from now. . . . This ought to be a joint business-government agency to attract to its board some of the most incisive minds in both of these fields. We need to plan for success, not simply to rescue semifailures.

Objectionable in all such proposals is their undemocratic nature. A business-government partnership that is not subject to public control ("minimize political pressure") is going to *plan* the long-run direction of the U.S. economy according to a profit calculus. One looks in vain for any acknowledgment that satisfying social needs and making money are two distinctly different and often antagonistic things. And what role do the rest of us have? How does labor fit into this scheme? And how do community groups?

PAUL TSONGAS, senator from Massachusetts, delivered the keynote address at the June 1980 ADA convention (included as an appendix in this book). In that speech he tried to define the crisis of liberalism. This book is an extension of that effort, Tsongas's attempt to "put my thesis into a coherent framework."

Tsongas tells us that Pat Moynihan thought his ADA address was the best given to that organization since Moynihan's own in 1967. It is a revealing comparison, because the underlying ideas of the two are very similar. In 1967 Moynihan stated, "We [liberals] have paid too little heed to the limited capacities of government to bring about social change." Tsongas takes this conservative notion and tries to make it the basis of a new liberalism, one relevant to the "realities of the 1980s."

There is very little in this book that is new. Not that it is all bad. Tsongas, while not naive about Soviet power, realizes that the attempt to achieve nuclear superiority is absurd. He argues that we should regard the Soviet Union as a cornered bear, with massive internal problems, that needs to be deterred yet not provoked into an act of military desperation. Tsongas is also aware that buying "more and bigger of the same" weapons may help our defense industries but will not increase our security.

The most readable part of Tsongas's book is the chapter on the Third World, perhaps because the formative experience of his life occurred in an Ethiopian village where he spent two years as a Peace Corps volunteer. Yet, even though Tsongas can write with compassion about the Third World, he still at times lapses into an incredible naiveté:

> Since most Third World nations know how to bargain effectively by now, the era of exploitation that has concerned many observers is pretty much over. In addition, many American corporations are becoming sensitive to the need for their representatives to be skilled in the language and customs of the country in question.

Tsongas is from Lowell, Massachusetts, once the textile capital of the world. That city's cycle of rise and decline has had a major impact on his thinking:

> In the twentieth century the textile companies went south—to be closer to the raw material, cotton, and to take advantage of low wage scales. Mills closed down, people were unemployed, investments in the community ended, and the city settled in for decades of decline. Lowell, along with many other New England cities, was an example of the problems of the free enterprise system. . . .
>
> The federal funds arrived: Model Cities, aid to education, revenue sharing and so on, and the decline continued. . . . Another reality became apparent. Government money does not by itself create a sustainable dynamic. . . .
>
> The only source of new logs for the fire to achieve this dynamism is the private sector. . . . Government money has but one purpose: to foster an environment that will attract private money, giving disadvantaged sectors of society a chance to reap the reward provided by economic growth. . . . The good old profit motive works as nothing else can or ever will. . . . Liberals intent upon the resurgence of older urban centers will have to lure industries that have left (or are thinking of leaving) for more profitable environs. This "reality" has taken my home city out of its doldrums and has caused me to regard corporate America with a different perspective.

A remarkable statement. We are told that the destruction of Lowell is caused by "the problems of free enterprise," and then that what once destroyed Lowell ("the good old profit motive") will now save it.

It is impossible to say how much of Lowell's

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economic revitalization (based on high-technology firms setting up operations there) is the result of Tsongas's program. I suspect that Lowell's proximity to centers of research such as Harvard and MIT has a lot to do with it. But even if Tsongas's program (a variant of the much talked-about "enterprise zones") was successful in Lowell it is surely no solution to the national urban crisis. His approach can only lead to an economic war between the states in which urban centers bid for industries and jobs by offering business subsidies, a union-free environment, lower wages, a docile labor force, and fewer regulations. Not only does this approach imply a blatant attack on organized labor, but by diminishing the public sector it also promises further to impair the already deteriorating condition of our nation's cities.

Following this step, Tsongas's further economic program is no surprise:

> The solution is to increase the financial attractiveness of investment. For Democrats, this can be hard to accept since we have traditionally viewed investing as a rich man's endeavor; and we have always been hard pressed to sympathize with the need to provide business with greater advantages. Yet that is what must happen.

At the core of Tsongas's new liberalism is another version of trickle-down economics. Both Tsongas and Simon accept the belief that there is an inevitable trade-off between economic growth and equality. The argument is familiar and gets to the heart of the liberal dilemma. Put briefly: America's economy is deteriorating because of declining productivity; productivity is declining because we save and invest too little; saving and investment have declined because inflation and taxes have reduced the incentive to invest; furthermore, public-sector deficits soak up private-sector investment capital that could otherwise be used productively.

If we accept this analysis, the solution seems obvious—lower corporate taxes, cut capital gains taxes, liberalize depreciation—anything that, in Tsongas's words, "increases the financial attractiveness of investment." All these proposals would have the effect of redistributing wealth upward; but remember, it is the wealthy who have the means to save and invest. And in this way, even though liberalism is the mass movement of humanitarian reform, it is continually frustrated by its reliance on private control over the investment process.

If we grant a crucial premise (and most liberals do), then Tsongas's argument seems reasonable. If we accept private control of the investment process and assume that only private wealth is productive, then the argument is sound. But comparison with other industrialized countries indicates that we don't have to accept the argument. Since World War II the U.S. has had one of the smallest public sectors, one of the most inequitable income distributions, the least planning, and recently one of the worst economic performances.

We learn more about American politics by noting the attention Tsongas's book has received than from reading the book itself. It is surely because of the present flatness of the American political terrain that we notice this book at all.

MARK GREEN'S *Winning Back America* is an attempt to offer a program for an "electable liberalism for the next generation." Green's book is wide-ranging and intelligent. He maps out a program consisting of 27 sections, each addressing a different issue. Each section is followed by a relevant list of organizations, newsletters, books, and articles. The resource guide alone makes the book valuable. Throughout, Green marshals statistics and argu-

Would Democracy Help, Maybe?

A serious crisis is preoccupying Cubans and attracting widespread attention in the Cuban press. All over the country, people are wondering how the Cuban baseball team failed to win the Gold Medal at the recent Central American/Caribbean Games in Havana.

Cuba is the world's reigning amateur baseball champion, and fans have become accustomed to victory every time there is an international tournament. But after the Cuban team was beaten by the Dominican Republic last week, newspapers demand "urgent analysis" of the national baseball program and called the defeat a "national catastrophe." According to the daily *Trabajdores*, "The team has decayed, lacks inspiration, and suffers from uncertain leadership."

President Fidel Castro, who attended all the baseball games in which the Cuban team participated, was said to have taken a personal interest in the matter.

— *Boston Globe*, August 26, 1982

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ments. Agree or not, one can't help but learn something from this book.

"The issue of the 1980s," Green states, "is economics." Green, for many years an associate of Ralph Nader, is an economic democrat; unlike Simon and Tsongas he rejects the assumption that there is a trade-off between economic growth and equality. He regards Keynesian demand management and supply-side economics as inadequate for the 1980s. "There is a third approach that focuses not on the macroeconomics of the national economy but on the microeconomics of companies, markets, and workers. . . . "

Green advocates economic democracy in the workplace, citing studies showing that when workers feel they are working for themselves, absenteeism declines, productivity improves, and fewer days are lost to strikes. The complement of democracy in the workplace, Green argues, is democracy in the boardroom. This reform of the internal governance structure of corporations would put the constituencies of the corporation—stockholders, workers, consumers—on the board of directors, and so companies would exercise their power in more democratic ways.

Economic democracy, Green further suggests, also includes democratic control of the investment process. Green's program includes increased worker ownership, the strengthening of the National Consumer Cooperative Bank that offers credit to consumer cooperatives, and bringing union pension funds under the control of their beneficiaries.

Green's enthusiasm for his program, however, at times limits the insights he gives us into the issues he discusses. And so, for instance, the book lacks a discussion of planning. But surely if economic democracy were to work, it would require some sort of democratic national planning. That there would be tension between democratic decision-making at the local level and the requirements of the national economy is undeniable. Yet this does not make planning impossible or undesirable. It is indeed an important issue, and its implications need to be understood if one is to take economic democracy seriously. But this kind of discussion is not to be found in this book. Yet Green is an articulate critic of both Reaganomics and the conservative drift in liberalism. In the struggles ahead he will be a valuable ally. □

PANTHEON PAPERBACK

"A persuasive argument that Reaganomics won't work



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LETTERS

A Good Word

Editors:

I have subscribed to *Dissent* for many years—since 1960, I believe—and know I have helped the magazine gain a wider exposure. I convinced a librarian at the University of Western Ontario to establish a subscription, and to order all available back issues; I contributed my own copies to fill the gap between reprints and copies then available so that library would have a complete run. I had the library at King's College, an affiliate of UWO, subscribe, while I was teaching there part-time.

Let me urge you to publish *regularly* articles on nuclear disarmament of the quality of those written by H. A. Feiveson and Bogdan Denitch in your spring and summer 1982 issues. Please carry one such article in each issue. I am currently chairperson of the Cincinnati-area Common Cause, and CC, as you know, is launching a nationwide campaign for nuclear disarmament. These articles so impressed an older MD that he subscribed, at my urging. I will continue to tout *Dissent* at our monthly meetings, and am now attempting to find someone to give a subscription to the Cincinnati Coalition for Peace, a local library/resource center. If I had a job I'd give it myself.

I believe that Common Cause's current effort to educate people and to lobby against our wasteful and dangerous military policies will attract many members. I wish to present *Dissent* as a good source of articles on this issue. People moved by this threat, the possibility of the extinction of humanity, when exposed to the other democratic socialist issues explored by *Dissent* may find an intellectual home. I did.

FRANK PENDLE
Cincinnati, Ohio □

Re: Letters

- Dissent *welcomes letters, but we must ask that they be kept within bounds, about 225 words. They must be typed, double-spaced, and carry the full address and name of the sender. We reserve the right to edit letters down to fit our space and to choose which shall be printed. Letters will not be returned to senders unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.*
- *Thank you for your kind cooperation.* □

Northern Ireland

Editors:

John Kurt Jacobsen's analysis—"Stalemate in Northern Ireland," *Dissent*, Summer 1982—is superior to that of most American academics and political observers. However, there are some sociohistorical and ideological problems with his analysis.

Political polls in northeast Ireland are as inaccurate as the census data that suggest a 2:1 Protestant numerical majority. Does Professor Jacobsen, or any other political observer, really believe that people are going to identify their true feelings about the British presence in Ireland for a pollster? . . . The survival of the Provisionals since 1970 and the perseverance of the nationalist community in the face of daily harassment, torture, internment, diplock courts, and murder is testimony to their stance on the basic issues.

Jacobsen neglects to mention the election of 1918—the only election ever held on the national issue. In that election, 80 percent of the people of *all* Ireland voted for a united and independent Ireland. A small but influential minority, living mainly in the counties of Antrim and Down, was allowed to dictate a solution for the other 30 counties. Northern Ireland, which consists of six of the nine counties of historic Ulster, was created as a gerrymandered state in order to assure a unionist majority. . . . The British government has allowed the ruling class of that fascist statelet to abuse the rights of the nationalist community for 60 years.

Jacobsen also seems to accept the "bloodbath" myth. No knowledgeable member of either the nationalist or unionist community accepts such a prediction. It is considered a British or middle-class rationale for the continued presence of British troops. Further, until now unionists have only had to speak up and demonstrate for the crown—not die for it. There is no evidence that they would be willing to die for union as nationalists have suffered and died for freedom. . . .

I do not believe that anyone in Ireland today feels that the SDLP represents the nationalist community. The party is in a sorry state of disarray and on the verge of collapse especially in the aftermath of the hunger strike. The Irish Independence and Sinn Fein parties could deal it a death blow through election interference.

In referring to the "collapse" of the hunger strike, Jacobsen has misread the situation entirely. The strike was discontinued by the prisoners not because of lack of public support but because of the extreme pressure exerted on their families by the Catholic Church as well as the promise of concessions by the government.

To Professor Jacobsen's credit, he accurately portrays the plight of the working-class people both north and south of the border, regardless of religious preference. This situation is not the fault of republicanism. It is caused by a number of factors:

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(1) the abortion of the Irish revolution by the partition in 1921;
(2) the loss of a great number of capable leaders in the civil war between republicans and "Free Staters";
(3) the continuance of colonialism in northeast Ireland and the neocolonialist relationship between the "Free State" and Britain;
(4) the continued division of the Protestant and Catholic working-class people by the ruling elites and a few demagogues such as Paisley and the late Bradford.

Today's situation indicates a need for changes north and south of the border. The reunification of Ireland along with the youthful demographic profile of the Irish people could significantly alter the political balance. This is a scenario that must threaten the present generation of political hacks in Dublin. A new 32-county Ireland could, at best, destroy the old parties and create new ones. At least, it could change the political party structure that has dominated a partitioned Ireland. A unified Ireland would be free to combine the industrial base of the northeast with the agricultural resources and growing industry of the south to, hopefully, embark upon a new experiment in social democracy.

SEAMUS METRESS
Toledo, Ohio

JOHN KURT JACOBSEN Replies

No need to quibble over census data, unless Professor Metress suggests that a hitherto concealed Catholic majority exists in the six counties in question. While any war-zone political poll is obviously problematic, the enormous support recorded by the parties (including, most of all, the much maligned SDLP) demanding the departure of British troops indicates that Catholics are not successfully deterred from expressing preferences.

In addition to the 1918 election I neglected to mention—because of space constraints—that there is the formation of the 1912–14 Ulster Volunteer Force to oppose impending Home Rule in Ireland. Here was the spectacle of a Protestant community armed and prepared to kill British soldiers in order to retain the right to fly the Union Jack. A bluff? Prime Minister Asquith chose not to call it. Several years later, thousands of UVF members were slaughtered on the Somme—for the Crown. Their paramilitary descendants (UVF, UDA, Red Hand Commandos, Ulster Freedom Fighters, and so on) engaged in several memorable sectarian murder campaigns during the '70s when British security measures were deemed less than satisfactory. The bloodbath "myth" is not to be dismissed lightly, although I agree that the *possibility* is purposefully exaggerated into a *certainty* by British authorities.

Metress mistakes the intense public sympathy for the suffering of the hunger strikers as an endorsement of the goals—and methods?—of the republican paramilitary organizations. For example, in Southern elections held after the strike ended the overall vote for H-Block candidates plummeted, and both seats won earlier by strikers were lost. As for the representativeness of the SDLP, I'll refer readers to the results of the October 20 Ulster Assembly elections.

Unfortunately, there is no persuasive evidence that young voters are altering the political patterns of their parents, nor does the uniting of a badly deteriorated industrial base in Ulster with the EEC-supported agriculture of the South (also dominated by multinational industries) inspire great hope. Nonetheless, I share Metress's hopes. But the contribution that traditional republican groups can make to a new experiment in social democracy is as much a mystery to most Northern Catholic voters as it is to me. □

A Welcome Decision

Editors:

As Irving Howe pointed out in "This Space Reserved," people do grow tired of being asked for financial assistance. I frequently receive requests from a variety of organizations for financial help and it is often difficult to decide if and how I should contribute.

With your request, I do not find it so difficult to make a decision. *Dissent* provides an intellectual format for many of the ideas that I have come to support and that I think are vital to our future. But, especially in these conservative times, the significance of a publication such as *Dissent* far outweighs my satisfaction from reading it or yours from publishing it.

Good luck on reaching $40,000!

GARY WARDLAW □

• *To all those who wrote letters similar to the one above, sent contributions, and/or made pledges, thank you!*

• *If you haven't yet sent your contribution or made your pledge, there is still time to do so.* — EDS. □

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Jewish Revival

Editors:

"The Jewish Revival," by Bershtel and Graubard (*Dissent*, Summer 1982) is an interesting article whose usefulness is somewhat diminished by the fact that the authors' thesis is entirely wrong.

First, a matter of principle. The crisis of Jewish culture and identity in America is a social crisis manifested in personal ways. Not the other way around. The solutions, if there are solutions, are social and not individual. The agency for change will be a movement —not lone individuals—or it will not be. Whether one imagines a "revolutionary" (that is, Zionist) or "reform" (autonomist) solution to the decline of American Judaism, it cannot be imagined simply as the sum total of individual acts.

Second, the "saving remnant" of American Judaism, the "Jewish revival" the authors are hoping for, will not be found in Greenwich Village and on the Upper West Side. They're looking in the wrong hemisphere. They should be looking at Ein Hashofet, the first of the "American" kibbutzim (its original name was "Kibbutz America"), which just celebrated its 50th anniversary. . . . The Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel (AACI), with over 13,000 members, is in absolute numbers . . . one of the largest activist Zionist organizations in the world. The thriving English language press in Israel, including not only the famous *Jerusalem Post* but a wide range of left publications, headed by *New Outlook*, testifies to the successful transplantation of thousands—estimates run as high as 50,000—of American Jews to Israeli soil. . . .

In looking for signs of a Jewish revival, turn first to the reborn Jewish homeland and the reborn Jewish people—and among them tens of thousands of former Americans for whom unorthodox Shabbat services were never enough.

ERIC LEE
Kibbutz Ein Dor, Israel □

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION (Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685). *1.* Title of Publication: DISSENT *A.* Publication No.: 00123846. *2.* Date of Filing: Sept. 1982. *3.* Frequency of Issue: Quarterly. *A.* No. of Issues Published Annually: Four. *B.* Annual Subscription Price: $14.00. *4.* Complete mailing address: Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas, Inc., 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. *5.* Location of the Headquarters of General Business Offices of the Publishers: 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. *6.* Names and Complete Addresses of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor: Publisher: Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas, Inc., 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editors: Irving Howe, 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Managing Editor: Edith Tarcov, 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. *7.* Owner: Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas, Inc., 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. *8.* Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 percent or more of total amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or other Securities: None. *9.* For Completion by Nonprofit Organizations Authorized to Mail at Special Rates (Section 411.3, DMM). The purpose, function and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months. *10.* Extent and Nature of Circulation: *A.* Total No. Copies Printed (Net Press Run): Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—7,550. Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—7,550. *B.* Paid Circulation. *1.* Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, and Counter Sales: Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—2,275. Actual no. of copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—2,300. *2.* Mail Subscriptions: Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—4,145. Actual no. of copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—4,316. *C.* Total Paid Circulation (Sum of 10B1 and 10B2): Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—6,420. Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—6,616. *D.* Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier, or Other Means; Samples, Complimentary, and Other Free Copies: Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—105. Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—112. *E.* Total Distribution (Sum of C and D): Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—6,525. Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—6,728. *F.* Copies not Distributed. *1.* Office Use, Left Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled After Printing: Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—1,025. Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—822. *2.* Returns from News Agents: Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—None. Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—None. *G.* Total (Sum of E, F 1 and 2—should equal net press run shown in A): Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months—7,550. Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date—7,550. *11.* I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

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


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Dissent Pamphlet 3 is reprinted from the Spring 1981 issue of *Dissent* where it appeared under the title of "Breaking Faith."

2, entitled "The Sunbelt Society," is out of print.



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